Lisa Joyal

This is an appeal from a sexual assault conviction.

The appellant, C.L., argued that the trial judge erred in modifying the standard W.(D.) jury instruction on reasonable doubt and credibility by incorporating a "J.J.R.D. instruction." The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's modification was an error, as the "J.J.R.D." language was intended for sufficiency of reasons in judge-alone trials, not for jury instructions, and could confuse the standard of proof.

The court allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial, while dismissing the unreasonable verdict challenge.

The appellant appealed his first-degree murder conviction, challenging the trial judge's decisions regarding expert evidence on the cause of death.

The primary expert opinion suggested drowning based on diatom analysis, but an alternate theory of starvation was also presented.

The appellant argued that the alternate theory lacked sufficient evidentiary basis and caused confusion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the expert's opinion on an alternate cause was properly admitted given the scientific controversy surrounding diatom analysis and other evidence supporting starvation.

The court affirmed that the jury, as the trier of fact, could consider all evidence and was not bound by expert opinions, especially when alternative explanations had an "air of reality."

Paul Rousselle appealed his conviction for aggravated assault on a four-month-old infant, Baby L., arguing that the trial judge's reasoning was illogical or irrational.

The medical evidence indicated Baby L. suffered injuries consistent with shaking.

Rousselle had initially denied involvement but later confessed to police and his partner that he shook the baby out of frustration when she wouldn't stop crying.

At trial, he recanted, claiming he lied to police to protect his own child from child protective services.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's decision to accept Rousselle's confessions while rejecting his claims of gentle force was logical and rational, supported by the medical evidence and the circumstances of the confession.

The court also upheld the admission of evidence regarding Rousselle's prior angry reaction to a video game interruption, finding it relevant to his state of mind and not unduly prejudicial.

The appellant, convicted of second-degree murder, appealed on the ground that the trial judge erred by allowing expert evidence regarding security video footage to go beyond permissible opinion, thereby usurping the jury's function.

The expert provided narrative testimony interpreting the video, which the appellant argued undermined his claims of self-defence and lack of mens rea.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge properly exercised his gatekeeper function, limiting the expert to his area of expertise, and provided sufficient cautions to the jury, reminding them of their ultimate responsibility to interpret the video evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

Appeal from a conviction for sexual assault.

The complainant, the appellant's former girlfriend, testified that she fell asleep in the appellant's bedroom and awoke to find him having vaginal intercourse with her without consent.

The appellant claimed the complainant had consented, saying she initiated the sexual activity.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's evidence and convicted him.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge reversed the burden of proof, misapprehended evidence, and failed to address the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no reversals of burden, no material misapprehension of evidence, and that the trial judge was not obligated to address the alternative defence given the complete rejection of the appellant's version of events.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession and importation of child pornography under s. 163.1 of the Criminal Code.

The primary issue was whether images of children in diapers met the statutory definition of child pornography, specifically whether the dominant characteristic of the images was the depiction of children's sexual organs or anal regions for a sexual purpose.

The trial judge applied an objective test and found that 23 images constituted child pornography.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in interpretation and improperly relied on police officer opinion evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no error in the trial judge's factual findings or legal analysis.

Crown appeal of a nine-year sentence imposed on an accused who pleaded guilty to eight counts of sexual assault, eight counts of making child pornography, and one count of possession of child pornography.

The accused, employed as an early childhood educator at a daycare centre, touched and photographed the genitals of sleeping toddlers and possessed a massive collection of graphic child pornography.

The trial judge imposed six years for sexual assault, one year consecutive for making child pornography, and two years consecutive for possession of child pornography.

The Crown sought 15 years, arguing the sentence failed to satisfy the totality principle and violated section 718.3(7) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that section 718.3(7) is subject to the totality principle and that the nine-year sentence was fit and consistent with sentencing principles for such offences.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after fatally stabbing his friend during a physical altercation that began as a fist fight and escalated when the deceased produced a knife.

The appellant admitted to causing the death but claimed self-defence.

He was sentenced to life imprisonment with parole ineligibility of 12 years.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the admission of various evidence, the jury charge on self-defence and provocation, and the sentencing decision.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction and sentence, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions, though it identified an error in sentencing that had no impact on the outcome.

A 51-year-old first offender pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography and making child pornography available.

His collection was one of the largest and worst ever encountered by the Ottawa Police Service, containing over 28,000 unique images and 1,144 unique videos, with 95% depicting explicit sexual activity including children as young as one year old.

The trial judge imposed a sentence of two years less one day followed by three years' probation, reasoning that probation would ensure the accused received counselling.

The Crown appealed, arguing the sentence was inadequate.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in principle by giving primary effect to rehabilitation rather than denunciation and general deterrence, which are the paramount sentencing objectives for child pornography offences.

The appellant was convicted of multiple offences including sexual assault and sexual exploitation against his former common law wife and her three daughters.

