Misha Alexander Feldmann

The Law Society alleged that the respondent lawyer failed to comply with a previous Tribunal order and the Guidelines for suspended lawyers by failing to provide a compliance report.

The lawyer admitted the misconduct.

The Tribunal accepted a joint submission for a one-month suspension and $3,889 in costs.

The Tribunal rejected the lawyer's request to apply the suspension retroactively, finding that the current misconduct was separate from the conduct that led to his existing suspension.

The one-month suspension was ordered to be served prospectively, and the lawyer was granted 12 months to pay the costs.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the Crown's appeal from a directed verdict of acquittal for Abdullahi Osman, who was charged as an accessory after the fact to murder.

The court held that, although attempted murder can in rare cases be an included offence to murder, there was no air of reality to the included offence of being an accessory after the fact to attempted murder in this case, as the evidence was clear that the principal's acts caused the victim's death.

The decision clarifies the law on included offences, the requirements for accessory after the fact liability, and the rare circumstances in which attempted murder may be left to a jury as an included offence where the victim dies.

The decision addresses the admissibility and weight of evidence in a drug trafficking prosecution, focusing on the negligent loss of a police entry video documenting the state of the apartment before a search.

The court finds a breach of section 7 of the Charter due to unacceptable police negligence but declines to exclude the evidence, instead giving reduced weight to the testimony of the officers responsible.

The accused is found guilty on the drug trafficking counts but acquitted on the proceeds of crime count.

The court sentenced Mwanza Serge Mutombo for aggravated assault after a guilty plea.

The facts involved a vicious, unprovoked attack on a vulnerable, homeless victim, resulting in severe injuries.

The court considered aggravating factors such as Mutombo’s significant criminal record, the use of a weapon, and the vulnerability of the victim, as well as mitigating factors including his guilty plea, disadvantaged background, and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

The court reviewed relevant case law and sentencing ranges, ultimately imposing a nine-year sentence, less pretrial custody credit, and making ancillary orders including a lifetime weapons prohibition and DNA order.

The accused, Malcom Bryce-Brown, faced ten criminal counts, including sexual assault, assault bodily harm, assault, possession of child pornography, and probation breaches.

The court found the accused guilty of possession of child pornography, two counts of assault (one causing bodily harm), and three related probation breaches based on concessions.

For the remaining counts, including sexual assault and assault bodily harm related to a choking incident, the court found reasonable doubt regarding consent, particularly concerning the agreed-upon "safe word" and the complainant's impaired memory due to marijuana use.

The court also addressed the legal principles of vitiation of consent in sexual activity involving bodily harm, concluding that the Crown did not prove the subjective intent to cause bodily harm required to vitiate consent in the choking incident, nor was sufficient evidence of bodily harm presented.

The accused, Osman, applied for a directed verdict on a charge of accessory after the fact to murder.

Osman had assisted the principal offender in escaping after a shooting, but the victim did not die until three days later.

The Crown conceded the accused could not be convicted of the charged offence since the victim was alive at the time of assistance, but argued for a conviction on the included offence of accessory after the fact to attempt murder.

The court rejected the Crown's arguments, finding that accessory after the fact to attempt murder is not an included offence under s. 662(1) and cannot be applied via s. 660 in these circumstances.

The application was granted and a directed verdict of acquittal was entered.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 18 months' probation for two counts of failing to comply with a recognizance in a domestic context.

He argued the sentencing judge failed to adequately consider the principle of restraint and his rehabilitation, seeking a conditional discharge due to potential employment and immigration consequences.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge made no error in principle and that a suspended sentence was appropriate given the repeated breaches of court orders.

The defendant sought to exclude evidence (a sawed-off shotgun and ammunition) seized under a search warrant, arguing the warrant was invalid due to a breach of his s. 7 Charter rights (loss of surveillance video) and insufficient grounds.

The court found a s. 7 Charter breach due to unacceptable police negligence in losing the video, remedying it by excising a subjective observation from the Information To Obtain (ITO).

However, the court determined that even with the excision, there were sufficient credible and corroborated grounds from a confidential informant and police surveillance for the justice of the peace to issue the warrant for the defendant's associated residence.

The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

The accused pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine and fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

A Gardiner hearing determined that the accused believed he possessed only cocaine, not fentanyl.

The court found the accused was not wilfully blind to the nature of the substance.

The accused, a young first-time adult offender with strong family support and early guilty plea, was sentenced to two years imprisonment: fifteen months for cocaine trafficking and nine months consecutive for fentanyl trafficking, with ancillary orders including DNA databank sample, weapons prohibition, and forfeiture.

The appellant was convicted after a 21-day jury trial of 32 charges including sexual assault, assault with a weapon, and assault causing bodily harm.

The convictions arose from a pattern of domestic abuse spanning over 10 years, including facilitation of sexual assault by strangers and assaults with various weapons.

The appellant appealed on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel and multiple errors in the jury charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no merit to the claims of ineffective assistance or errors in the charge to the jury.

The applicant sought to exclude evidence of drugs found in his bedroom, arguing his s. 8 Charter rights were violated.

