Christian Angelini

The applicant, charged with drug trafficking and driving while prohibited, sought to exclude evidence obtained during a traffic stop, alleging violations of his Charter rights under sections 8, 9, and 10.

The court found that the police officer's stop was a pretextual investigative detention, not a legitimate Highway Traffic Act stop, and that the officer's testimony was not credible.

The court identified multiple, deliberate breaches of the applicant's rights, including arbitrary detention (s. 9), failure to inform of reasons for detention (s. 10(a)), and eliciting incriminating information before providing right to counsel (s. 10(b)).

While racial profiling was alleged, it was not established on the evidence.

Applying the Grant test, the court determined that the seriousness of the state's Charter-infringing conduct and the significant impact on the applicant's protected interests outweighed society's interest in an adjudication on the merits.

Consequently, the evidence was excluded, leading to an acquittal on all counts.

During a trial for first-degree murder, the Crown sought to introduce a video chronology prepared by police.

The chronology compiled still shots from extensive surveillance video, adding identifying information, circles, arrows, and short neutral descriptions.

The defence objected, arguing the video itself is the only admissible evidence and the chronology amounted to Crown advocacy.

The court ruled the video chronology admissible as a demonstrative aid to assist the jury in comprehending voluminous and complex video evidence.

The court held that such summaries are permissible if they are neutral, introduced through a witness who can be cross-examined, and accompanied by limiting instructions to the jury.

The accused were charged with first-degree murder.

At the outset of the trial, two of the accused brought an application to exclude cellphone video recordings showing them celebrating at a nightclub hours after the shooting, arguing the prejudicial effect outweighed the probative value.

The Crown argued the videos were probative of their relationship, their presence together after the shooting, and their state of mind.

The court found the videos highly probative of the accused's identity, relationship, and state of mind, and concluded that the probative value strongly outweighed any general prejudice.

The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed, and the videos were ruled admissible subject to agreed-upon editing.

During a trial for first degree murder, the Crown brought an application to adduce a post-arrest statement made by the accused to the police.

The accused brought a cross-application to exclude the statement under s. 24(2) of the Charter, arguing his s. 10(b) right to counsel was violated because he did not understand the legal advice he received from duty counsel and his own lawyer.

The court dismissed the Charter application, finding the accused was advised of his rights multiple times, spoke to counsel three times, and clearly understood the advice.

The court also ruled the statement was admissible in the Crown's case-in-chief, as there was independent evidence of fabrication to support its use as after-the-fact conduct evidence.

The three accused were jointly charged with first-degree murder.

One of the accused gave a post-arrest video statement to the police implicating himself and his co-accused.

The accused brought pre-trial applications to redact portions of the statement, and two of the accused alternatively sought to sever their trials.

The court granted the redactions consented to by the Crown but refused further redactions, finding the contested portions highly probative of the maker's involvement and credibility.

The court dismissed the application for severance, holding that the strong policy preference for joint trials applied and that a mid-trial and final jury instruction would adequately cure any reasoning prejudice to the co-accused.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought a pre-trial motion to sit at counsel table rather than in the prisoner's dock during their jury trial.

The court balanced fair trial considerations against courtroom security.

Given that the accused were detained in custody, had histories of institutional misconduct, and there was hostility between the co-accused, the court found that security concerns outweighed the potential prejudice of sitting in the dock.

The application was dismissed.

The Crown brought an application at the outset of a first-degree murder trial to admit six utterances made by the deceased shortly after being shot.

The court analyzed the admissibility of the statements under the dying declaration exception, the spontaneous utterance exception, and the principled approach to hearsay.

The court found that while only the statements made to police qualified as dying declarations, all six utterances were admissible as spontaneous utterances and under the principled approach to hearsay, as the pressure of the shooting excluded the possibility of concoction or distortion.

The accused was charged with assault with a weapon, attempted murder, and firearms offences following two altercations with the complainant.

In the first incident, the accused confronted the complainant in his van while holding a chair leg.

In the second incident, shots were fired at the complainant in a parking lot.

The court found the accused guilty of assault with a weapon for the first incident.

However, relying on circumstantial evidence and the Villaroman framework, the court found the accused not guilty of the attempted murder and firearms charges, as there was a reasonable possibility that another individual present at the scene was the shooter.

The accused, charged with human trafficking and related sexual service offences, sought to introduce evidence of the complainant's continued sex work after their relationship ended.

The Crown argued the accused must bring an application under s. 276 of the Criminal Code.

The court held that s. 276(1) does not apply to the charged offences, as they lack 'some connection' to the listed sexual offences.

However, applying the common law principles from Seaboyer, the court required a voir dire to determine the admissibility of the evidence to prevent twin-myth reasoning.

The court also exercised its inherent jurisdiction to appoint counsel for the complainant on the voir dire.

The applicants, John Jansen and Britaney Hall, sought a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay from charge to anticipated trial end was 39 months and 13 days, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling established by R. v. Jordan.

The court deducted defence-attributable delays, including Jansen's explicit waiver of 2.5 months and Hall's 6-month delay due to a certiorari application and changes in preliminary hearing instructions.

After accounting for discrete unexpected events, the net delay for Jansen was approximately 35 months and for Hall approximately 27.5 months.

The court found the case to be moderately complex and applied the Jordan transitional exception, concluding that the Crown's reliance on the previous R. v. Morin framework was reasonable.

Both applications for a stay of proceedings were dismissed.

The defendant, Abdallah Mohamed, sought to quash his committal for trial on two counts of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, arguing insufficient evidence of knowledge and control.

The Superior Court reviewed the preliminary inquiry judge's decision, applying the limited weighing of circumstantial evidence test from *Charenski*.

The court found that the preliminary inquiry judge correctly applied the legal principles and that the combination of the defendant's presence, the unzipped satchel's location, and witness testimony suggesting drug dealing was sufficient to support an inference of knowledge and control.

The application for certiorari was dismissed.

The accused, a 34-year-old first offender with serious health issues including HIV and Hepatitis C, was found guilty by a jury of possession of cocaine, and possession of ketamine and MDMA for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown sought a 12-month custodial sentence, while the accused sought a 9-month conditional sentence.

The court considered the accused's strict compliance with house arrest bail conditions for nearly three years as a significant mitigating factor.

The court imposed a 16-month conditional sentence to be served in the community, followed by two years of probation, finding this would satisfy the principles of denunciation and deterrence while promoting rehabilitation.

Applicants charged with possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of evidence on the basis that police breached their rights under sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The applicants were stopped by plainclothes detectives during a community policing patrol.

The court found that although the applicants were arbitrarily detained when police blocked their passage on the sidewalk and exited their vehicle, the Charter breaches were not sufficiently serious to warrant exclusion of evidence under section 24(2).

The court admitted the evidence, finding that the detention was brief, the officer had reasonable grounds to arrest based on the smell of marijuana, and the reliable evidence was essential to the Crown's case.