Carlos F. Rippell

The accused was charged with two counts of assault and one count of uttering threats against his spouse.

The trial involved a significant credibility contest, with the complainant's evidence undermined by secret audio recordings showing her to be aggressive, and the accused's evidence also found lacking in credibility.

The court found that while it was probable injuries occurred during an altercation, the evidence was insufficient to disprove the accused's claim of self-defence.

The accused was found not guilty on all counts.

The Crown sought to introduce expert opinion evidence from an RCMP analyst comparing camouflage clothing seized from the accused's residence with clothing worn by a masked individual in a terrorist propaganda video.

The accused challenged the admissibility of the comparison evidence.

The court excluded the comparison evidence, finding it was not necessary as the trier of fact could make the comparison without expert assistance.

The court also found the proposed expert was not duly qualified to opine on camouflage patterns due to limited and dated training, and noted concerns regarding confirmation bias and reliability.

Following a jury trial, the sentencing court addressed convictions for human trafficking and procuring a complainant under 18, with acquittals on sexual interference and assault-with-a-weapon counts.

The court held that denunciation and deterrence required substantial penitentiary terms given the complainant's youth, vulnerability, coercive exploitation, and enduring harm, while also weighing mitigation including limited or absent records and subordinate roles in a joint enterprise.

The court rejected a 12-year Crown position and a conditional-sentence defence position, finding both inconsistent with proportionality and parity.

The court imposed six-year custodial sentences on each offender, less pre-sentence custody credit, and granted ancillary non-communication, DNA, weapons prohibition, and 20-year SOIRA orders, while declining requested s. 161 orders.

During a routine traffic stop for a suspended license, a police officer arrested and handcuffed the applicant, a Black man, detaining him in a cruiser for nearly ninety minutes.

The police then conducted a warrantless search of his vehicle, discovering a firearm, and subsequently questioned him after he requested to speak with a lawyer.

The applicant challenged the admissibility of the firearm and his statements under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court granted the application and excluded the evidence, finding that the police committed serious Charter breaches motivated in part by unconscious racial bias.

The appellant, Roger Wain Foreshaw, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder, raising six grounds of appeal.

Key issues included the trial judge's prohibition of cross-examination on a witness's record suspension, the absence of a Mayuran instruction regarding an alleged confession, the application of the Browne v. Dunn rule, alleged misstatements of evidence in the jury charge, errors in the third-party suspect instruction, and a finding of no s. 10(b) Charter breach.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge erred in prohibiting cross-examination on the record suspension, this error did not result in a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The court upheld the trial judge's decisions on the other grounds, affirming the conviction.

The appellants, Roslyn Blake and Claire Graham, appealed their convictions, seeking a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Charter, relying on the framework established in *R. v. Jordan*.

The Court of Appeal assumed, without deciding, that Ms. Graham's net delay could exceed 30 months.

However, the court upheld the trial judge's finding in Ms. Blake's case that the complexity of the matter justified the delay beyond the presumptive ceiling, noting that this assessment was equally applicable to both co-accused appellants.

The court emphasized the deference owed to the trial judge's expertise in assessing case complexity.

The appeals were dismissed.

The offender was convicted of assault causing bodily harm after sucker-punching his supervisor at work, causing life-altering injuries.

The court considered the offender's escalating criminal record for violence, lack of remorse, and the severe impact on the victim.

A conditional sentence was deemed inappropriate due to the high risk to the community.

The offender was sentenced to 10 months in custody followed by two years of probation.

The accused brought a Charter motion to exclude evidence obtained by police following a vehicle stop.

The court found multiple Charter breaches, including an unlawful search of the vehicle without grounds (s. 8), unlawful detention and arrest of the passenger (s. 9), persistent questioning (s. 8), failure to provide rights to counsel upon initial arrest (s. 10(b)), and failure to file a report to a justice (s. 8).

The court determined that the police conduct, particularly the search without grounds, was a major departure from Charter standards and had a significant impact on the accused's rights.

Applying the R. v. Grant s. 24(2) analysis, the court concluded that admitting the evidence, including a handgun and ammunition, would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, and therefore excluded it.

Andrew Allen was charged with impaired driving and unlawfully refusing to provide a breath sample.

He brought a Charter application under s. 24(2) to exclude evidence, alleging breaches of his s. 9 (arbitrary detention due to wrongful arrest on a warrant and arbitrary confinement in a cell) and s. 10(b) (right to counsel) Charter rights.

The court found that the initial arrest on a warrant was without reasonable grounds and the subsequent confinement in a cell, driven by OPP policy rather than individualized assessment, constituted arbitrary detention, both breaching s. 9.

The failure to immediately inform him of his right to counsel upon arrest was a s. 10(b) breach.

Applying the Grant test, the court determined that the breaches were serious and had a significant impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests.

Despite society's interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits, the admission of the impugned evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

Two consolidated appeals challenging the constitutionality of ss. 278.92 to 278.94 of the Criminal Code (the 'record screening regime'), enacted by Bill C-51 in 2018.

The regime governs the admissibility of complainants' private records in the possession or control of the accused in sexual offence proceedings, and extends complainant participatory rights to admissibility hearings.

The majority held that the provisions do not infringe ss. 7, 11(c), or 11(d) of the Charter, finding that the admissibility threshold is rationally connected to Parliament's objective of protecting complainants' privacy and dignity, the Stage One application process is not overbroad, advance disclosure does not violate the right to silence or the privilege against self-incrimination, and complainant participation does not undermine trial fairness or prosecutorial independence.

