John David Kingdon

The applicant, facing firearms charges, brought a Charter application alleging violations of his ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) rights due to racial profiling during a police search and detention.

The court found that the safety search and subsequent search of his person, belongings, and vehicle were unlawful and tainted by unconscious racial bias, constituting breaches of ss. 8 and 9.

While the initial 10(b) rights during the Cannabis Control Act investigation were suspended due to brief roadside detention, the post-arrest delay in providing access to counsel was an unreasonable breach of s. 10(b).

Applying the Grant factors, the court concluded that admitting the firearm would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, particularly given the serious nature of the racial profiling and the systemic issues it represents.

The firearm was excluded.

The Defence brought an application seeking a declaration that s. 12(3) of the Cannabis Control Act, which permits warrantless searches of vehicles and occupants for unlawfully stored cannabis, violates ss. 7 and 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing it is unreasonable and overbroad.

The Crown contended the provision is constitutional, citing public safety and the regulatory nature of the Act.

The court dismissed the application, finding that s. 12(3) does not infringe either section of the Charter, is reasonable, and is justified by its regulatory purpose and the exigencies of vehicle searches.

The applicants, arrested in a large-scale police investigation, brought an abuse of process motion seeking a stay of proceedings due to systemic delays in holding their special bail hearings.

They argued that their section 11(e) Charter rights were violated, similar to the applicants in a previous case where a stay was granted.

The court found that while the applicants' rights were violated by the delays, the systemic problem in the jurisdiction had been largely rectified following the previous decision.

As the ongoing systemic delay had been addressed, a stay of proceedings was no longer necessary to protect the integrity of the justice system.

The application was dismissed, though the court noted the Charter violations could warrant a sentence reduction if the applicants are convicted.

The applicants, charged with serious firearms and gaming offences, experienced a 12-day delay before their special bail hearing was held.

They brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, arguing that the delay violated their s. 11(e) rights and constituted an abuse of process.

The Crown conceded the Charter breach and acknowledged systemic issues in scheduling lengthy bail hearings in Brampton.

The court found that the systemic and ongoing nature of the bail delays severely compromised the integrity of the justice system.

Despite the seriousness of the charges, the court concluded that a stay of proceedings was the only appropriate remedy to address the persistent institutional failure.

The accused was charged with robbery and wounding following a home invasion where two brothers were assaulted and stabbed.

The central issue at trial was identity.

The victims identified the accused, whom they had known from their neighbourhood years prior, both during the incident and in subsequent photo lineups.

Despite defence arguments regarding the reliability of the recognition evidence, the passage of time, and flaws in the photo lineup procedures, the court found the identification evidence credible and reliable.

The accused was found guilty of all charges.

The applicant, Aiko Hamasaki, brought a motion to exclude a statement she gave to police, alleging violations of her Charter rights under sections 10(a) and 10(b).

The court found no breach of section 10(a) regarding the information provided upon arrest.

However, the court found a breach of section 10(b) when a police officer suggested Ms. Hamasaki consult a lawyer "more versed in criminal law" than her immigration lawyer, Matthew Wong, after she had expressed a desire to contact Mr. Wong.

This unsolicited advice was deemed an impermissible interference with her right to counsel of choice, especially given her vulnerable state and the power imbalance.

Consequently, the statement was excluded from evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The applicant, an 18-year-old with no criminal record, sought a review of a detention order following his arrest for a gunpoint carjacking and firearms offences.

The reviewing judge admitted fresh evidence consisting of a more stringent release plan involving GPS monitoring and new disclosure weakening the Crown's case on the most serious charges.

The court found that the applicant's detention was not necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice under the tertiary ground and ordered his release on strict conditions, including house arrest and GPS monitoring.

The accused was charged with four counts of domestic assault against his former spouse spanning thirteen years (2004-2017), and two counts of failing to comply with a recognizance by breaching a non-communication clause in 2018.

The Crown's case rested entirely on the complainant's testimony regarding four separate incidents of physical violence.

The accused denied all assault allegations and testified that he received legal advice permitting the email communication.

The trial judge found credibility concerns with the complainant's evidence, including her combative demeanor during cross-examination, vague details regarding older incidents, alcohol consumption affecting reliability, and a potential motive to fabricate given pending family court proceedings.

The court acquitted on all four assault counts due to reasonable doubt.

However, the court convicted on the remaining breach of recognizance charge, finding that while the email content was innocuous, it violated an absolute prohibition in the context of domestic violence allegations, and the de minimus doctrine did not apply.

The defendant, charged with driving with excess blood alcohol, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay.

The total gross delay was approximately 25 months.

The court applied the Jordan framework and deducted 55 weeks of delay attributable to the defence, including periods where the defence was unavailable or sought adjournments not legitimately taken to respond to the charges.

The net delay of 12.5 months fell well below the 18-month presumptive ceiling.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with assault on May 6, 2017.

Following a judicial pre-trial in October 2017, a trial date was set for May 2018, but the case was not reached due to insufficient court resources.

A second trial date was set for January 2019.

After the trial concluded on January 8, 2019, the defence filed a section 11(b) Charter application alleging unreasonable delay.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the net delay fell below the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R v. Jordan, and that the defence had not demonstrated meaningful steps to expedite proceedings.

