MacPherson

The Crown appealed an acquittal for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in requiring proof that the offence occurred within a specific one-hour window after the accused raised an alibi defence.

The accused cross-appealed his conviction for assault, arguing the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the exact time of the offence was not an essential element and the alibi did not freeze the Crown's case to the time estimated by the complainant in cross-examination.

A conviction for sexual assault was substituted.

The accused's cross-appeal was dismissed, as the trial judge's treatment of the defence evidence was not inconsistent.

The court-appointed receiver brought a motion seeking a declaration that the debtor had no automatic right of appeal from an Approval and Vesting Order under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, and an order denying leave to appeal.

The debtor argued it had an automatic right of appeal under s. 193(a) or (c) of the BIA, or alternatively sought leave under s. 193(e).

The Court of Appeal held that the debtor had no automatic right of appeal, as the order did not affect future rights or result in a direct loss exceeding $10,000.

The Court also denied leave to appeal, finding the proposed appeal lacked merit, did not raise an issue of general importance, and would unduly hinder the insolvency proceedings.

The appellant was convicted of trafficking a person under 18, procuring, advertising sexual services, and publishing child pornography, but acquitted of administering a noxious substance.

She appealed the convictions, arguing the verdicts were inconsistent.

The Crown appealed the conditional sentence of two years less a day, arguing it was demonstrably unfit for sexual offences against a child.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding sufficient evidence supported the verdicts despite the jury rejecting the complainant's drugging allegations.

The Court also dismissed the Crown's sentence appeal, holding that the trial judge properly applied the Friesen framework and that the offender's significant mental disabilities and history of exploitation constituted exceptional circumstances justifying a conditional sentence.

The procuring conviction was stayed on consent under the Kienapple principle.

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder and other offences arising from a bar shooting, as well as his 17-year global sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in relying on recognition evidence and rejecting exculpatory testimony, and failed to give sufficient credit for harsh pre-sentence custody conditions during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the circumstantial identification evidence or his discretionary application of credit for harsh conditions.

The appellant pleaded guilty to sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching involving a young female relative and was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant argued the sentence was excessive and sought a reduction to four to five years.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against the length of the sentence, finding no error in the sentencing judge's balancing of mitigating and aggravating factors.

However, on joint agreement of the parties, the court amended the ancillary prohibition orders under section 161 of the Criminal Code to accurately reflect the trial judge's original order.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred by refusing to grant an adjournment to retain new counsel after he discharged his trial lawyer mid-trial, and that the Crown's cross-examination and closing address rendered the trial unfair.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly exercised her discretion to refuse a lengthy adjournment, as the discharge was an attempt to derail the trial, and the appointment of amicus curiae ensured trial fairness.

The Court also held that while some of the Crown's conduct was improper, the trial judge's corrective instructions neutralized any prejudice.

The applicant sought an extension of time to file a Notice of Appeal from a 2009 finding that he was not criminally responsible (NCR) for assault with a weapon and criminal harassment.

The applicant filed the Notice of Appeal 11.5 years after the NCR finding.

The motions judge applied the test for extending time to appeal, considering the applicant's intention, explanation for delay, and the merits of the proposed appeal.

The court found no bona fide intention to appeal within the appeal period, an inadequate explanation for the 11.5-year delay, and no merit to the proposed appeal.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder following a home invasion and robbery where a co-perpetrator shot and killed the victim.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on post-offence conduct, circumstantial evidence, and by failing to answer a withdrawn jury question regarding the mens rea for murder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the jury instructions and concluding the trial judge appropriately accepted the jury's decision to withdraw their question after they resolved it themselves.

The appellant, a pastor, appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual offences against his 14-year-old step-daughter.

He argued the trial judge placed undue reliance on the complainant's demeanour when assessing credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly analyzed the substance of the evidence and did not overemphasize demeanour.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as no submissions were made and the sentence was fit.