Heather Spence

The accused, Travis Roopchand, was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level in excess of 80 mg.

The court found that the Crown proved identity beyond a reasonable doubt, establishing Roopchand as the driver.

However, the court acquitted Roopchand of impaired operation, finding insufficient evidence of impairment beyond the accident and an odour of alcohol.

Regarding the "Over 80" charge, the defence argued for exclusion of breath test results due to alleged Charter breaches (sections 8, 9, and 10(a)).

The court found no Charter breaches, or in the alternative, that any minor breach was inadvertent and would not warrant exclusion under a s. 24(2) Grant analysis.

Consequently, the breath test results were admitted, and Roopchand was found guilty of the "Over 80" charge.

The accused, charged with drug and firearm offences, brought a Charter motion challenging the validity of tracking and search warrants based on information from a confidential informant.

The court found that the police affiants engaged in deliberate deception by including false information and omitting material facts in the warrant applications, subverting the prior authorization process.

The court held that this egregious misconduct constituted an abuse of process violating section 7 of the Charter, warranting a stay of proceedings.

Alternatively, the court found the arrest unlawful and the search incident to arrest unreasonable, excluding the evidence under section 24(2).

The applicant brought a second motion under s. 11(b) of the Charter seeking a stay of proceedings for unreasonable delay.

The total delay was calculated at 30 months and 19 days, but after subtracting defence delay, the net delay was 29.5 months, which is below the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court trials.

The court found that while the defence took meaningful steps to expedite the proceedings, the case did not take markedly longer than it reasonably should have, particularly given the complexities of disclosure involving a confidential informant.

The motion for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The applicant, charged with firearms and drug trafficking offences, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing his right to a trial within a reasonable time was infringed.

The anticipated delay was 27.5 months, which is below the 30-month ceiling for Superior Court trials established in Jordan.

The applicant argued the Crown failed to conduct a diligent prosecution by delaying severance and the preferring of a direct indictment.

The court found that while the Crown's communication and timing on certain procedural steps were problematic, the overall delay did not markedly exceed what was reasonably required for a multi-accused case.

The motion was dismissed.

The accused, Doris Xhialli, was charged with failing to provide a breath sample contrary to s. 320.15(1) of the Criminal Code.

Police found the accused in the driver's seat of a vehicle with an open bottle of vodka.

After a breath demand, the accused repeatedly refused, arguing he was in a parking lot and not driving.

He was arrested.

Two minutes after arrest, while being searched, he quietly stated, "I can do it, I can do it now." The court considered whether this constituted a "last chance" offer within the same transaction and whether the accused's s. 10(b) Charter rights were breached by the officer not facilitating immediate access to counsel post-arrest.

The court found the accused's post-arrest offer to be insincere and not a genuine change of mind.

It also found no breach of s. 10(b) or s. 9 Charter rights, concluding the accused voluntarily waived his right to speak with counsel at the scene, preferring expeditious release.

The accused was found guilty.

The defendant brought a Charter application to exclude breathalyzer readings, alleging a breach of his s. 10(b) Charter rights due to a five-minute delay in providing rights to counsel after arrest.

The court found that a breach of s. 10(b) did occur, as the officer's explanations for the delay (retrieving driver's licence and cell phone, calling for a tow) did not amount to justification.

However, applying the Grant analysis, the court determined that the breach was comparatively less serious, with a medium impact on the defendant's rights, and that the societal interest in adjudicating impaired driving cases on their merits outweighed the impact of exclusion.

Consequently, the Charter application was denied, and the breathalyzer readings were admitted.

The defendant, Tariq Hansraj, was charged with 80 plus operation.

The trial addressed several Charter issues, including unlawful detention (ss. 8, 9, 10(b)), delayed breath demand, and denial of right to counsel, as well as the factual issue of care or control.

The court found an 11-minute delay in reading rights to counsel but determined it was not a serious Charter violation warranting exclusion of evidence.

The court also found that the defendant was in care or control of the vehicle, despite his arguments.

Hansraj was convicted.

The applicants, arrested in a large-scale police investigation, brought an abuse of process motion seeking a stay of proceedings due to systemic delays in holding their special bail hearings.

They argued that their section 11(e) Charter rights were violated, similar to the applicants in a previous case where a stay was granted.

The court found that while the applicants' rights were violated by the delays, the systemic problem in the jurisdiction had been largely rectified following the previous decision.

As the ongoing systemic delay had been addressed, a stay of proceedings was no longer necessary to protect the integrity of the justice system.

The application was dismissed, though the court noted the Charter violations could warrant a sentence reduction if the applicants are convicted.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and refusing to provide a breath sample following a single motor vehicle accident.

The accused challenged the grounds for her arrest under sections 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The court found that the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to believe the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol based on her observable signs of impairment at the roadside, including unsteadiness, slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, and incoherent responses.

The court also found that a formal breath demand was made at the detachment, and the accused's refusal to comply constituted the offence of refusing to provide a breath sample.

The accused was convicted on both charges.

The accused was charged with sexual assault following an alleged incident at a co-worker's birthday celebration.

The complainant had significant memory gaps due to intoxication and alleged she was sexually assaulted while unconscious or incapable of consenting.

