Christopher S. Rudnicki

The appellant, convicted of sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching, sought bail pending appeal.

This was a renewed application after a previous denial.

The Crown conceded the appeal was not frivolous and the appellant was not a flight risk, but opposed bail on public interest grounds, specifically public safety and public confidence in the administration of justice.

The court found that while public safety concerns could be mitigated by strict conditions, the high enforceability interest due to the serious nature of the offences and the appellant's lack of insight into the harm caused by prior breaches outweighed the reviewability interest, which was deemed low despite arguable grounds of appeal.

The motion for bail pending appeal was denied.

The appellant pleaded guilty to sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching involving a young female relative and was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant argued the sentence was excessive and sought a reduction to four to five years.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against the length of the sentence, finding no error in the sentencing judge's balancing of mitigating and aggravating factors.

However, on joint agreement of the parties, the court amended the ancillary prohibition orders under section 161 of the Criminal Code to accurately reflect the trial judge's original order.

The appellant, Andrew Burnett, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder on two grounds: procedural error due to email discussions about jury instructions in his absence (violating s. 650(1) Criminal Code) and a breach of his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel.

The Court of Appeal found that while procedural errors occurred regarding the email discussions, they did not cause prejudice to the appellant.

The court also upheld the trial judge's finding that there was no breach of the implementational component of s. 10(b) Charter right, as the appellant's desire for counsel was ambivalent and he prioritized understanding the case against him.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, JC, appealed his convictions for sexual assault and extortion, which arose from allegations that he threatened to post a sexually explicit video of the complainant (HD) if she did not continue a sexual relationship with him.

JC had been acquitted of initial sexual assault and voyeurism charges related to the video's creation due to reasonable doubt about HD's capacity to consent.

On appeal, JC argued the trial judge erred by relying on stereotypes to reject his testimony about seeking consent and his theory that HD fabricated allegations to protect her relationship.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge committed material errors by using ungrounded common-sense assumptions and stereotypes to discredit JC's evidence on consent, and by mischaracterizing and rejecting JC's motive theory based on stereotypical reasoning and the complainant's willingness to endure trial.

The errors were deemed material and not harmless.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant, Aghayere Justin Omoragbon, sought leave to appeal a global sentence of seven years (net four years after pre-sentence custody credit) for 11 offences, including firearms and drug trafficking.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding no demonstrable unfitness or error in principle in the trial judge's sentencing.

The court upheld the trial judge's diminished weight given to youth as a mitigating factor due to the appellant's lengthy record and escalating seriousness of offences, affirmed the application of the totality principle, and rejected the claim for enhanced credit for lockdown days without evidence of adverse effect.

The appellant appealed his sentence of six years imposed for robbery with a restricted firearm and related offences.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: (1) that the mandatory five-year minimum sentence under s. 344(1)(a)(i) violates s. 12 of the Charter and should be struck down; (2) that the trial judge erred in failing to give enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody given harsh detention conditions; and (3) that the trial judge erred in principle by failing to adequately weigh the appellant's personal circumstances and the restraint principle applicable to young first offenders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the sentence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault against his stepdaughter on the ground that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient for meaningful appellate review.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to adequately explain the rejection of his denials, failed to reconcile inconsistencies in the complainant's and her mother's evidence, and failed to address allegations of fabrication and collusion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons clearly demonstrated his reasoning and that he was alive to the frailties in the evidence.

The trial judge's credibility findings were open to him on the record.

A youth, T.J.T., convicted of second-degree murder, faced a Crown application for an adult sentence under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The court assessed the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness and the sufficiency of a youth sentence for accountability.

Considering T.J.T.'s difficult upbringing, immaturity at the time of the offence, and significant rehabilitative progress in custody, the court found the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness was not rebutted.

Consequently, a youth sentence was imposed, consisting of the maximum four years in custody followed by three years of conditional supervision, with no credit for pre-sentence custody to ensure sufficient accountability and rehabilitation.

The applicant sought to exclude statements made to police, arguing they were involuntary and obtained in breach of Charter rights due to a failure to advise of the right to remain silent and to counsel.

The court found that while the rights were read, the police failed to maintain an adequate contemporaneous record of the accused's utterances regarding the marijuana plants and the offer to show the light switch.

This failure raised a reasonable doubt as to the voluntariness of the statements, leading to their exclusion.

This pre-trial application addressed the admissibility of expert testimony on urban street gangs, evidence of prior violent incidents, and YouTube videos in a murder trial.

The Crown sought to introduce this evidence to establish motive related to inter-gang rivalry.

The court applied the Mohan criteria and a cost/benefit analysis, ruling that expert evidence on general gang phenomena and specific incidents was admissible, but with limitations on ultimate issues and hearsay.

Initially, some videos were admitted, but this ruling was reversed after the accused made admissions regarding gang existence and membership, as the videos' probative value was then outweighed by their prejudice.

A subsequent application by the Crown to re-admit videos during cross-examination of an accused was also refused, upholding the principle against compelling an accused to put character in issue.

The Crown sought to admit expert testimony on urban street gang slang to interpret intercepted communications in a murder trial.

While the defence conceded the general admissibility criteria, the judge raised concerns about the expert opining on the precise meaning of communications, which could trench on the ultimate issue.

Despite conflicting authorities, the judge permitted the expert to interpret the communications directly, as all counsel uniformly preferred this approach over hypotheticals.