Daniel A. Stein

The accused, a municipal bus driver, was charged with dangerous driving causing death after her bus rammed into a line of stopped cars at full speed, killing one driver.

The Crown relied on Engine Control Module (ECM) data showing the accelerator was fully depressed and brakes were not applied until seconds after impact.

The defence argued the brakes failed and challenged the ECM's reliability, pointing to a botched police inspection and the unexplained destruction of the bus before trial.

The court admitted the accused's spontaneous utterances at the scene that the brakes failed.

Finding that the Crown failed to exclude the reasonable possibility of mechanical failure, the court acquitted the accused.

The appellant appealed his five-year penitentiary sentence for offences including break and enter, criminal harassment, and firearms violations committed against his former spouse.

The trial judge treated the conduct as an escalating pattern of intimate partner violence and prioritized denunciation and deterrence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle, holding that the trial judge properly characterized the offences as intimate partner violence and appropriately weighed the aggravating factors, including the appellant's extensive record of breaching court orders.

The sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

The appellant, A.J.D., appealed his conviction for sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual assault involving a child complainant.

The appeal raised two main issues: whether the trial judge erred in foreclosing re-examination on the appellant's intellectual disability, and whether the trial judge and Crown improperly relied on the complainant's undisclosed diary.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the trial judge did not err in his treatment of re-examination, as the defence was permitted to raise the issue and the judge reasonably exercised discretion in not considering it further due to lack of supporting evidence.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's use of the diary, which was treated as narrative evidence, and concluded that any improper use by the Crown did not affect the trial's outcome or overall fairness.

The appellant, Christopher Smith, appealed his convictions for possessing identity documents, counterfeit marks, and cocaine.

The central issue at trial was possession and knowledge.

On appeal, the court dismissed arguments regarding inadmissible evidence and jury instructions on cross-count and propensity reasoning, finding no reversible error or prejudice.

However, the court found that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that the marks on the identity documents were counterfeit, as there was no evidence of post-issuance alteration.

Consequently, the convictions for possessing counterfeit marks were set aside, and the conditional stay on the identity document convictions was lifted, with the sentence reallocated.

The offender, a medical doctor, was convicted by a jury of trafficking in fentanyl.

He participated in a scheme with a pharmacist and others, prescribing over 4,000 fentanyl patches for financial gain.

The court found his actions constituted a severe breach of trust motivated by greed.

Emphasizing general deterrence and denunciation, the court sentenced the offender to 12 years in prison, along with ancillary orders.

Dr. Otto, charged with fentanyl trafficking, faced a parallel professional discipline investigation by the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (CPSO).

During the CPSO investigation, Dr. Otto provided a statutorily compelled statement and patient files.

The Crown sought a ruling on the voluntariness and admissibility of this compelled statement and the use of the patient files in the criminal trial, arguing for its use for impeachment purposes if Dr. Otto testified.

The defence sought exclusion of the statement for all purposes and challenged the production order used to obtain the CPSO file.

The court found the statement voluntary and not made to a person in authority, but nevertheless excluded it for all purposes under s. 24(1) of the Charter, applying the principles from R. v. White and R. v. Soules.

The court upheld the production order for the CPSO file, finding sufficient grounds even after excising information derived from the compelled statement.

The patient files were deemed admissible as they were created as part of a regulated profession, not compelled by the state in an adversarial context.

The defendant, Dr. George Otto, brought an application under s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude evidence following findings of s. 8 Charter violations related to search warrants and production orders for electronic devices in a fentanyl trafficking case.

The court applied the R. v. Grant framework, balancing the seriousness of the state's conduct, the impact on the accused's Charter interests, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

While acknowledging significant privacy impacts, the court found the police conduct was not deliberate or flagrant, and the evidence was reliable and crucial to the Crown's serious case.

Ultimately, the court determined that admitting the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute, and its exclusion would.

The applicant, a doctor charged with fentanyl trafficking, brought a pre-trial motion under s. 8 of the Charter challenging several search warrants and the manner in which his electronic devices were searched.

The court upheld the initial transmission data warrants and the warrant to search the applicant's home.

However, the court found multiple s. 8 violations regarding the search of the electronic devices, including a lack of specific grounds to search all 15 seized devices, an overly broad authorization to search for photographs, the unauthorized obtaining of a medical software password from a service provider, and the failure to file a Report to Justice.

The application was allowed in accordance with these findings.

Dr. George Otto, charged with fentanyl trafficking, brought a pre-trial motion challenging the constitutionality of Criminal Code provisions (ss. 492.2 and 487.016) authorizing the seizure/production of prospective and historical transmission data.

The core issue was whether the "reasonable suspicion" standard for judicial authorization met the requirements of s. 8 of the Charter.

The court concluded that the "reasonable suspicion" standard was sufficient, finding the data obtained in this case to be minimally intrusive and not revealing core biographical information.

The motion seeking a declaration of unconstitutionality was dismissed.

Three appellants challenged mandatory minimum sentencing provisions for unauthorized production of marijuana under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act as violating s. 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (cruel and unusual punishment).

