Gagandeep Pannu

The defendant, Avardeep Soni, brought an application to stay proceedings for two counts of assault and two counts of sexual assault, alleging unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The court applied the framework from R. v. Jordan, deducting defence-attributable delay (18 days for delaying JPT to pursue resolution) and exceptional circumstances delay (30 days for COVID-19 backlog and new scheduling procedures).

The net delay was calculated at 16.56 months, which is below the presumptive ceiling for provincial court.

The court found the applicant failed to demonstrate sustained efforts to expedite proceedings and that the case markedly exceeded what was reasonably required.

The application was dismissed.

The applicants challenged the lawfulness of a search conducted pursuant to a warrant, specifically contesting the Crown's assertion of informant privilege over redacted materials related to a source.

The court conducted a *Basi* hearing, including *viva voce* evidence, to assess the privilege claim.

The application for further disclosure was dismissed, with the court upholding the Crown's claim of privilege for Source #1.

The applicants challenged the lawfulness of a search warrant and the respondent's assertion of informant privilege over redacted portions of the Information to Obtain (ITO).

After reviewing sealed materials regarding Source #2, the court upheld the privilege claim.

The applicants expanded their challenge to Source #1, alleging the source may have acted as a police agent.

The court reviewed further sealed materials and ordered an in camera, ex parte hearing to hear viva voce evidence regarding Source #1.

The applicant, Phi Ho, sought leave to cross-examine two affiants, DC Deston and DC Seville, regarding Informations to Obtain (ITOs) for a tracking warrant and a general warrant.

The applicant challenged assertions in the ITOs, including the necessity of a tracking warrant, the characterization of observed meetings, and alleged inaccuracies regarding property ownership and confidential informant information.

The court dismissed the application, finding no basis to grant leave for cross-examination on the challenged issues, as they related to facial validity or were speculative, and additional judicial summaries clarified apparent inconsistencies.

The offenders were found guilty by a jury of exercising control, direction, or influence over the movements of two complainants who provided sexual services, and of receiving a financial benefit from those activities.

The court found the offenders exploited the young, vulnerable complainants for profit, with Mr. Deidun providing drugs and transportation, and Ms. Bernard booking hotel rooms.

After considering the Tang/Miller factors, the parity principle, pre-sentence custody, and Downes credit for restrictive bail conditions, the court sentenced Mr. Deidun to a net term of 30 months less 10 days, and Ms. Bernard to a net term of 11 months and 15 days.

The accused was charged with multiple offences, including two counts of robbery, possession of a restricted firearm, and breach of recognizance.

The accused conceded guilt on the firearm possession and breach of recognizance charges.

The court dismissed the accused's application for a directed verdict on one robbery count, finding that the act of driving away while the victim held onto the vehicle constituted violence.

The court found the accused guilty of the second robbery based on eyewitness identification and circumstantial evidence, but acquitted the accused of the first robbery due to reasonable doubt regarding his involvement.

The offender was found guilty of sexual interference against his daughter over a six-year period, starting when she was six years old.

The Crown sought an 8-year penitentiary sentence, while the defence sought a 5-year term.

Applying the principles from R. v. Friesen, the court emphasized the profound breach of trust, the severe harm to the victim, and the need for denunciation and deterrence.

The court sentenced the offender to 8 years in prison and imposed several ancillary orders, including a 20-year SOIRA order and a s. 161 prohibition order.

The applicant sought a bail review after being detained following an initial bail hearing on secondary and tertiary grounds.

The Crown conceded that the COVID-19 pandemic constituted a material change in circumstances.

The court considered the applicant's escalating criminal behaviour, including breaches of prior court orders and serious firearm-related charges, and a proposed release plan that included GPS monitoring.

Despite the heightened risks of COVID-19 in correctional facilities, the court found a substantial likelihood of the applicant re-offending and that his release would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.

The bail review application was dismissed, and the applicant remained detained.

The Crown charged three defendants with various offences arising from a police stop of a vehicle in downtown Barrie.

The defendants challenged the lawfulness of the police conduct, alleging violations of their Charter rights under sections 8, 9, and 10(b).

The Crown conceded that Charter violations occurred.

The court found that the passengers (Hamidu and Farah) were arbitrarily detained without being advised of their right to counsel, and that evidence obtained from this unlawful detention should be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The driver (Husen) was subject to a brief detention in furtherance of a valid Highway Traffic Act investigation, and the firearm evidence was admitted against him.

The charges against Hamidu and Farah were dismissed; Husen faced trial on firearm-related charges.

The court convicted the accused of sexual interference arising from repeated sexual touching and escalating sexual acts against his daughter over several years beginning when she was a child.

Applying the reasonable doubt standard and the W.(D.) credibility framework, the court found the complainant's evidence credible, detailed, and materially corroborated by surrounding evidence, while rejecting the accused's and grandmother's testimony as contradictory and tailored to deny opportunity.

The court held that the Crown proved the s. 151 offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

The uttering threats charge was dismissed for lack of substantial evidence that any death threat was made.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay from charge to anticipated trial completion was 93.5 months (2,843 days).

After deducting defence-attributable delay and exceptional circumstances, the net delay was 35.76 months, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court cases established in R. v. Jordan.

The court found that the Crown failed to rebut the presumption of unreasonableness by demonstrating transitional exceptional circumstances, noting the case's lack of complexity, significant institutional delay under Morin principles, and the applicant's substantial prejudice.

The application was allowed, and the charges were stayed.

The accused was charged with driving over 80 after failing an approved screening device (ASD) test and providing Intoxilyzer samples almost three times the legal limit.

At trial, the accused applied to exclude the breath evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, alleging breaches of his s. 8 and s. 10(b) rights.

The court found no s. 8 breach, as the officer had reasonable suspicion for the ASD demand and reasonable grounds for the Intoxilyzer demand.

The court found a s. 10(b) breach because the police failed to give a Prosper warning when the accused waived his right to counsel after an unsatisfactory call with duty counsel.

However, applying the Grant framework, the court concluded the evidence should not be excluded.

The accused was found guilty.

The defendant was charged with driving dangerously, failing to remain and provide particulars following a motor vehicle collision, impaired operation of a motor vehicle, and driving with an excess blood alcohol concentration.

The defendant brought Charter applications seeking to exclude evidence for violations of sections 7, 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Crown conceded that two constitutional violations occurred: arbitrary detention and failure to immediately inform of the right to counsel.

The court found a section 8 Charter violation regarding an unlawful search of the defendant's garage but rejected the section 9 and 10(b) violation claims.

Under section 24(2) analysis, the court excluded only the defendant's brief confession made outside the garage, while admitting all other evidence.