Aaron Lorne Shachter

The applicant, Phi Ho, challenged the lawfulness of searches conducted at a StorageMart locker, a residential address (Moody Drive), and a Mercedes vehicle, as well as the issuance of five production warrants and three tracking warrants.

The applicant sought to exclude evidence obtained from these searches, arguing that the Informations to Obtain (ITOs) contained flaws, including insufficient detail in redacted portions and inaccuracies or carelessness by the affiant.

The court reviewed the unredacted ITOs and the judicial summary, finding that the applicant was sufficiently informed to challenge the material.

The court addressed specific alleged errors, such as mischaracterizations of ownership and discrepancies in GPS data, ordering some excisions and amplifications to the ITOs.

Ultimately, the court found that even with the amended record, there were reasonable grounds to support the issuance of all judicial authorizations.

The court also considered whether the affiant's conduct amounted to "blatant dishonesty" subverting the judicial process, concluding that while some errors were concerning, they did not rise to that level, nor did they undermine the integrity of the pre-authorization process.

The application to exclude evidence and invalidate the warrants was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of conspiring to import narcotics in association with a criminal organization.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding the co-conspirator's exception to the hearsay rule (the Carter analysis) and that the conspiracy conviction was inconsistent with his acquittal on a related trafficking charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury instructions were functional and not confusing, and that the disparate verdicts were intelligible given the distinct evidence and theories for each charge.

The appellant, Jorge Andres Pontigo, appealed his conviction for importing cocaine.

He was found with cocaine hidden in coffee bags at Pearson International Airport.

The trial judge disbelieved his testimony that he unknowingly took the wrong bag, finding he knew about the cocaine.

The appeal raised four grounds: failure to consider exculpatory receipts, error in finding tailored evidence, reversal of burden of proof, and misapplication of the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the first three grounds, finding no error.

While conceding the Browne v. Dunn error, the Crown argued it was harmless.

The Court agreed, applying the curative proviso, as the circumstantial case for knowledge was strong and the error did not impact the verdict.

The appellant, convicted of importing cocaine and possession for the purpose of trafficking, appealed his conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal addressed arguments that the appellant had abandoned his intent to import, that the importing offence was not complete because the cocaine was seized at customs, and that the trial judge erred in rejecting the defence of duress.

The court dismissed the conviction appeal, affirming that importing is complete upon physical entry with intent, even if customs seizes the drugs, distinguishing from controlled delivery scenarios.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the 10-year sentence to be fit and within the appropriate range.

The applicants challenged the lawfulness of a search conducted pursuant to a warrant, specifically contesting the Crown's assertion of informant privilege over redacted materials related to a source.

The court conducted a *Basi* hearing, including *viva voce* evidence, to assess the privilege claim.

The application for further disclosure was dismissed, with the court upholding the Crown's claim of privilege for Source #1.

The applicants challenged the lawfulness of a search warrant and the respondent's assertion of informant privilege over redacted portions of the Information to Obtain (ITO).

After reviewing sealed materials regarding Source #2, the court upheld the privilege claim.

The applicants expanded their challenge to Source #1, alleging the source may have acted as a police agent.

The court reviewed further sealed materials and ordered an in camera, ex parte hearing to hear viva voce evidence regarding Source #1.

This ruling addresses an application for leave to cross-examine an affiant and sub-affiants concerning a search warrant.

The court granted limited cross-examination on specific factual assertions within the Information to Obtain (ITO), including the association between parties, discrepancies in surveillance observations (e.g., backpack possession), and potential confusion in identification due to similar appearances between individuals.

However, leave was denied for cross-examination on the affiant's characterization of observations as drug trafficking and on the overall reliability of confidential information or the non-charging of other targets, deeming these matters more appropriate for legal argument.

The applicant, Phi Ho, sought leave to cross-examine two affiants, DC Deston and DC Seville, regarding Informations to Obtain (ITOs) for a tracking warrant and a general warrant.

The applicant challenged assertions in the ITOs, including the necessity of a tracking warrant, the characterization of observed meetings, and alleged inaccuracies regarding property ownership and confidential informant information.

The court dismissed the application, finding no basis to grant leave for cross-examination on the challenged issues, as they related to facial validity or were speculative, and additional judicial summaries clarified apparent inconsistencies.

The accused was charged with numerous weapons offences following a police search of an apartment at 16 McAdam Avenue, Toronto, where officers discovered two locked suitcases containing 12 firearms, ammunition, and a grenade.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, including fingerprint evidence linking the accused to the suitcases and items within them, surveillance footage showing the accused's presence at the apartment, and his association with the primary target of the investigation.

The accused testified that he had handled the blue suitcase during a trip to London with the apartment's lessee, that his fingerprints on the ammunition bag resulted from incidental contact during packing, and that he was unaware of the weapons stored in the locked suitcases in the bedroom closet.

The court found that while the accused's explanation regarding the food sealer was not credible, the totality of the circumstantial evidence, when examined holistically, left a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused had knowledge of and control over the weapons.

On appeal from convictions for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and breach of recognizance, the appellant challenged the trial judge's rejection of his Charter claims.

