Carlos F. Rippell

The appellant, Roger Wain Foreshaw, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder, raising six grounds of appeal.

Key issues included the trial judge's prohibition of cross-examination on a witness's record suspension, the absence of a Mayuran instruction regarding an alleged confession, the application of the Browne v. Dunn rule, alleged misstatements of evidence in the jury charge, errors in the third-party suspect instruction, and a finding of no s. 10(b) Charter breach.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge erred in prohibiting cross-examination on the record suspension, this error did not result in a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The court upheld the trial judge's decisions on the other grounds, affirming the conviction.

The appellants, Roslyn Blake and Claire Graham, appealed their convictions, seeking a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Charter, relying on the framework established in *R. v. Jordan*.

The Court of Appeal assumed, without deciding, that Ms. Graham's net delay could exceed 30 months.

However, the court upheld the trial judge's finding in Ms. Blake's case that the complexity of the matter justified the delay beyond the presumptive ceiling, noting that this assessment was equally applicable to both co-accused appellants.

The court emphasized the deference owed to the trial judge's expertise in assessing case complexity.

The appeals were dismissed.

The accused brought a Charter motion to exclude evidence obtained by police following a vehicle stop.

The court found multiple Charter breaches, including an unlawful search of the vehicle without grounds (s. 8), unlawful detention and arrest of the passenger (s. 9), persistent questioning (s. 8), failure to provide rights to counsel upon initial arrest (s. 10(b)), and failure to file a report to a justice (s. 8).

The court determined that the police conduct, particularly the search without grounds, was a major departure from Charter standards and had a significant impact on the accused's rights.

Applying the R. v. Grant s. 24(2) analysis, the court concluded that admitting the evidence, including a handgun and ammunition, would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, and therefore excluded it.

Andrew Allen was charged with impaired driving and unlawfully refusing to provide a breath sample.

He brought a Charter application under s. 24(2) to exclude evidence, alleging breaches of his s. 9 (arbitrary detention due to wrongful arrest on a warrant and arbitrary confinement in a cell) and s. 10(b) (right to counsel) Charter rights.

The court found that the initial arrest on a warrant was without reasonable grounds and the subsequent confinement in a cell, driven by OPP policy rather than individualized assessment, constituted arbitrary detention, both breaching s. 9.

The failure to immediately inform him of his right to counsel upon arrest was a s. 10(b) breach.

Applying the Grant test, the court determined that the breaches were serious and had a significant impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests.

Despite society's interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits, the admission of the impugned evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision declaring certain Criminal Code provisions related to sexual services unconstitutional and sought a stay of the declaration pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal applied the tripartite test from RJR-MacDonald Inc., finding a serious question to be tried, irreparable harm to the Crown (public confusion, impact on law enforcement), and that the balance of convenience favoured granting the stay, especially given the short duration of the stay until the appeal hearing.

The appellant was convicted of assault with a weapon, possession of a weapon, break and enter, and theft.

Identity was the primary issue at trial.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty, rejecting his explanation for his whereabouts as fabricated.

The Court of Appeal allowed the conviction appeal, finding that the trial judge erred by drawing an inference of guilt from a finding of fabrication without independent evidence.

The convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered on all charges.

The sentence appeal was not addressed.

This case involves a Charter challenge to sections 286.2 (material benefit), 286.3(1) (procuring), and 286.4 (advertising) of the Criminal Code, enacted as part of the Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act (PCEPA).

The applicant argued these provisions violate sections 2(b), 2(d), and 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that sections 286.2, 286.3(1), and 286.4 infringe section 7 of the Charter due to overbreadth and gross disproportionality, as they make the lawful activity of selling sexual services more dangerous by preventing sex workers from taking safety measures like sharing expenses or openly advertising.

These infringements were not saved by section 1 of the Charter.

The court declined to rule on the section 2(d) challenge and found itself bound by prior appellate and Supreme Court decisions regarding the section 2(b) challenge to advertising.

Further submissions on the appropriate remedy were requested.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault arising from a street altercation where he stabbed the complainant 13 times with a folding knife.

The trial judge granted a directed verdict of acquittal on a weapons possession charge.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: (1) the trial judge erred in refusing a Scopelliti application to call a witness regarding the complainant's prior violent conduct while intoxicated and in restricting cross-examination on a prior peace bond; (2) the trial judge erred in dismissing a Corbett application to exclude evidence of the appellant's prior firearm conviction; and (3) the trial judge failed to inform the jury of the acquittal on the weapons charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

This decision addresses a blended voir dire concerning the voluntariness of statements made to police and alleged Charter violations (ss. 8, 9, 10(a), 10(b)) during the investigative detention of two accused, Anderson and Rhoden, following a vehicle stop linked to a shooting.

The court found that while initial detention and some searches were lawful, the detention became arbitrary after two hours (4:46 a.m.), and certain statements by Anderson were involuntary due to police inducement or trickery.

