Lisa Joyal

An appeal concerning a non-publication order imposed under section 517 of the Criminal Code at a bail hearing.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued reasons for decision regarding the applicability and scope of the publication ban, which restricts the publication, broadcast, or transmission of evidence, information, representations, and reasons given at the bail hearing.

This decision concerns a non-publication order imposed under section 517 of the Criminal Code at a bail hearing.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued reasons addressing the application of the publication ban, which restricts the publication, broadcast, or transmission of evidence, information, representations, and reasons given at the bail hearing.

The decision itself contains information covered by the non-publication order and will only be made available on the Court of Appeal's website once the order ceases to be in effect.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder in the death of his former girlfriend and the 18-year parole ineligibility period imposed at his second trial.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on hearsay regarding statements by the appellant's deceased mother and that the trial judge erred in imposing the 18-year parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds of appeal, finding no reversible error in the jury instructions and determining that the 18-year period was a fit sentence given the horrific nature of the crime, the appellant's high moral culpability, and the absence of remorse.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Denim Henderson’s conviction and sentence appeals arising from the death of nine-month-old Kaleb McKay.

The appeal addressed whether charges for aggravated assault and failing to provide necessaries of life were properly joined with a second degree murder charge, and whether a discreditable conduct instruction was required.

The court held that the indictment was valid under s. 589 of the Criminal Code, as the charges arose from the same transaction.

The court also found no error in the trial judge’s instructions and concluded that the jury’s verdict was not tainted by improper propensity reasoning.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered the appeals of Rushawn Anderson and Nicholas Rhoden from convictions for attempted murder and aggravated assault.

The appellants argued that the trial judge erred in admitting out-of-court statements, in his rulings on Charter violations, in instructing the jury on fabrication, and that the verdicts were unreasonable.

The majority dismissed the appeals, finding the fabrication instruction sufficient and the verdicts reasonable.

In dissent, Gomery J.A. would have allowed the appeals, finding the fabrication instruction flawed and the verdicts unreasonable, and would have substituted acquittals.

The appellants, convicted of murder, appealed on grounds of reasonable apprehension of bias by the trial judge and violation of their right to be present.

The trial judge repeatedly encouraged guilty pleas in chambers and directly to the accused, expressing strong opinions on the evidence and linking rulings to plea outcomes.

The Court of Appeal found that the judge's conduct created a reasonable apprehension of bias and infringed the accused's right to be present under s. 650(1) of the Criminal Code, compromising the fairness and integrity of the trial.

The appeals were allowed, and a new trial was ordered for both appellants.

The appellant, Dalibor Klaric, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's jury instruction regarding sexual assault as an element of constructive first-degree murder under s. 231(5) of the Criminal Code, specifically concerning the absence of consent.

The Court of Appeal found the instruction, though brief, was carefully tailored to the live issue at trial and the positions of the parties, adequately equipping the jury to decide the case.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, A.S., appealed a dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence imposed for multiple sexual and child pornography offences involving her minor children.

The appeal raised two arguments: that the sentencing judge failed to consider the appellant’s future treatability at the designation stage (a "Boutilier error") and erred by not considering a less restrictive sentencing option.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge had properly applied the principles from R. v. Boutilier, deeply engaged with the psychiatric evidence regarding treatability and intractability, and correctly concluded that a lesser sentence would not adequately protect the public given the appellant's lifelong risk and the unlikelihood of rehabilitation within a determinate period.

The appellant, William Savage, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder.

The appeal raised several grounds, including issues with oath-helping evidence, the sufficiency of cautionary instructions regarding a key witness's reliability, the use of ante-mortem statements, instructions on post-offence conduct, alleged misstatements by Crown counsel in closing arguments, the W.(D.) instruction, and the trial judge's decision to instruct the jury on included offences (second-degree murder and manslaughter).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's instructions or the Crown's conduct that would warrant a new trial.

The applicant, S.M.J., sought to reopen his appeal against a 2011 dangerous offender designation, which he had abandoned in 2014.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the application, finding it was not in the interests of justice to reopen the appeal.

The court rejected the applicant's claim that he abandoned the appeal due to duty counsel's advice, finding his abandonment was firm and voluntary.

Furthermore, the court found no merit in the proposed appeal, specifically addressing the applicant's argument that the trial judge erred by failing to consider treatability and intractability (a "Boutilier error") at the designation stage.

The court concluded that the trial judge's analysis, read as a whole, was faithful to the principles of treatability and intractability, and even if there was an error, the curative proviso would apply as the designation was inevitable.

The appellant, H.C., appealed his conviction for manslaughter by criminal negligence.

The conviction stemmed from the accidental shooting death of a friend, K.P., with the appellant's unsecured sawed-off shotgun.

The trial judge found that H.C.'s failure to safely store the weapon and ammunition was a significant contributing cause of K.P.'s death, despite the gun being loaded and fired by an unknown third party while H.C. was not present.

On appeal, H.C. argued that the loading and firing of the gun constituted intervening acts that severed the chain of causation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's application of causation principles from R. v. Maybin, finding that the intervening acts were reasonably foreseeable given the context of intoxication, reckless handling of the gun, and prior accidental discharge, and therefore did not break the chain of causation.

