John North

Three appellants challenged mandatory minimum sentencing provisions for unauthorized production of marijuana under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act as violating s. 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (cruel and unusual punishment).

The Court of Appeal found that certain mandatory minimum provisions were grossly disproportionate when applied to reasonably foreseeable circumstances, including cases involving minimal involvement, mistaken licensees, and situations lacking culpability regarding statutory aggravating factors.

The court struck down provisions imposing two and three-year mandatory minimums for production of more than 500 plants and the statutory aggravating factor provision.

The court reduced one appellant's sentence and dismissed appeals in the other cases.

Three appellants challenged mandatory minimum sentencing provisions for unauthorized production of marijuana under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act as violating s. 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (cruel and unusual punishment).

The Court of Appeal found that certain mandatory minimum provisions were grossly disproportionate when applied to reasonably foreseeable circumstances, including cases involving minimal involvement, mistaken licensees, and situations lacking culpability regarding statutory aggravating factors.

The court struck down provisions imposing two and three-year mandatory minimums for production of more than 500 plants and the statutory aggravating factor provision.

The court reduced one appellant's sentence and dismissed appeals in the other cases.

The appellant appealed her conviction from the Superior Court of Justice, arguing that the trial judge committed a palpable and overriding error by failing to make more detailed inquiries into the appellant's mental status while she was testifying.

The Court of Appeal rejected this submission, finding that the trial judge had made sufficient inquiries, the appellant had confirmed she was able to continue and had no difficulty with her memory, and defence counsel did not pursue the issue at trial.

No fresh evidence was produced to support the appellant's claim that her mental status would have interfered with her ability to testify.

The appellant was convicted of 40 counts including drug trafficking, criminal organization offences, weapons offences, proceeds of crime, extortion, and criminal interest rate offences.

He was sentenced to 19 years imprisonment with a 9.5-year parole ineligibility period.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld most convictions but allowed the appeal in part.

The court found no Charter violations regarding search and seizure or trial delay.

However, the court quashed convictions for entering into criminal interest rate agreements, finding the trial judge erred in applying a presumption of knowledge without requiring proof of mens rea.

The court also reduced the sentence from 19 to 15 years and set aside the parole ineligibility order except for criminal organization convictions.

The appellant was arrested on a charge of importing cocaine under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and was detained in custody.

Following conviction by jury, the appellant filed an application for judicial interim release under section 523(2)(a) of the Criminal Code, alleging a change in circumstances.

The trial judge dismissed the application on the tertiary ground.

The appellant then brought an application in the nature of habeas corpus with certiorari in aid, seeking declarations regarding the court's jurisdiction to review bail and challenging the absence of a review mechanism as violating her Charter rights.

The Superior Court judge dismissed the application.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that Parliament deliberately chose not to provide a review mechanism for trial judge orders under section 523(2)(a), and that habeas corpus was not an appropriate remedy in these circumstances.

The offender was found guilty by a jury of importing approximately 2.9 kilograms of cocaine hidden in his suitcase.

The Crown and defence presented a joint submission for a sentence of five and a half years, which is below the usual range of six to eight years for first-time importers.

The court accepted the joint submission, finding that the offender's severe cognitive deficits and the certainty of his deportation to Guyana were unusual mitigating circumstances that justified a departure from the usual range.

The offender was sentenced to five and a half years in custody, less pre-sentence custody credit.

Following an earlier ruling declaring two mandatory minimum sentencing provisions in s. 7(2)(b) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act unconstitutional under s. 12 of the Charter, the court considered whether those provisions were severable from the remainder of the section.

The applicant argued the entire subsection constituted a unitary sentencing scheme that must fall together.

The Crown argued the offending subsections could be removed without affecting the validity of the remaining provisions imposing mandatory minimums for larger-scale cannabis production.

Applying the severance principles from Schachter v. Canada and related authorities, the court concluded the unconstitutional provisions were not inextricably bound to the remaining subsections.

The court held that only ss. 7(2)(b)(i) and (ii) were of no force or effect and that ss. 7(2)(b)(iii–vi) remained valid.

The applicant pled guilty to the production of marijuana and theft of electricity after police discovered a large-scale grow operation with a hydro bypass in a residential home.

The Crown sought a mandatory minimum sentence of three years under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The applicant brought a constitutional challenge arguing the mandatory minimums violated s. 12 of the Charter.

The court found that the mandatory minimum sentences could foreseeably capture conduct with minimal moral blameworthiness, such as a licensed producer making an honest mistake about the number of plants, or a gardener unaware of a public safety hazard.

The court declared the mandatory minimum sentences under ss. 7(2)(b)(i)(ii) and 7(3)(c) of no force or effect.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms alleging a breach of the right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b).

Approximately 26 months had elapsed between arrest and the scheduled trial date on a charge of importing heroin.

Much of the delay occurred while the accused attempted to change counsel, pursued Legal Aid Ontario appeals, and brought two Rowbotham applications to obtain funded counsel.

The court found that the 15½‑month delay associated with securing counsel was neutral and attributable to the accused’s own decisions rather than Crown or institutional misconduct.

Balancing the Morin factors, the court concluded the delay was not unreasonable and declined to stay the proceedings.