Lisa Joyal

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault against his separated wife, which occurred in the lobby of her brother's apartment building.

He argued the trial judge erred in rejecting his self-defence claim, misapplied the W.(D.) test regarding credibility, provided insufficient reasons under Sheppard, and reached an unreasonable verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly considered and rejected the self-defence claim, appropriately assessed credibility, and provided adequate reasons for the conviction.

The appellant appealed his conviction for uttering a threat to cause death.

The appellant admitted to saying 'kill you' but claimed the full sentence was 'You are acting like I'm trying to kill you.' The trial judge failed to make a finding on the actual words spoken and did not explain why the appellant's innocent explanation was rejected.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial, finding the actus reus of the offence was not made out on the trial judge's reasons.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge's finding that he held a handgun, rather than an imitation, was unreasonable.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court failed to squarely address this issue, but the Court of Appeal held that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude it was a handgun based on the complainant's belief, the description of the object, the appellant's conduct, and his threat to shoot.

The Court also found no error in the admission of bad character evidence as part of the narrative.

The appeal was dismissed.

The police responded to a 911 call regarding a domestic assault.

The complainant fled her home in pyjamas and the police accompanied her back to retrieve her belongings and protect her property.

The respondent blocked the bedroom doorway and refused to move, leading to his arrest for obstructing a peace officer and resisting arrest.

The trial judge and summary conviction appeal judge acquitted the respondent, finding the police lacked authority to remain in the home.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the police entry and subsequent conduct were lawful under their common law and statutory duties to preserve the peace and protect property.

Criminal appeal from convictions arising from an armed robbery, where the principal issues were the admissibility of alleged confessions and the adequacy of the challenge-for-cause process.

The court held that the voir dire was infected by legal error and a failure to scrutinize all circumstances surrounding custodial interrogations, including missing arrest records, lack of audio or video recording, allegations of assault, oppressive conditions, and right-to-counsel concerns.

The Crown failed to meet its burden of proving voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt, and one impugned statement was also inadmissible as bad character evidence.

The challenge-for-cause instructions were additionally found deficient.

Convictions were quashed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his second degree murder conviction on the basis that the trial judge’s pre-Lifchus jury charge failed to properly distinguish proof beyond a reasonable doubt from proof on a balance of probabilities.

Applying the substantial compliance approach from post-Lifchus Supreme Court authorities, the court held that the charge, read as a whole and in the context of the full trial, adequately conveyed the very high criminal standard of proof.

The court found no reasonable likelihood that the jury misapprehended the burden or standard of proof and no serious concern about the validity of the verdict.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed, including the 12-year parole ineligibility period.

The appellant applied for bail pending his appeal of convictions involving the sexual assault of children.

The Crown opposed bail on the public interest ground, noting the appellant's history of failing to appear and breaching previous bail orders, including babysitting children while on release prior to sentencing.

The court denied the application, finding that the appellant's detention was necessary in the public interest, but ordered the appeal to be expedited.

The appellant appealed a finding that he was a dangerous offender and the resulting indeterminate sentence.

He had pleaded guilty to twenty sexual offences against young boys.

Due to a procedural error, two informations covering the same conduct were before the court, and the trial judge mistakenly referred to '39 convictions'.

The Court of Appeal held that this procedural irregularity did not vitiate the process and that the trial judge's reference was an inadvertent error.

The court found that the dangerous offender designation and the indeterminate sentence were reasonably supported by the evidence.

The appeal was allowed only to set aside the convictions on the first information, but the appeal regarding the dangerous offender application was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault, using a firearm, and possession of a prohibited weapon following his fourth trial.

He appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting an overheard utterance to his lawyer ('I had a gun, but I didn't point it') without context, and in instructing the jury that his failure to ask why he was being arrested could be used to assess his guilt.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the utterance's meaning was too speculative and its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.

The court also found the trial judge impermissibly undermined the appellant's right to silence.

Given this would be the appellant's fifth trial, the court entered a stay of proceedings.

Following a successful appeal that quashed his attempted murder conviction, the appellant was sentenced for maiming and use of a firearm.