Police responded to a 911 call about a domestic assault and forced entry into the applicant's locked bedroom out of concern for the safety of anyone inside.

Inside, they found a dead dog and drugs in plain view.

The court held the entry was a justifiable use of police powers to protect life and safety, and the search was lawful.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The offender was convicted by a jury of two counts of sexual assault and two counts of uttering death threats arising from incidents within an intimate relationship.

The sentencing judge determined the factual circumstances of the offences based on the complainant’s evidence, concluding beyond a reasonable doubt that the assaults involved forced anal and vaginal penetration accompanied by threats and domination.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence in cases of domestic sexual violence, noting numerous aggravating factors including repeated assaults, threats against the complainant and her child, breach of trust, and physical injury.

Mitigating factors included the offender’s difficult upbringing, substance abuse history, and mental health challenges, as well as time spent in pre-trial custody and restrictive bail conditions.

A global custodial sentence was imposed along with ancillary orders including a weapons prohibition, DNA order, and lifetime sex offender registration.

In a trial for sexual assault and uttering death threats, the Crown brought a pre-trial motion to admit a letter purportedly written by the accused to the complainant while he was in custody.

The defence opposed, arguing lack of provenance and that the prejudicial effect of a line apologizing for 'ruff' sex outweighed its probative value.

The court held that the letter was presumptively admissible as a party admission, finding on a balance of probabilities that the accused authored it.

The court ruled the letter admissible, leaving the parties to agree on edits to mitigate any prejudicial effect.

The accused brought a pre-trial application under s. 276 seeking to adduce evidence of two prior incidents of anal intercourse with the complainant in a sexual assault prosecution.

The defence argued the evidence was necessary to rebut the complainant’s preliminary inquiry statement that she had never done those things before and was therefore not comfortable.

The court held that, if the Crown did not elicit similar evidence at trial, the proposed evidence lost its articulated relevance and its admission would undermine the objectives of s. 276 by inviting discriminatory reasoning and unnecessary intrusion on dignity and privacy.

The application was dismissed, subject to the possibility of reconsideration if the evidentiary landscape changed at trial.

The appellant appealed her conviction, arguing that the police officer's search of the vehicle's glove box and console violated her s. 8 Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even if the search constituted a s. 8 violation, the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2).

Applying the Grant factors, the court noted the officer acted in good faith, the appellant's privacy interest in the vehicle was minimal, and the seized evidence was central to the charge.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for possession of cocaine after pleading guilty in the Ontario Court of Justice and receiving a $100 fine.

He argued that his plea should be set aside because he misunderstood the consequences, believing he would receive a conditional discharge rather than a conviction that created a criminal record affecting employment prospects.

The court reviewed the requirements for a valid guilty plea under s. 606 of the Criminal Code and the governing jurisprudence that a plea must be voluntary, unequivocal, and informed.

The record showed the trial judge conducted a plea comprehension inquiry confirming the accused understood the consequences and that sentencing remained within the court’s discretion.

The court held that dissatisfaction with collateral consequences, such as employment impacts, does not invalidate a properly entered guilty plea.

The appellants were convicted of multiple offences related to their involvement in a large-scale clandestine drug lab producing MDMA, ketamine, and methamphetamine.

They appealed their convictions, arguing insufficient evidence of production and identification, and their sentences of 14 and 16 years, arguing the trial judge erred by treating lack of remorse as an aggravating factor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding ample circumstantial and identification evidence.

While the Court agreed the trial judge erred in considering lack of remorse as an aggravating factor, it upheld the sentences as proportionate given the massive scale of the operation and the danger of the drugs produced.

In a second‑degree murder prosecution, the accused brought a motion to exclude proposed in‑dock identification evidence from a Crown witness.

The witness first identified the accused approximately ten and a half months after the homicide during testimony at another individual’s preliminary inquiry, after seeing the accused’s photograph in media reports following his arrest.

The identification arose through leading questions and occurred in circumstances suggesting contamination and suggestion.

The court held that the identification did not qualify as reliable recognition evidence and had no meaningful probative value while posing a substantial risk of prejudice.

Exercising its discretion, the court excluded the evidence from the jury.

During a jury trial for aggravated assault and weapons offences, the accused young person brought an application to exclude his adult criminal record, which consisted of a single conviction for first degree murder.

The defence had vigorously cross-examined the primary Crown witness on his extensive criminal record.

The court applied the Corbett framework and dismissed the application, finding that the probative value of the murder conviction on the accused's credibility outweighed its prejudicial effect, and that excluding it would create a serious imbalance given the attack on the Crown witness's credibility.

The Crown appealed a six-year sentence imposed following convictions on 32 counts arising from prolonged domestic violence and sexual assaults against an intimate partner and children.

Applying the deferential sentence appeal standard, the court held that the sentence was manifestly unfit given the number of offences, the duration and escalation of the abuse, the use of weapons, the vulnerability of the victims, and the severe impact on them.

The court compared the case to prior appellate authorities involving severe spousal abuse and sexual violence, while emphasizing the additional aggravating feature of multiple child victims.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was varied to a global sentence of 12 years' imprisonment.