The Court of Appeal found that certain mandatory minimum provisions were grossly disproportionate when applied to reasonably foreseeable circumstances, including cases involving minimal involvement, mistaken licensees, and situations lacking culpability regarding statutory aggravating factors.

The court struck down provisions imposing two and three-year mandatory minimums for production of more than 500 plants and the statutory aggravating factor provision.

The court reduced one appellant's sentence and dismissed appeals in the other cases.

The appellant was convicted after a judge-alone trial of nine historical sexual offences against his two biological daughters and his step-daughter, and was acquitted of two charges relating to a third biological daughter.

He received a concurrent sentence of six years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the conviction on three grounds: (1) the trial judge erred in admitting similar fact evidence across counts; (2) the trial judge improperly admitted evidence of uncharged bad conduct; and (3) the trial judge reversed the burden of proof.

The appellant also appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in methodology and relied on uncharged acts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal and allowed the sentence appeal in part, removing an administrative error from the ancillary order.

The appellant appealed his conviction for unlawful possession of heroin, cocaine, methamphetamine and ketamine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The appellant argued the verdicts were unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge properly drew inferences of knowledge and control based on the appellant's possession of a key to the locked bedroom where contraband was found, his attempt to enter the bedroom immediately after police entry, and the discovery of his social insurance card in a drawer adjacent to where drugs were found, along with buy money.

The court found this constellation of evidence created a powerful inference of possession beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant appealed her conviction from the Superior Court of Justice, arguing that the trial judge committed a palpable and overriding error by failing to make more detailed inquiries into the appellant's mental status while she was testifying.

The Court of Appeal rejected this submission, finding that the trial judge had made sufficient inquiries, the appellant had confirmed she was able to continue and had no difficulty with her memory, and defence counsel did not pursue the issue at trial.

No fresh evidence was produced to support the appellant's claim that her mental status would have interfered with her ability to testify.

The appellant was convicted of 28 counts of fraud over $5,000 in connection with a Ponzi scheme involving three accused persons and losses exceeding $2,000,000.

He appealed his convictions and sentence on grounds of delay contrary to s. 11(b) of the Charter and alleged errors in the trial judge's jury instructions.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal found that while the total delay of 59½ months exceeded the presumptive ceiling under the Jordan framework, it was justified by defence delay, discrete events (including the co-accused's illness), case complexity, and the transitional exceptional circumstance based on the parties' reasonable reliance on the Morin framework.

The jury instructions were found to be fair and balanced when reviewed as a whole.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault and sentenced to 22 months' imprisonment following a home invasion robbery.

The appellant claimed self-defence after striking the intruder with a shovel, causing significant injuries.

The trial judge rejected the self-defence claim, finding the appellant had the intruder under control and administered a gratuitous beating.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence on multiple grounds, including alleged misapprehension of evidence regarding bear spray effects, the timing of acquiring the shovel, and the number of blows struck.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no material errors in the trial judge's credibility assessments and factual findings.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court finding the 22-month sentence was within the appropriate range for aggravated assault by a first offender.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder and his 15-year period of parole ineligibility.

He argued that the trial judge erred in admitting a portion of his uncautioned statement to the police, erred in his Corbett ruling regarding the admissibility of his criminal record, and imposed an excessive period of parole ineligibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusion on the voluntariness of the statement was reasonable, the Corbett ruling was well-reasoned, and the 15-year parole ineligibility period was within a reasonable range.

The appellant appealed his convictions for historical sexual assault and his sentence as a dangerous offender.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting similar fact and reply evidence, and that the sentencing judge should have imposed a long-term offender order instead of a dangerous offender designation, given the potential use of anti-androgen medication.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the evidentiary rulings.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentencing judge correctly concluded there was no reasonable possibility of controlling the appellant's risk in the community, given his life-long condition and the uncertainty of his long-term commitment to taking sex drive reducing medication.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's decision to sentence him as an adult and to impose a sentence of eight years, less credit for time served, to be served in a youth facility.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's reasons and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant pleaded guilty to fraud over $5000 for his role in a massive investment scheme.

At sentencing, while unrepresented, he disputed many facts but the trial judge refused to strike the plea and sentenced him to 8 years' imprisonment and ordered $35.6 million in restitution.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the guilty plea was voluntary, unequivocal, and informed, and that the undisputed facts satisfied the elements of fraud.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal in part, reducing the restitution order to $20 million to better reflect the appellant's degree of criminal responsibility and the funds he retained control over.

The appellant was convicted of incest and 46 counts of forgery.

The Crown alleged that the appellant's co-accused and husband was actually her son, and that they had fathered children together, including a deceased child.

The appellant appealed, arguing that DNA warrants used to compare their blood with the deceased child's blood violated her Charter rights, and that the trial judge erred in failing to give a W.(D.) charge regarding exculpatory defence evidence.

The Court of Appeal held that while the DNA comparison between the two accused breached section 8, the evidence should not be excluded under section 24(2).

Furthermore, although the trial judge erred in the jury charge regarding reasonable doubt and credibility, the curative proviso applied due to the overwhelming evidence of guilt.

The appeal was dismissed.