He appealed on five grounds: refusal to sever the sexual assault charge involving the adult complainant; refusal to allow him to sit at counsel table; improper application of the collateral fact rule; jury instructions on similar fact evidence; and failure to correct alleged impropriety in Crown's closing address.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while some errors occurred, they were not material and did not result in an unfair trial.

The appellant was convicted after a judge-alone trial of nine historical sexual offences against his two biological daughters and his step-daughter, and was acquitted of two charges relating to a third biological daughter.

He received a concurrent sentence of six years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the conviction on three grounds: (1) the trial judge erred in admitting similar fact evidence across counts; (2) the trial judge improperly admitted evidence of uncharged bad conduct; and (3) the trial judge reversed the burden of proof.

The appellant also appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in methodology and relied on uncharged acts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal and allowed the sentence appeal in part, removing an administrative error from the ancillary order.

The appellant, a former RCMP officer, appealed his sentence of 15 years' imprisonment (less 22 months credit for pre-sentence custody) imposed after conviction on multiple counts involving serious abuse of his 11-year-old son, including two counts of aggravated assault, one count of assault with a weapon, one count of sexual assault causing bodily harm, one count of unlawful confinement, one count of failing to provide the necessaries of life, and two counts relating to improper storage of ammunition and a firearm.

The appellant sought a reduction of five to ten years in his term of imprisonment, advancing three grounds of appeal challenging the sentencing range, the weight given to mental health evidence, and the consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the sentence.

Crown appeal from the acquittal of Aasif Patel on charges of first degree murder and second degree murder in connection with the fatal shooting of Lorenzo Martinez.

The Crown argued that the trial judge erred in refusing to instruct the jury on party liability under section 21(2) of the Criminal Code (common unlawful purpose) and in his instructions regarding section 21(1) liability (aiding and abetting).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Crown had materially changed its legal theory between trial and appeal, which would be unfair to the respondent and offend double jeopardy principles.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's instructions on causation or on the relationship between the liability of the principal and the party.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault-related charges involving his daughter and stepdaughter.

He appealed on four grounds: (1) the trial judge's refusal to sever the counts; (2) the admission of the "teaching" comment as similar fact evidence while excluding the underlying acts; (3) alleged errors in the jury charge; and (4) the exclusion of expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's rulings on severance, similar fact evidence, jury instructions, or the exclusion of the psychological report.

The Crown appealed a sentencing judge's decision dismissing its application to designate the respondent as a dangerous offender under section 753(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The sentencing judge instead designated the respondent as a long-term offender and imposed a determinate sentence of two years less one day, followed by a five-year long-term supervision order.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentencing judge's decision, finding that there was sufficient evidence of treatability and a reasonable possibility of eventual control of the respondent's risk in the community through a graduated release plan involving psychiatric treatment and community supervision.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault of his sister-in-law, alleging the conviction was unreasonable.

The complainant alleged approximately 10-50 sexual assaults occurred between 1997 and 1999 when she was 16-17 years old.

The Court of Appeal found that important aspects of the complainant's evidence were demonstrably false, including her claims of being enslaved and controlled.

The trial judge herself had significant misgivings about the complainant's credibility and found that the Crown had not proven most of the alleged assaults beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellate court determined that the risk of wrongful conviction was too high and set aside the conviction, entering an acquittal.

The respondent walked into a police station and confessed to burning down his mother's house, stating he was homeless and wanted to go to jail.

The police officer repeatedly warned him of the consequences and advised him to seek counsel, which he eventually did before giving a full statement.

The trial judge excluded the statement, finding it was involuntary due to the respondent's oppressive personal circumstances and the 'inducement' of jail time, leading to an acquittal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge erred in law by finding oppression and inducement absent any police misconduct, and by conflating the voluntariness analysis with the ultimate reliability of the statement.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of guns and drugs and public mischief, arguing that the trial Crown's conduct deprived him of a fair trial.

The Court of Appeal found that the Crown improperly cross-examined the appellant by demanding his 'theory' of the case, which undermined the presumption of innocence.

Furthermore, the Crown improperly telephoned a potential witness from the courtroom and used the resulting hearsay during the cross-examination of a key defence witness.

The Court concluded that the Crown's conduct was sufficiently prejudicial to deprive the appellant of a fair trial, allowed the appeal, and directed a new trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel.

He alleged that his counsel failed to properly cross-examine the complainant on inconsistencies, failed to comply with the rule in Browne v. Dunn, and improperly asserted alternative defences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that trial counsel's performance was reasonable, the trial judge was aware of the evidentiary frailties, and there was no miscarriage of justice.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on historical sexual offences.

The trial judge had excluded the respondent's inculpatory statement to police, finding breaches of ss. 7 and 10(b) of the Charter, and admitted a pre-sentence report for the truth of its contents regarding the respondent's developmental deficits.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in law by misapplying hearsay exceptions without a reliability analysis, and by failing to apply the proper test from R. v. Singh regarding whether police persuasion deprived the respondent of his right to choose to speak.

A new trial was ordered.