The appellant, Terrence Barrett, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder, arguing three grounds: Crown's closing remarks, trial judge's instruction on prior inconsistent statements and agreed facts, and refusal to instruct the jury on the partial defence of provocation.

The Court of Appeal found no miscarriage of justice regarding the Crown's remarks or the jury instructions on evidence.

However, the court determined that there was an air of reality to the defence of provocation, which the trial judge erred in not putting to the jury.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered on the ground of failure to instruct on provocation.

The appellant, V.N., appealed his conviction for possessing and accessing child pornography, arguing his guilty plea was uninformed due to unawareness of collateral consequences: a lifetime SOIRA order and ineligibility for a criminal record suspension.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that V.N. failed to present credible evidence establishing a reasonable possibility that he would not have pleaded guilty had he been aware of these consequences, as his primary concerns at the time of the plea were addressed.

The appellant was convicted of numerous offences, including carjacking and home invasion.

The defence argued the incidents were staged robberies intended to steal money from a third party, not actual robberies of the alleged victims.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's ruling on reply evidence, the reference to co-accused guilty pleas, and the assessment of evidence inconsistencies.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no miscarriage of justice despite a minor error in considering one co-accused's guilty plea.

The applicant, charged with second-degree murder, sought a review of his detention order under s. 680 of the Criminal Code after being denied bail at first instance.

The majority of the Court of Appeal found that the bail judge's decision to deny bail was "clearly unwarranted" based on the primary and tertiary grounds.

They concluded that the applicant's proposed release plan, especially a new, more robust one presented on appeal, sufficiently addressed concerns about his attendance in court and maintaining confidence in the administration of justice, despite the gravity of the charge and the arguable strength of the Crown's circumstantial case.

The court granted bail.

The dissenting judge argued for deference to the bail judge's factual findings and found the original decision reasonable.

The appellant, JC, appealed his convictions for sexual assault and extortion, which arose from allegations that he threatened to post a sexually explicit video of the complainant (HD) if she did not continue a sexual relationship with him.

JC had been acquitted of initial sexual assault and voyeurism charges related to the video's creation due to reasonable doubt about HD's capacity to consent.

On appeal, JC argued the trial judge erred by relying on stereotypes to reject his testimony about seeking consent and his theory that HD fabricated allegations to protect her relationship.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge committed material errors by using ungrounded common-sense assumptions and stereotypes to discredit JC's evidence on consent, and by mischaracterizing and rejecting JC's motive theory based on stereotypical reasoning and the complainant's willingness to endure trial.

The errors were deemed material and not harmless.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed a Court of Appeal decision that had set aside a jury's convictions of the respondent for indecent assault and gross indecency on the ground that the verdict was unreasonable.

The sole issue was whether inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony — as between his police statement, preliminary inquiry evidence, and trial evidence — were so significant that a conviction based on his evidence was unreasonable as a matter of law.

The majority held that the inconsistencies, while troubling, did not render the jury's verdict unreasonable, as the complainant offered an explanation (that counselling had improved his memory) and the jury was entitled to accept it after thorough cross-examination and a comprehensive, unchallenged jury charge.

The majority further held that the Crown was not required to adduce further evidence or expert evidence regarding the role of counselling in refining memory.

The convictions were restored; Brown and Rowe JJ. dissented, substantially for the reasons of Justice White below.

The applicant sought an order under s. 680 of the Criminal Code directing a panel of the Court of Appeal to review a decision denying him bail pending trial on a charge of second-degree murder.

The bail judge had denied release primarily on the tertiary ground, finding the Crown's case strong based on video and eyewitness evidence.

The motion judge found it arguable that the bail judge committed a material error of law or fact in assessing the strength of the Crown's case without making specific findings of fact or identifying a specific basis for party liability.

The application was granted, and a review by a panel was ordered.

The respondent pleaded guilty to failing to provide the necessaries of life after her nine-year-old daughter, who had cerebral palsy, died from malnutrition and dehydration.

The sentencing judge imposed a sentence of one day in jail and three years of probation, after crediting the respondent with 17 months of pre-disposition custody.

The Crown appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge erred by failing to prioritize denunciation and deterrence as required by section 718.01 of the Criminal Code, improperly considering the failures of the Children's Aid Society as a mitigating factor, and imposing a demonstrably unfit sentence.

The Court substituted a sentence of three years in a penitentiary, but stayed the execution of the remaining 19 months of custody.

The Crown appealed acquittals for making and distributing child pornography and child luring arising from sexualized text messages sent by an adult to a 14‑year‑old boy about the boy's friend.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge committed legal errors in interpreting ss. 163.1 and 172.1 of the Criminal Code.

Private electronic communications can constitute “written material” capable of meeting the statutory definition of child pornography, and the analysis must focus objectively on the content of the communications rather than the accused's claimed joking motive.

The trial judge also erred by importing a requirement that luring be for a sexual purpose and by failing to consider the facilitation element of s. 172.1.

Because the legal errors affected the acquittals, the court set them aside and ordered a new trial on all counts.