Paul H. Reinhardt

The accused pleaded guilty to attempting to break and enter a dwelling house with intent to commit an indictable offence and theft under five thousand dollars.

The Crown sought a global sentence of twelve months less pre-sentence detention credited at 1.5 to 1, followed by three years probation.

The defence sought time served plus two years probation, emphasizing the accused's difficult personal history as a Kurdish Convention refugee and the minimal nature of the offences.

The court imposed a sentence of time served plus one day in gaol on the attempt charge, with fifteen days concurrent on the theft charge, followed by three years concurrent probation.

The court considered collateral consequences under immigration law but found no risk of deportation given the accused's protected status as a Convention refugee.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, and with having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol.

The accused was found sleeping in the driver's seat of his parked vehicle on a residential side street adjacent to his apartment building.

The trial judge found that the Crown failed to prove an essential element of the offence—that the accused had care or control of the vehicle.

Applying the framework established in R. v. Boudreault, the court determined that the accused had rebutted the statutory presumption of care or control under section 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code by establishing he had no intention to drive.

Furthermore, the Crown failed to establish a realistic risk of danger to persons or property, as the vehicle was safely parked on a quiet residential street with no foreseeable danger.

The accused was acquitted on both counts.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference with a child under 16 years of age, allegedly occurring between March 5 and March 27, 2017.

The Crown's case relied primarily on the testimony of the eight-year-old complainant, who was seven years old at the time of the alleged offences.

The trial judge found that the Crown had not proven the offences beyond a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused on both counts.

The judgment focused on credibility and reliability issues with the complainant's testimony, including inconsistencies regarding when the assaults allegedly occurred, the complainant's failure to disclose to her parents despite having the opportunity to do so, and the absence of material details regarding the alleged assaults.

The accused was charged with sexual assault contrary to section 271 of the Criminal Code for conduct occurring on November 27, 2015, in Toronto.

The complainant attended what she believed to be a film audition and participated in two filmed scenes involving sexual activity.

The Crown alleged the accused committed sexual assault by touching the complainant without consent during Scene 1 and by penetrating her vagina without consent during Scene 2.

The trial judge found that the Crown failed to prove lack of consent beyond a reasonable doubt.

The judge concluded the complainant consented to the filmed audition, that any penetrations in Scene 2 were accidental, and that the accused held a reasonable but mistaken belief in consent.

The charge was dismissed.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control of a motor vehicle under section 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged that the accused drove a Honda Odyssey van to his wife's workplace while impaired by alcohol.

The defence argued that the accused did not drive the vehicle; rather, his cousin drove it while the accused sat in the passenger seat.

The trial judge found that the Crown's evidence was internally inconsistent and contradictory regarding whether the accused was in the driver's seat or had care or control of the vehicle.

The Crown witnesses gave conflicting accounts of the accused's position when first observed by police.

The trial judge preferred the credible testimony of the accused's wife and the defence witnesses, which established that the accused's cousin drove the vehicle.

The trial judge found reasonable doubt on the issue of care or control and acquitted the accused.

The accused pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine for the purposes of trafficking contrary to section 4(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

Police seized 81.64 grams of cocaine powder from the accused's family residence where three young children and a teenager were living.

The Crown sought a 15-month custodial sentence, while the defence sought 3 to 6 months followed by probation.

The court imposed a 6-month custodial sentence followed by 3 years' probation with conditions including a curfew and 180 hours of community service.

The court balanced aggravating factors (quantity of drugs, prior trafficking conviction, presence of children in the home) against significant mitigating factors (full cooperation with police, genuine remorse, role as primary caregiver and financial provider for extended family, successful completion of counselling, low risk of reoffending).

The applicant brought a motion under sections 15 and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms seeking a stay of proceedings for impaired driving and over 80 operation charges.

The applicant, who has multiple disabilities including visual impairment (alternating exotropia), ADHD, and significant scarring from chemical burns, alleged that state actors (Crown, court clerks, accessibility coordinator, and police) failed to provide timely and independent disability accommodation, resulting in differential treatment contrary to section 15.