The offences occurred during a dispute between high school students, resulting in the victim becoming a paraplegic.

The Court of Appeal considered the severe consequences to the victim, the need for denunciation, the appellant's youth and lack of a criminal record, and 20 months of pre-trial custody.

The Court imposed a total sentence of 10 years' imprisonment.

The appellant appealed convictions arising from a shooting during a street confrontation, including attempted murder, maiming, and using a firearm in the commission of an indictable offence.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's jury charge on intent for attempted murder was deficient because it invited an inference of intent from the act of shooting alone without reviewing the surrounding circumstances relevant to intent.

Given the jury's repeated questions and the defence position at trial, the omission constituted non-direction amounting to misdirection on the attempted murder count.

The appeal was allowed in part, the attempted murder conviction was quashed and an acquittal entered on that count, while the other convictions were left undisturbed.

Sentencing submissions were to be filed in writing.

The young person appellant appealed his convictions for robbery, use of a firearm, unlawful confinement, possession of a stolen motor vehicle, and possession of stolen firearms.

He argued the verdicts were unreasonable and that the trial judge erred in dismissing his application for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions for the robbery and firearms offences, finding the circumstantial and direct evidence supported the trial judge's conclusions.

However, the court quashed the conviction for possession of a stolen vehicle, as there was no evidence the appellant had control over the vehicle.

The court also upheld the trial judge's finding that the 22-month delay was not unreasonable given the complexities of the case.

The appellant appealed her conviction on the basis that statements obtained following a breach of her right to counsel should have been excluded.

The court held that the trial judge was entitled to find that the appellant was eager to volunteer information for her own advantage and would have acted the same way even if given the toll-free number.

The court further upheld the finding that the breach was technical rather than serious, with police acting in good faith.

The appeal court concluded that admission of the statements would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute and dismissed the conviction appeal.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed following a guilty plea to aggravated assault arising from a stabbing that caused near-fatal injuries.

The majority held that the trial judge crafted a sentence that appropriately responded to the circumstances, including significant restrictions on liberty over four and a half years, and found no error warranting appellate intervention.

Fresh psychiatric evidence indicating the respondent's mental state was stable and that he presented no risk to the community reinforced that conclusion.

A dissenting judge would have set aside the conditional sentence and imposed a 12-month custodial sentence plus probation.

The appellant appealed a conviction for criminal harassment arising from sexually explicit comments to a 14-year-old complainant, a subsequent sexual telephone call, and several hang-up calls after the complainant told him not to contact her again and called police.

The court applied the five-element framework for criminal harassment under s. 264 and held that the full factual context, not the hang-up calls in isolation, established harassment, knowledge, fear for safety, and the reasonableness of that fear.

The complainant's age, the sexually charged nature of the prior interactions, and the explicit warning to stop contacting her supported the conviction.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed sentence, arguing the sentencing judge placed exaggerated weight on remorse and family history while underemphasizing the seriousness of the offence, the severity of the injuries, the respondent's record, and the need for denunciation and general deterrence.

The majority accepted that the deferential standard applied but held the sentence was demonstrably unfit.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted and the custodial sentence was increased to 18 months less four months' credit, for a net sentence of 14 months, with probation left undisturbed.

A dissenting judge would have dismissed the appeal.

The appellant, a young offender, appealed conviction and sentence, arguing that a videotaped police statement was inadmissible because it was a continuation of earlier inadmissible statements.

The Court of Appeal held that the governing authority did not establish hard and fast rules on admissibility where the statutory criteria had been met, and upheld the trial judge’s findings that the statement was not tainted and that the appellant wanted to acknowledge responsibility.

The court found no error in admitting the videotaped statement.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence of four months open custody and community service was not demonstrably unfit.

The appellant union applied to the Canada Labour Relations Board for certification as the bargaining agent for employees of the St. Regis Band Council.

The Board granted certification, but the Federal Court of Appeal set it aside on the basis that the Band Council lacked corporate status and was therefore not a 'person' or 'employer' under the Canada Labour Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the Band Council, as a statutory creature of the Indian Act with powers to enact by-laws and hire staff, is a designated body of persons that can be considered an employer within the meaning of the Code.