Ian D. Scott

The appellant appealed his conviction for criminal harassment.

He argued that evidence of his criminal record should not have been admitted, that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on 'repeatedly communicated' instead of 'engaged in conduct', and that the reasonable doubt instruction was flawed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the criminal record evidence was relevant to the complainant's reasonable fear, that communicating constitutes conduct, and that the jury was properly instructed on reasonable doubt.

The appellant appealed her conviction for attempting to obstruct justice following a guilty plea.

She sought to introduce fresh evidence demonstrating that she honestly believed the information she asked a social worker to provide to the police was true, and that her trial counsel failed to identify and investigate this defence of honest mistake of fact.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding that trial counsel's failure to investigate the defence resulted in an uninformed guilty plea.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge's handling of a difficult situation would have led the jury to conclude his lawyer no longer believed in him.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge handled the situation appropriately with a firm and fair instruction to the jury.

The court rejected the appellant's submission as speculative and contrary to the presumption that jurors follow a trial judge's directions.

Following a successful Crown appeal against directed verdicts of acquittal for first and second-degree murder, the Court of Appeal considered whether to set aside the respondents' convictions for forcible confinement.

Although the respondents had not cross-appealed, the Court invoked s. 686(8) of the Criminal Code to set aside the forcible confinement convictions.

The Court reasoned that the forcible confinement charge was inextricably bound to the first-degree murder charge under s. 231(5)(e), and allowing the convictions to stand would impair the respondents' fair trial rights at the new trial.

The Crown appealed the nine-month sentences imposed on the respondents, who pled guilty to forcible confinement, assault with a weapon, and failing to provide the necessaries of life in relation to their two adopted sons.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in principle by failing to consider the respondents' prolonged breaches of trust as an aggravating factor and that the sentences were demonstrably unfit given the horrific and prolonged cycle of abuse.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentences were increased to five years for the mother and four years for the father.

The Crown appealed directed verdicts of acquittal for first and second-degree murder.

The respondents had been convicted of manslaughter and forcible confinement after participating in the beating and confinement of the victim, who was left bound in a remote cabin and subsequently died.

The trial judge ruled there was no evidence of the requisite intent for murder.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge impermissibly weighed the evidence and usurped the jury's function.

The Court held there was sufficient circumstantial evidence of intent, planning, and deliberation to leave the murder charges to the jury, and ordered a new trial on first-degree murder.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in rejecting his explanation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that there was an ample basis for the trial judge's conclusion that the explanation could not reasonably be true, and that the fresh evidence did not alter this view.

The appellant appealed his convictions for three bank robberies, arguing the trial judge erred in relying on contaminated eyewitness identification evidence and improperly admitting out-of-court statements for the truth of their contents.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the trial judge failed to consider the impact of flawed police photo line-up procedures and improperly accepted a witness's out-of-court statement without applying the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The Court declined to apply the curative proviso, allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial.

The respondent was charged with criminal harassment based on an information that was a nullity, as the alleged offence date predated the enactment of the criminal harassment provisions.

She was released on a recognizance with non-communication conditions, which she subsequently breached, leading to convictions for failing to comply and failing to appear.

A summary conviction appeal judge quashed the convictions, reasoning that the nullity of the underlying information rendered the release order a nullity.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the convictions, holding that the rule of law requires court orders to be obeyed until they are set aside through due process, even if the underlying information is a nullity.