Kellie Hutchinson

The applicants, Jide Animashaun and Marlon Johnson, challenged a search warrant for their cell phones and sought to exclude a firearm and cell phone data under s.24(2) of the Charter.

They argued the initial phone seizure was unlawful, the Information to Obtain (ITO) contained errors, the searches were conducted outside the authorized timeframe, and police conduct subverted the pre-authorization process.

The court found the initial seizure lawful, addressed errors in the ITO through excision and amplification, and determined the phone extractions were not outside the authorized timeframe.

The application was dismissed as no Charter violations were established.

Sentencing for human trafficking, material benefit, and procuring offences arising from the exploitation of two complainants in the sex trade, including one complainant under 18 years of age.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, adopted a four-to-eight-year trafficking range, rejected the defence position that immigration consequences justified an artificially reduced custodial disposition, and held that a conditional sentence was unavailable and inappropriate.

The court also rejected a Kienapple argument because trafficking and procuring targeted distinct wrongs, and granted limited mitigation for restrictive bail conditions under Downes.

A global sentence of four years was imposed, reduced to 43 months after pre-trial custody and bail-condition credit, together with non-communication, DNA, and SOIRA orders.

The defendant, Tyrone Dwayne McEwan, was found guilty of human trafficking and related offences.

This decision provides reasons for his sentence.

The court first dismissed the Crown's motion to apply a mandatory minimum sentence for human trafficking, affirming that it had been struck down as unconstitutional based on horizontal stare decisis.

The court then sentenced the defendant, considering the high moral culpability due to the exploitation of a vulnerable victim and aggravating factors such as greed.

Mitigating factors included a difficult upbringing, family support, and rehabilitative potential.

Significant credit was granted for harsh pre-trial custody conditions and restrictive bail conditions.

The final sentence imposed was 5 years of incarceration for human trafficking, with concurrent sentences for other counts, resulting in an effective sentence of 2 years, 11 months, and 15 days after credits.

Ancillary orders included a non-communication order and a DNA order, while forfeiture of seized items and the victim surcharge were declined or waived.

This sentencing decision concerns a defendant convicted of procuring, luring, and obtaining sexual services from a 17-year-old complainant.

The court addresses the appropriate sentence, considering aggravating factors such as the defendant's age and multiple incidents, and mitigating factors including no prior criminal record and a mistaken belief about the age of consent for sexual activity.

The decision also discusses the constitutional validity of mandatory minimum sentences for luring in light of recent Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence (Friesen, Sullivan, Hills, Hilbach) and the impact of Bill C-5 on the availability of conditional sentences.

The court ultimately imposes a global sentence of 3 years in custody, to be served concurrently for all counts, along with a Sex Offender Information Registry Act order and a DNA order.

This sentencing decision concerns Justin Barrett, who pleaded guilty to procuring a 16-year-old girl for sexual services.

The court considered the aggravating factors, including the planned and deliberate nature of the offence, its duration, breach of trust, the victim's vulnerability, and the profound impact on her and her family.

Mitigating factors included the guilty plea, positive antecedents, employment on bail, and family support.

The court rejected the defence's request for a conditional or reformatory sentence, emphasizing general deterrence and denunciation.

Barrett was sentenced to 4 years imprisonment, a DNA order, and a 20-year SOIRA order.

The offender was convicted of internet child luring following a police sting operation where he believed he was communicating with a 15-year-old girl.

The court considered the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence under s. 172.1(2)(a) of the Criminal Code, finding it unconstitutional based on binding precedent.

Weighing the offender's difficult background as a refugee against the gravity of the offence and the Supreme Court's direction to increase sentences for child sexual offences, the court imposed a sentence of 16 months' imprisonment, one year of probation, and ancillary orders.

The applicant, facing 14 charges including assault with a weapon and uttering death threats, sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after being detained following a preliminary inquiry.

He argued there was a material change in circumstances, including a new affidavit from the complainant and a proposed Charter challenge, and that the preliminary inquiry judge erred by failing to consider his status as a Black male under s. 493.2.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding no material change in circumstances, no error of law by the preliminary inquiry judge, and that the decision to detain on the secondary ground was not clearly inappropriate given the applicant's history of breaching a no-contact order and evidence of witness tampering.