Consequently, evidence obtained after 4:46 a.m., Anderson's confessions of his real name, his videotaped statement to Det. Cobor, and evidence from the unlawful trunk search were excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

Early statements and the initial false name provided by Anderson were deemed admissible.

The appellant appealed her convictions for two counts of robbery with a firearm.

The appeal concerned the validity of "tower dump" production orders for cell phone records obtained from two cell phone towers near the site of a robbery.

The appellant challenged the production orders under section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing that an Information to Obtain contained material inaccuracies regarding witness statements about cell phone use by one of the perpetrators.

The motion judge denied the appellant's request for leave to cross-examine the affiant and dismissed the Charter application, finding that even after excising the inaccuracies, sufficient grounds remained to support the production orders.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in the application of the test for leave to cross-examine and no misapprehension of the evidence regarding the inference of cell phone use during the robbery.

The accused, charged with importing heroin, applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging breaches of his s. 7 rights while in pre-trial custody.

The court found that the correctional facility failed to provide adequate medical care for a severe foot fracture, resulting in permanent injury, and unlawfully placed the accused in administrative segregation for 79 days without proper justification or review.

Concluding that the state's conduct was egregious and offensive to societal notions of fair play and decency, the court held that this was one of the clearest of cases where a stay of proceedings was warranted to protect the integrity of the justice system.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol following a traffic stop on October 10, 2016.

The Crown presented evidence of dangerous driving patterns, physical signs of intoxication, and breath test results.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of the breath test results on Charter grounds, alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).

The court found the defendant guilty on both counts, rejecting Charter arguments and finding that the officer had reasonable grounds for arrest and that any delay in providing rights to counsel was justified by safety concerns.

The accused, charged with firearms offences related to importing a prohibited device via the 'dark web', brought a pre-trial motion seeking a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay was 37 months, exceeding the 30-month Jordan ceiling.

However, the court deducted 7.5 months of delay caused by defence counsel's unavailability following a conditional adjournment granted due to late-breaking electronic evidence.

The court found the net delay fell below the ceiling and, alternatively, that the case's technological complexity and transitional considerations justified the delay.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of possession of a loaded, restricted firearm following a search of his apartment pursuant to a telewarrant.

The trial judge found that the Information to Obtain the warrant was facially insufficient and that section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was breached.

However, the trial judge refused to exclude the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's decisions regarding disclosure, cross-examination of the affiant, and the exclusion of evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's discretionary decisions and upholding the admission of the firearm evidence.

Crown's appeal of the acquittal of the respondent on charges of conspiracy to import a narcotic and importing a controlled substance (cocaine).

The respondent was jointly tried with a co-accused who was convicted of the conspiracy count.

The Crown raised two issues on appeal: whether the trial judge wrongly excluded evidence tying the respondent to the conspiracy, and whether the trial judge erred by imposing a reasonable doubt standard at step two of the Carter test for conspiracy membership.

The appellate court dismissed the Crown's appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions.

The appellant was convicted of possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and possession of cannabis resin following a joint trial in the Ontario Court of Justice.

He appealed on three grounds: reasonable apprehension of bias based on remarks made by the trial judge in an unrelated sentencing proceeding; the trial judge's erroneous admission of a videotaped police interview as voluntary; and the trial judge's failure to conduct an inquiry into a breach of the right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter when uncontradicted evidence revealed such a breach.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that while the bias claim and voluntariness determination were not independently fatal, the trial judge's failure to assist a self-represented accused by raising and inquiring into the Charter breach rendered the trial unfair.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant was arrested on a charge of importing cocaine under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and was detained in custody.

Following conviction by jury, the appellant filed an application for judicial interim release under section 523(2)(a) of the Criminal Code, alleging a change in circumstances.

The trial judge dismissed the application on the tertiary ground.

The appellant then brought an application in the nature of habeas corpus with certiorari in aid, seeking declarations regarding the court's jurisdiction to review bail and challenging the absence of a review mechanism as violating her Charter rights.

The Superior Court judge dismissed the application.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that Parliament deliberately chose not to provide a review mechanism for trial judge orders under section 523(2)(a), and that habeas corpus was not an appropriate remedy in these circumstances.

The accused pleaded guilty to aggravated assault and possession of a weapon (shotgun) for a purpose dangerous to the public peace.

The offences arose from a planned drug robbery in which the accused arranged the sale of marijuana and lured the victim to the rear of an apartment building where masked associates robbed him.

One of the associates shot the victim, causing a serious gunshot wound to the right forearm.

The accused was not the shooter but admitted to being wilfully blind to the possibility that his associates would use a firearm.

The court imposed a 9-month custodial sentence on the aggravated assault charge (with a 3-month credit for time on house arrest), followed by a 12-month conditional sentence on the weapons charge, and a 12-month probationary term.

The court also imposed a DNA collection order and a 10-year firearms prohibition.