John David Kingdon

The applicant, facing firearms charges, brought a Charter application alleging violations of his ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) rights due to racial profiling during a police search and detention.

The court found that the safety search and subsequent search of his person, belongings, and vehicle were unlawful and tainted by unconscious racial bias, constituting breaches of ss. 8 and 9.

While the initial 10(b) rights during the Cannabis Control Act investigation were suspended due to brief roadside detention, the post-arrest delay in providing access to counsel was an unreasonable breach of s. 10(b).

Applying the Grant factors, the court concluded that admitting the firearm would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, particularly given the serious nature of the racial profiling and the systemic issues it represents.

The firearm was excluded.

The Defence brought an application seeking a declaration that s. 12(3) of the Cannabis Control Act, which permits warrantless searches of vehicles and occupants for unlawfully stored cannabis, violates ss. 7 and 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing it is unreasonable and overbroad.

The Crown contended the provision is constitutional, citing public safety and the regulatory nature of the Act.

The court dismissed the application, finding that s. 12(3) does not infringe either section of the Charter, is reasonable, and is justified by its regulatory purpose and the exigencies of vehicle searches.

The applicant, Aiko Hamasaki, brought a motion to exclude a statement she gave to police, alleging violations of her Charter rights under sections 10(a) and 10(b).

The court found no breach of section 10(a) regarding the information provided upon arrest.

However, the court found a breach of section 10(b) when a police officer suggested Ms. Hamasaki consult a lawyer "more versed in criminal law" than her immigration lawyer, Matthew Wong, after she had expressed a desire to contact Mr. Wong.

This unsolicited advice was deemed an impermissible interference with her right to counsel of choice, especially given her vulnerable state and the power imbalance.

Consequently, the statement was excluded from evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was charged with four counts of domestic assault against his former spouse spanning thirteen years (2004-2017), and two counts of failing to comply with a recognizance by breaching a non-communication clause in 2018.

The Crown's case rested entirely on the complainant's testimony regarding four separate incidents of physical violence.

The accused denied all assault allegations and testified that he received legal advice permitting the email communication.

The trial judge found credibility concerns with the complainant's evidence, including her combative demeanor during cross-examination, vague details regarding older incidents, alcohol consumption affecting reliability, and a potential motive to fabricate given pending family court proceedings.

The court acquitted on all four assault counts due to reasonable doubt.

However, the court convicted on the remaining breach of recognizance charge, finding that while the email content was innocuous, it violated an absolute prohibition in the context of domestic violence allegations, and the de minimus doctrine did not apply.

The accused was charged with assault on May 6, 2017.

Following a judicial pre-trial in October 2017, a trial date was set for May 2018, but the case was not reached due to insufficient court resources.

A second trial date was set for January 2019.

After the trial concluded on January 8, 2019, the defence filed a section 11(b) Charter application alleging unreasonable delay.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the net delay fell below the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R v. Jordan, and that the defence had not demonstrated meaningful steps to expedite proceedings.

The defence's late filing of the application and failure to comply with court rules were significant factors in the dismissal.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and having a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The court conducted a blended voir dire to determine whether the accused's Charter rights were violated and whether evidence should be excluded.

The court found a breach of the accused's section 10(b) right to counsel of choice when police failed to wait a reasonable period for the accused's preferred counsel to return a call before offering duty counsel.

However, the court found the accused was in care and control of the vehicle and was impaired by alcohol.

The breath sample evidence was excluded due to the Charter violation, resulting in dismissal of the "over 80" charge but conviction on the impaired driving charge.

The defendant brought an application for particulars in response to the Crown's brief response to a Charter application alleging violations of sections 7, 9, 10(a), 10(b), and 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The defendant argued that the Crown's response was deficient in form and substance, being silent on some grounds and lacking precision on others.

The court dismissed the application for particulars without prejudice, finding that the defendant was not prejudiced in establishing the alleged Charter violations given that counsel had been retained for over two months, disclosure had been provided, and the parties had agreed to a blended voir dire procedure.

The defendant was charged with dangerous operation of a motor vehicle arising from an incident on January 12, 2016, and possession of cannabis.

The Crown called evidence from two police officers who observed the defendant's driving.

The defendant testified in his own defence.

The Crown conceded lack of continuity regarding the cannabis evidence and invited acquittal on that count.

The central issue was whether the defendant operated his motor vehicle in a manner dangerous to the public.

The court found the police officers' evidence credible and rejected the defendant's testimony, finding the defendant guilty of dangerous driving and not guilty of possession of cannabis.

The applicant sought an adjournment of his criminal trial due to defence counsel's unforeseen injury.

The court granted the adjournment, vacating the June 12, 2017 trial date and rescheduling it for December 11, 2017.

The ruling also provided practice points regarding the proper procedure for adjournment applications under Rule 26, emphasizing the need for a proper record and specific information in affidavits, particularly in light of the R. v. Jordan decision and the SCJ Provincial Practice Direction.

The accused, a cabinetmaker with over 20 years of business experience, was charged with three counts of fraud over $5,000 relating to contracts entered into between November 2012 and April 2013.

During a period of financial difficulty, the accused accepted deposits representing 50% of estimated project costs from multiple customers but used the deposits to pay personal debts rather than purchase materials for the work.

None of the projects were completed and customers lost their deposits.

The Crown alleged fraud; the defence claimed the accused honestly believed the work would be completed.

Count 1 was conceded by the Crown.

The court found the accused guilty on Count 2 (relating to a January 2013 contract with one customer) but not guilty on Count 3 (relating to a contract with another customer).

The accused was charged with refusing to provide a breath sample to a peace officer.

The Crown alleged the officer had reasonable suspicion to demand an approved screening device (ASD) test, made the demand forthwith, and the accused refused to comply.

The defence argued the officer lacked reasonable suspicion, the demand was not made forthwith, and the accused was unable to use the machine properly due to inadequate instruction and anxiety.

The court found the officer had reasonable suspicion based on the accused coming from a licensed establishment, odour of alcohol, and red watery eyes.

The court found the forthwith requirement was met.

Most significantly, the court found the accused eventually refused to blow into the device, which constituted the offence.

The accused was convicted.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on a charge of failing or refusing to comply with a demand for breath samples under s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge had accepted the defence of officially induced error based in part on the police advising that the accused “may” be charged if she refused to provide a breath sample.

On appeal, the court held that the use of the word “may” was not erroneous because police retain discretion whether to lay charges.

The court further found that the accused’s own testimony demonstrated she did not rely on any police advice in deciding to refuse the demand.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and the matter remitted for a new trial before a different judge.

The offender pleaded guilty to manslaughter after bringing a loaded handgun into a community centre while searching for individuals involved in a prior robbery.

During a confrontation, the offender attempted to strike a young person with the firearm and the gun accidentally discharged, fatally wounding the victim.

The court considered numerous aggravating factors including the illegal possession of a loaded firearm, breach of a recognizance prohibiting firearm possession, flight from police, and the devastating impact on the victim’s family and the community.

Mitigating factors included the guilty plea, youth, lack of prior criminal record, expressions of remorse, and prospects for rehabilitation.

The court imposed a global sentence reflecting denunciation and deterrence while granting enhanced credit for pre‑sentence custody due to remand conditions and institutional lockdowns.