This is a sentencing decision by the Ontario Court of Justice for Erhard Haniffa, convicted of communicating with a person believed to be under 16 for the purpose of facilitating a sexual offence (s. 172.1(2) Criminal Code).

The matter was remitted by the Court of Appeal for sentencing on this specific count.

The Crown sought a custodial term of 2 years less 1 day, while the defence argued for a conditional sentence.

The court, acknowledging its limited jurisdiction to count 2, imposed an 18-month conditional sentence.

The decision considered the impact of R v Friesen on sentencing principles for child sexual offences, recent legal changes regarding mandatory minimums and conditional sentence restrictions, the offender's changed personal circumstances, and the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic's effect on correctional facilities.

The court balanced denunciation and general deterrence with the principle of imposing the least restrictive sentence.

Following a finding that sections 286.2, 286.3(1), and 286.4 of the Criminal Code violated section 7 of the Charter, the court determined the appropriate remedy under section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.

Applying the framework from Ontario (Attorney General) v. G, the court rejected the Crown's request for tailored remedies (reading in, reading down, or severance), finding that such modifications would significantly alter Parliament's legislative scheme.

The court also declined to suspend the declaration of invalidity, concluding the Crown failed to demonstrate a compelling public interest justifying a suspension.

The impugned provisions were declared immediately of no force and effect.

This case involves a Charter challenge to sections 286.2 (material benefit), 286.3(1) (procuring), and 286.4 (advertising) of the Criminal Code, enacted as part of the Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act (PCEPA).

The applicant argued these provisions violate sections 2(b), 2(d), and 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that sections 286.2, 286.3(1), and 286.4 infringe section 7 of the Charter due to overbreadth and gross disproportionality, as they make the lawful activity of selling sexual services more dangerous by preventing sex workers from taking safety measures like sharing expenses or openly advertising.

These infringements were not saved by section 1 of the Charter.

The court declined to rule on the section 2(d) challenge and found itself bound by prior appellate and Supreme Court decisions regarding the section 2(b) challenge to advertising.

Further submissions on the appropriate remedy were requested.

The defendant was convicted of internet child luring following a police sting operation known as Project Raphael.

The defendant's initial application for a stay of proceedings based on entrapment was dismissed by the court, relying on horizontal precedent that found the project was a bona fide investigation.

Following a recent decision by another judge who reversed his own prior ruling and found the project constituted entrapment, the defendant applied to re-open his entrapment application.

The court granted the request, finding that the reversal in horizontal precedent constituted a material change in circumstances that justified re-opening the application to hear evidence and make an independent determination.

The defendants, A.M. and M.P., were charged with ten offences including human trafficking, exercising control or influence over a person, drug trafficking, uttering threats, and advertising sexual services.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the complainant, A.K., whose credibility and reliability were significantly challenged due to inconsistencies between her trial, preliminary inquiry, and police statements, and her admitted attempt to protect the accused.

The court found A.K. to be generally an honest witness but cautioned against relying solely on her testimony.

A.M. was found guilty of advertising sexual services (Count 5), exercising control over movements for sexual services (Count 4), receiving financial benefit from sexual services (Count 3), and trafficking Molly (Count 8).

M.P. was found guilty of advertising sexual services (Count 5), exercising control over movements for sexual services (Count 4), and receiving financial benefit from sexual services (Count 3).

All other charges, including human trafficking (Count 1), receiving financial benefit from human trafficking (Count 2), uttering threats (Count 6), assault (Count 7), and trafficking cocaine and cannabis (Counts 9 and 10), were dismissed for both defendants due to insufficient evidence or credibility concerns.

The Crown sought a preliminary ruling to dismiss the defendant's entrapment application, arguing that prior Project Raphael cases had already determined the police investigation was bona fide and not random virtue testing.

The defendant argued that the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Mills provided a new basis to distinguish his case.

The court found that Mills did not alter the entrapment analysis regarding the bona fide nature and precision of the police investigation, and dismissed the first branch of the defendant's entrapment application, but allowed the defendant to proceed with arguments under the second branch of entrapment (inducement).