The defence's late filing of the application and failure to comply with court rules were significant factors in the dismissal.

The accused was charged with driving over 80 after failing an approved screening device (ASD) test and providing Intoxilyzer samples almost three times the legal limit.

At trial, the accused applied to exclude the breath evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, alleging breaches of his s. 8 and s. 10(b) rights.

The court found no s. 8 breach, as the officer had reasonable suspicion for the ASD demand and reasonable grounds for the Intoxilyzer demand.

The court found a s. 10(b) breach because the police failed to give a Prosper warning when the accused waived his right to counsel after an unsatisfactory call with duty counsel.

However, applying the Grant framework, the court concluded the evidence should not be excluded.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and having a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The court conducted a blended voir dire to determine whether the accused's Charter rights were violated and whether evidence should be excluded.

The court found a breach of the accused's section 10(b) right to counsel of choice when police failed to wait a reasonable period for the accused's preferred counsel to return a call before offering duty counsel.

However, the court found the accused was in care and control of the vehicle and was impaired by alcohol.

The breath sample evidence was excluded due to the Charter violation, resulting in dismissal of the "over 80" charge but conviction on the impaired driving charge.

The defendant brought an application for particulars in response to the Crown's brief response to a Charter application alleging violations of sections 7, 9, 10(a), 10(b), and 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The defendant argued that the Crown's response was deficient in form and substance, being silent on some grounds and lacking precision on others.

The court dismissed the application for particulars without prejudice, finding that the defendant was not prejudiced in establishing the alleged Charter violations given that counsel had been retained for over two months, disclosure had been provided, and the parties had agreed to a blended voir dire procedure.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg in 100 ml of blood.

During the breath testing procedure, the Intoxilyzer 8000C generated an 'ambient fail' message.

The accused argued that the breath technician failed to follow the instrument's manual, meaning the device was 'operated improperly' and the Crown could not rely on the presumption of identity under section 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The court found that the manual's instructions were not mandatory and that the technician's actions did not call into question the reliability of the breath sample results.

The presumption of identity applied, resulting in a finding of guilt.

This was a historical sexual assault prosecution arising from allegations by a complainant who described four incidents of sexual touching and sexual assault occurring during a theatre-based mentorship relationship when he was 17 and 18 years old.

The trial judge applied the W.(D.) credibility framework and held that the case turned on credibility and reliability, with particular attention to inconsistencies, implausibilities, chronology, and post-incident conduct.

The court accepted the accused's evidence as candid, plausible, and corroborated in material respects, including his account of later friendly contact and timing of events.

The judge further held that the complainant's evidence, even if assessed independently, left a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted on all charges.

The defendant was charged with dangerous operation of a motor vehicle arising from an incident on January 12, 2016, and possession of cannabis.

The Crown called evidence from two police officers who observed the defendant's driving.

The defendant testified in his own defence.

The Crown conceded lack of continuity regarding the cannabis evidence and invited acquittal on that count.

The central issue was whether the defendant operated his motor vehicle in a manner dangerous to the public.

The court found the police officers' evidence credible and rejected the defendant's testimony, finding the defendant guilty of dangerous driving and not guilty of possession of cannabis.

The applicant sought an adjournment of his criminal trial due to defence counsel's unforeseen injury.

The court granted the adjournment, vacating the June 12, 2017 trial date and rescheduling it for December 11, 2017.

The ruling also provided practice points regarding the proper procedure for adjournment applications under Rule 26, emphasizing the need for a proper record and specific information in affidavits, particularly in light of the R. v. Jordan decision and the SCJ Provincial Practice Direction.

The accused, a cabinetmaker with over 20 years of business experience, was charged with three counts of fraud over $5,000 relating to contracts entered into between November 2012 and April 2013.

During a period of financial difficulty, the accused accepted deposits representing 50% of estimated project costs from multiple customers but used the deposits to pay personal debts rather than purchase materials for the work.

None of the projects were completed and customers lost their deposits.

The Crown alleged fraud; the defence claimed the accused honestly believed the work would be completed.

Count 1 was conceded by the Crown.

The court found the accused guilty on Count 2 (relating to a January 2013 contract with one customer) but not guilty on Count 3 (relating to a contract with another customer).

The appellant appealed his conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample.

He argued the trial judge erred by failing to apply the 'last chance' doctrine, failing to consider his medical condition as a reasonable excuse, and misapprehending the evidence of his failure to comply.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant was given six opportunities to provide a sample, his medical complaints were not supported by the evidence, and his refusal was unequivocal.

The accused was charged with refusing to provide a breath sample to a peace officer.

The Crown alleged the officer had reasonable suspicion to demand an approved screening device (ASD) test, made the demand forthwith, and the accused refused to comply.

The defence argued the officer lacked reasonable suspicion, the demand was not made forthwith, and the accused was unable to use the machine properly due to inadequate instruction and anxiety.

The court found the officer had reasonable suspicion based on the accused coming from a licensed establishment, odour of alcohol, and red watery eyes.

The court found the forthwith requirement was met.

Most significantly, the court found the accused eventually refused to blow into the device, which constituted the offence.

The accused was convicted.