Both Crown appeals were allowed, the cross-appeal by one accused was dismissed, and the complainant's appeal was allowed with costs.

Three judges dissented in part, concluding the record screening regime — though not the s. 276 regime — is unconstitutional.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on charges relating to the sale of sexual services.

The application judge had struck down sections 286.2 (material benefit), 286.3 (procuring), and 286.4 (advertising) of the Criminal Code, enacted by the Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act, finding they infringed section 7 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the provisions do not violate section 7.

The Court found that cooperative arrangements among sex workers do not constitute a 'commercial enterprise' under the material benefit provision, and that the procuring and advertising provisions are neither overbroad nor grossly disproportionate to their objectives.

The Court also rejected arguments that the provisions unjustifiably infringed sections 2(b) and 2(d) of the Charter.

The acquittals were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision declaring certain Criminal Code provisions related to sexual services unconstitutional and sought a stay of the declaration pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal applied the tripartite test from RJR-MacDonald Inc., finding a serious question to be tried, irreparable harm to the Crown (public confusion, impact on law enforcement), and that the balance of convenience favoured granting the stay, especially given the short duration of the stay until the appeal hearing.

The applicant, a young Black man, brought a Charter application to exclude a loaded handgun found in his satchel during a search incident to an investigative detention in an apartment.

The court found that the police lacked reasonable grounds for the search, concluding that one officer's testimony about the applicant attempting to conceal the satchel was untruthful.

The court permitted cross-examination of the officer on prior judicial findings of untruthfulness and concluded that racial profiling played a substantial role in the police conduct.

Finding a serious breach of section 8 of the Charter, the court excluded the firearm under section 24(2).

The appellant was convicted of assault with a weapon, possession of a weapon, break and enter, and theft.

Identity was the primary issue at trial.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty, rejecting his explanation for his whereabouts as fabricated.

The Court of Appeal allowed the conviction appeal, finding that the trial judge erred by drawing an inference of guilt from a finding of fabrication without independent evidence.

The convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered on all charges.

The sentence appeal was not addressed.

Following a finding that sections 286.2, 286.3(1), and 286.4 of the Criminal Code violated section 7 of the Charter, the court determined the appropriate remedy under section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.

Applying the framework from Ontario (Attorney General) v. G, the court rejected the Crown's request for tailored remedies (reading in, reading down, or severance), finding that such modifications would significantly alter Parliament's legislative scheme.

The court also declined to suspend the declaration of invalidity, concluding the Crown failed to demonstrate a compelling public interest justifying a suspension.

The impugned provisions were declared immediately of no force and effect.

This case involves a Charter challenge to sections 286.2 (material benefit), 286.3(1) (procuring), and 286.4 (advertising) of the Criminal Code, enacted as part of the Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act (PCEPA).

The applicant argued these provisions violate sections 2(b), 2(d), and 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that sections 286.2, 286.3(1), and 286.4 infringe section 7 of the Charter due to overbreadth and gross disproportionality, as they make the lawful activity of selling sexual services more dangerous by preventing sex workers from taking safety measures like sharing expenses or openly advertising.

These infringements were not saved by section 1 of the Charter.

The court declined to rule on the section 2(d) challenge and found itself bound by prior appellate and Supreme Court decisions regarding the section 2(b) challenge to advertising.

Further submissions on the appropriate remedy were requested.

The applicant was pulled over for a traffic infraction and subsequently arrested for breaching a recognizance.

After finding a small amount of marijuana on the applicant's person, police conducted a full search of the vehicle, discovering a firearm.

The applicant brought a Charter application arguing the stop was racially motivated and the search and questioning violated his rights.

The court found no arbitrary detention but concluded the police violated the applicant's s. 10(b) rights through improper questioning and his s. 8 rights by conducting an unreasonable search that exceeded their authority under the Cannabis Control Act.

The firearm was excluded from evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The applicant, charged with sexual assault, brought a Charter challenge against ss. 278.92, 278.93, and 278.94 of the Criminal Code.

These provisions required the defence to disclose private records to the complainant and permitted the complainant to participate in the admissibility hearing.

The court found that the overbreadth of s. 278.92, the mandated disclosure of the accused's defence to the complainant, and the complainant's participation in the evidentiary process significantly impaired the accused's right to a fair trial and undermined the Crown's constitutional role.

The court declared ss. 278.92, 278.94(2), and 278.94(3) unconstitutional and of no force and effect under ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.

The applicant, charged with possessing a loaded restricted firearm and failing to comply with a recognizance, sought a bail review under ss. 520 and 525 of the Criminal Code.

He argued that a new release plan involving electronic monitoring, a formal Charter application regarding the search of his vehicle, and the Covid-19 pandemic constituted material changes in circumstances.

The court found that the pandemic was not a material change warranting release, but the strength of the s. 8 Charter argument and the addition of electronic monitoring to the release plan sufficiently mitigated the secondary ground risks.

The application was granted, and the applicant was released on strict conditions including house arrest and GPS monitoring.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault arising from a street altercation where he stabbed the complainant 13 times with a folding knife.

The trial judge granted a directed verdict of acquittal on a weapons possession charge.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: (1) the trial judge erred in refusing a Scopelliti application to call a witness regarding the complainant's prior violent conduct while intoxicated and in restricting cross-examination on a prior peace bond; (2) the trial judge erred in dismissing a Corbett application to exclude evidence of the appellant's prior firearm conviction; and (3) the trial judge failed to inform the jury of the acquittal on the weapons charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.