The offender was convicted of child luring and obtaining sexual services from a person under 18 after communicating with an undercover police officer posing as a 14-year-old escort.

At sentencing, the court applied the Kienapple principle to stay one of the luring counts.

The court then considered a Charter challenge to the one-year mandatory minimum sentence under s. 172.1(2)(a) of the Criminal Code.

Finding that the mandatory minimum would result in a grossly disproportionate sentence in reasonably foreseeable circumstances, the court struck it down under s. 12 of the Charter.

The offender was sentenced to 7 months' imprisonment concurrent on the remaining counts, reflecting his youth, rehabilitation prospects, and lack of prior record.

Arian Faroughi, convicted of communicating with persons believed to be underage for sexual purposes, brought an application to stay the charges due to police entrapment and a violation of his section 7 Charter rights.

The applicant argued that police inducement occurred through persistent texting, exploitation of his nervousness, and the use of a phone number previously associated with other escort ads.

The Crown contended there was no inducement and the applicant was a willing participant.

The court found that the police were acting under a bona fide inquiry and did not induce the applicant, applying the objective test from R. v. Mack.

The court determined that an average person in the applicant's position would not have been induced, and the police's oversight regarding the phone number was harmless and not a deliberate act of entrapment.

The section 7 disclosure argument was also dismissed.

The accused was charged with luring a minor following an undercover police sting operation.

Upon arrest, police seized his cell phone and subsequently obtained two warrants to extract and search its data.

The accused brought a pre-trial motion to exclude the cell phone evidence, alleging multiple breaches of his section 8 Charter rights regarding the warrants' execution and the police's failure to report the seized data back to a justice of the peace.

The court found a section 8 breach due to the failure to report the seized data under section 489.1 of the Criminal Code, but declined to exclude the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The court also granted the Crown's application to adduce text messages from the phone as bad character evidence, finding their probative value regarding the accused's ability to communicate in English outweighed any prejudicial effect.

The defendant, Sivaratnam Sinnappillai, brought a motion for a directed verdict at the close of the Crown's case in a trial for child luring and inviting sexual touching under s. 172.1 of the Criminal Code.

The defendant argued there was insufficient evidence to establish the first essential element of the offences, specifically the identity of the communicator.

The court dismissed the application, finding that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence, even without relying on the seized cell phone, for a reasonable jury to infer the defendant's guilt.

Issues regarding the continuity of the cell phone were deemed to go to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility at this stage.

The applicants sought an order in the nature of certiorari quashing their committal to stand trial on charges of trafficking in persons and receiving a financial benefit.

They argued the preliminary inquiry justice erred in law by committing them despite an absence of evidence that they exploited the complainant.

The court dismissed the application, finding there was sufficient evidence that the applicants abused their position of trust or power as the complainant's drug suppliers to induce her to provide sexual services, which could reasonably be expected to cause her to fear for her safety if she stopped.

The accused was charged with human trafficking, child pornography, assault, and related offences involving two victims in the sex trade.

The Crown alleged that the accused recruited and exploited the victims, exercised control over their movements and finances, posted advertisements for their sexual services, and created and distributed child pornography involving a minor.

The accused was found guilty on 14 of 15 counts.

The court found that the accused knowingly recruited both victims for exploitation, exercised control through coercion and implied threats, withheld identification documents, assaulted one victim, received financial benefits from their sexual services, and created and distributed child pornography.

The court rejected the defence argument that the accused had an honest but mistaken belief regarding the minor's age, finding instead that he was wilfully blind to her age and failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain it.

The York Regional Police and the Crown brought a certiorari application to quash five defence subpoenas issued for a preliminary hearing.

The subpoenas sought to compel police officers to attend for discovery and to produce documents related to the policy of not audio recording booking areas.

The court held that while discovery is a legitimate ancillary purpose of a preliminary hearing, subpoenas cannot be used as a disguised attempt to obtain disclosure, circumventing the Stinchcombe/O’Connor regime.

The court quashed the subpoenas as they pertained to the production of documents but ordered that four police witnesses attend for discovery purposes, subject to the preliminary hearing justice's discretion to limit unreasonable discovery.