The accused denied the allegations, providing a substantially different account of events.

The court applied the W. (D.) framework and found that while the complainant's evidence regarding the kissing incident was credible, the accused's alternative account was plausible and could not be rejected based on the evidence presented.

The Crown failed to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the charges were dismissed.

The Crown appealed the trial judge's decision to exclude breath samples and dismiss 'over 80' charges against the respondent.

The trial judge found that the investigating officer failed to administer the approved screening device 'forthwith' in violation of s. 8 of the Charter, and failed to implement the respondent's right to counsel of choice in violation of s. 10(b).

The Superior Court of Justice found no error in the trial judge's analysis, concluding that the officer prioritized privacy over the statutory imperative to administer the test forthwith, and took a 'short-cut' by calling duty counsel instead of facilitating the respondent's counsel of choice.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused was charged with "over 80" (impaired driving with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit).

The trial focused on whether police breached the accused's Charter rights during the breath testing procedure.

The court found that a police officer assaulted the accused while he was in custody and handcuffed to a bench, attempting to force him to speak to his girlfriend.

The court determined this constituted a serious breach of the accused's section 7 Charter rights (security of the person).

The court further found that the police failed to properly investigate or report the allegation of assault.

Consequently, the court excluded the breath test evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

A police officer arrested the accused for impaired driving but failed to immediately advise him of his right to counsel, instead choosing to search for identification and seize an item from the vehicle.

The Crown conceded this constituted a breach of s. 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found the breach sufficiently serious to warrant exclusion of the breath test results, particularly given systemic failures by the Peel Regional Police to comply with the immediacy requirement.

The accused was convicted of impaired driving based on observations of erratic driving and physical indicia of impairment, but the charge of exceeding the legal limit was dismissed due to the exclusion of the breath test evidence.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving, "over 80," and dangerous driving following a June 6, 2015 motor vehicle accident.

The trial was originally scheduled for July 28-29, 2016 but was not reached and rescheduled for January 16-17, 2017.

The defendant applied for a stay of proceedings pursuant to section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay.

The parties agreed that the net delay was 18 months and 28 days, exceeding the presumptive ceiling of 18 months established in R. v. Jordan by 28 days.

The Crown argued a transitional exceptional circumstance applied, but the court found the Crown failed to establish this exception and granted the stay of proceedings.

The defendant was charged with Over 80 contrary to s. 254(1)(b) of the Criminal Code following a roadside stop and breath demand.

All issues were conceded except for a s. 9 Charter application alleging arbitrary detention.

The court found that the defendant was arbitrarily detained and imprisoned for over six hours after the investigation was complete, as the officers in charge failed to release her despite having no reasonable grounds to continue detention.

The court excluded the breath readings as evidence pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The defendant was acquitted.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol content (Over 80).

Following her arrest and breath testing, which revealed readings of 145 mg/100 ml and 135 mg/100 ml, she was detained at the police station.

The defendant brought a Charter application alleging a breach of Section 9 (arbitrary detention).

The court found that while the initial detention was lawful, the defendant was unlawfully held for approximately six hours beyond the point at which she should have been released.

The officers in charge failed to establish reasonable grounds under Section 498(1.1) of the Criminal Code to justify the continued detention.

The court found a Section 9 Charter breach and adjourned the matter for submissions on remedy.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and over 80 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood following a motor vehicle incident on September 20, 2013.

The Crown established that the accused was driving during the operative two-hour window and that breath samples were taken as soon as practicable.

Although the statutory presumption of care or control was rebutted due to the vehicle being inoperable, the Crown proved de facto care or control based on the accused's ongoing intentional course of conduct with the vehicle in circumstances creating a realistic risk of danger.

The court found the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol, evidenced by observations of impairment, alcohol on breath, stumbling, red-rimmed eyes, and impaired judgment in standing on a live traffic lane.

Both charges were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

At trial, the accused brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The central issue was whether the "forthwith" requirement under section 254(2) of the Criminal Code was met when the police officer made a breath demand but did not have an approved screening device available, resulting in a 14-minute delay before the sample could be obtained.

The court found that the forthwith requirement was not met, that the accused's Charter rights were violated, and that the breath samples should be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The charge was dismissed.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess alcohol following observations of erratic driving on Highway 400.

The Crown sought to rely on breath test results taken approximately 113 minutes after the alleged offence.

The court addressed three key issues: whether the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest for impaired driving; whether the first breath test was taken within two hours of the offence; and whether the Crown proved impaired driving beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found reasonable and probable grounds existed, the two-hour requirement was satisfied, and the Crown proved impairment beyond a reasonable doubt based on civilian witness observations of repeated lane weaving, officer observations of physical signs of impairment, and breath test results.

The accused was charged with Impaired Care or Control and Care or Control Over 80 following an investigation while sitting in a parked motor vehicle.

The Crown alleged the accused exhibited indicia of impairment warranting arrest.

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the arrest, arguing there were no objective reasonable and probable grounds, and sought exclusion of breath test results under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The court found breaches of Charter ss. 8 and 9 rights but admitted the evidence under s. 24(2) analysis.

The court convicted on the Care or Control Over 80 charge but acquitted on the Impaired Care or Control charge.