The trial judge found an arbitrary detention under s. 9 based on the precipitous arrest for breach of recognizance (the officer failed to verify that the cellphone prohibition remained in force), but rejected the appellant's racial profiling claim.

The trial judge also rejected the s. 8 unreasonable search argument and admitted the evidence under s. 24(2).

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in his analysis of the racial profiling claim and in his s. 24(2) analysis, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant was convicted at trial of producing methamphetamine and possessing it for the purpose of trafficking following a fire at an industrial complex containing a clandestine drug lab.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on the appellant's fingerprint on a pop can found in the unit and a cell phone found in the lab that the trial judge concluded belonged to the appellant.

The phone contained incriminating evidence including photographs of equipment used in methamphetamine production.

The appellant appealed on three grounds: improper reliance on certified court documents to link him to the phone, misapprehension of evidence regarding photographs on the phone, and that the conviction on the possession for trafficking count was unreasonable or insufficiently reasoned.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's reasoning and that the circumstantial evidence cumulatively supported the convictions beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was convicted after trial of possession of MDA and methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking, unlawful production of MDA, and unlawful production of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking.

Police discovered a clandestine methamphetamine laboratory in the basement of the accused's home, containing 23 kilograms of finished methamphetamine and 3.2 kilograms of MDA with a combined street value between $1.4 and $3.2 million.

The accused, a first-time offender, was sentenced to eight years imprisonment less credit for pre-sentence custody and restrictive bail conditions, resulting in a net sentence of seven years and three months.

Concurrent sentences were imposed on the other counts.

A firearms prohibition order and DNA order were also imposed.

The accused were convicted of trafficking cocaine and conspiracy to import cocaine, with some offences committed in association with the 'Ndrangheta criminal organization.

The Crown relied on evidence from a paid police agent who recorded conversations with the accused detailing plans to import large quantities of cocaine.

The court sentenced the first accused to 11.5 years and the second accused to 9 years imprisonment, emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence for large-scale cocaine importation schemes.

The applicant, charged with numerous drug trafficking and organized crime offences, sought a bail review under s. 520(1) of the Criminal Code to vacate a detention order.

The applicant argued the justice of the peace erred in law by rejecting the proposed sureties and conflating drug trafficking with trafficking for a criminal organization.

The Superior Court found no error in law, noting the overwhelming evidence of the applicant's high-ranking position in a mafia organization and the massive scale of the drug transactions.

The court upheld the detention on both the secondary and tertiary grounds, concluding that release would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's sentencing decision and characterized the sentence as lenient in the extreme.

While acknowledging the appellant's efforts to remain drug-free for ten months, the court dismissed the appeal.

The accused was charged with possession for the purpose of trafficking in MDMA and marijuana and possession of currency obtained by crime.

Following a trial, the court found that the accused's Charter rights under sections 8 and 10(b) were violated.

The search of the accused's bag during investigative detention was not justified on safety grounds.

More significantly, the police failed to implement the accused's repeated requests to speak to counsel from the time of his detention through his arrest and overnight custody.

The court excluded all evidence seized pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The applicant sought to exclude evidence of drugs found in his bedroom, arguing his s. 8 Charter rights were violated.

Police responded to a 911 call about a domestic assault and forced entry into the applicant's locked bedroom out of concern for the safety of anyone inside.

Inside, they found a dead dog and drugs in plain view.

The court held the entry was a justifiable use of police powers to protect life and safety, and the search was lawful.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The appellant pleaded guilty to production of marijuana and received an absolute discharge.

No mandatory firearms prohibition order was made, but police refused to return his firearms.

The appellant appealed to set aside his guilty plea.

The Court of Appeal found that the Crown erroneously elected to proceed summarily on an exclusively indictable offence, and the trial judge failed to put the appellant to his election for mode of trial.

This failure deprived the trial court of jurisdiction, which could not be cured on appeal.

The Court also clarified that a mandatory firearms prohibition does not take effect without a judicial order.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed convictions for marijuana possession and resisting arrest on the basis that, as a self-represented accused, he did not receive the minimum judicial assistance necessary to ensure a fair trial.

The court held that the trial judge's failures regarding inquiries about counsel and disclosure, explanation of trial procedure and offence elements, attention to potential Charter issues, and gatekeeping on opinion evidence cumulatively rendered the trial unfair.

Applying appellate principles governing unrepresented accused, the court found a miscarriage of justice and allowed the conviction appeal.

A new trial was ordered, and the sentence appeal was treated as moot because the sentence had already been served.

The accused was charged with assaulting a security guard with intent to resist arrest and possessing hydromorphone, morphine, and marijuana for the purpose of trafficking.

Security guards employed by a private contractor observed the accused and a companion acting suspiciously in a Toronto Parking Authority parking lot and conducted an investigation.

The accused claimed the security guards planted the drugs and breached his Charter rights.

The court found that the Charter does not apply to private security guards, even when employed by a public entity.

The court rejected the accused's credibility regarding both the drug possession and the assault, finding him guilty on all counts.