The applicant argued that inadequate accommodation led to his failure to appear on two occasions, resulting in unnecessary strip searches.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the conduct of state actors is subject to Charter scrutiny under Eldridge, the applicant failed to establish a factual foundation for a section 15 breach.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with blood alcohol content exceeding the legal limit (over 80) following a motor vehicle stop on January 16, 2010.

The accused brought multiple Charter applications alleging breaches of sections 8, 10(b), 11(b), 9, and 15.

The court dismissed the Charter applications.

On the substantive charges, the court found that while the Crown proved the over 80 charge beyond a reasonable doubt based on breath test readings of 170 and 180 milligrams, the impaired driving charge was dismissed because the Crown's evidence regarding impairment was undermined by the accused's pre-existing physical disabilities from a chemical fire injury, which made certain behavioral markers attributable to disability rather than alcohol consumption.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown's case relied on an approved screening device test and breathalyzer results.

The court found that the arresting officer lacked the requisite reasonable suspicion to demand the approved screening device test under section 254(2) of the Criminal Code.

The officer's testimony was equivocal and inconsistent with his notes and the testimony of other Crown witnesses.

The court excluded the breathalyzer evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter due to the serious Charter breach and credibility concerns regarding the officer's investigation and testimony.

Without the breathalyzer evidence, the Crown failed to prove impaired driving beyond a reasonable doubt.

Both counts were dismissed.

The accused, Angela Smith, was charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

She brought an application for a stay of proceedings based on two Charter breaches: (1) loss of material evidence (the digital video recording from the holding cell) contrary to sections 7 and 11(d), and (2) excessive invasion of privacy through surveillance of her while using the toilet in the holding cell, contrary to section 8.

The court found both breaches established and granted a stay of proceedings, finding this to be the clearest of cases given the systemic and ongoing nature of the privacy violation, the accused's awareness of being recorded, the lack of legitimate safety concerns, and the failure of police to provide basic feminine hygiene accommodations.

The accused brought a motion to quash three search warrants and exclude evidence obtained from their execution.

The warrants were issued based on an Information to Obtain (ITO) that relied primarily on an unconfirmed tip from a confidential informant regarding drug dealing outside a bar, supplemented by limited surveillance observations and an undercover entry into the accused's apartment.

The court found that the ITO lacked sufficient credible and reliable evidence to establish reasonable and probable grounds for the warrants.

Additionally, the manner of execution—including an unannounced forced entry and ramming of doors—was unreasonable.

The court excluded all evidence obtained from the searches under section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute due to inadequate police disclosure, sloppy investigative work, and excessive force during execution.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings on the grounds that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been breached.

The charges arose from an alleged impaired driving incident on January 16, 2010.

The matter had a complex procedural history, including an initial stay granted by a trial judge in September 2011, which was subsequently overturned on Crown appeal in May 2012.

The court considered the length of delay, reasons for delay, and prejudice to the accused.

The application was dismissed, finding no unreasonable delay attributable to the Crown or institutional factors, and no sufficient actual prejudice to warrant Charter relief.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine and cannabis for the purposes of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

A Charter application was brought challenging the lawfulness of the vehicle search and cell phone seizure.

The court found that the initial traffic stop was justified based on unattached licence plates.

However, the subsequent search of the concealed tire-well compartment in the vehicle trunk was found to be an unreasonable search in breach of section 8 of the Charter.

The court concluded that the officers lacked reasonable grounds to arrest prior to discovering the drugs and that the search was not a bona fide inventory search but rather a pretext for a drug investigation.

The evidence was excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused pleaded guilty to six counts of robbery and six counts of using an imitation firearm in the commission of an indictable offence.

The robberies occurred between December 2011 and January 2012 at various financial institutions in Toronto.

The accused displayed an imitation firearm during each robbery and made demands for money, obtaining approximately $34,000 in total with no recovery.

The court imposed a global sentence of eight years less pre-sentence custody credit, resulting in an additional five years, eight months and 19 days of imprisonment.

The sentence balanced principles of denunciation and deterrence with rehabilitation, taking into account the accused's remorse, medical evidence of improvement, and potential for rehabilitation.

The accused was charged with criminal negligence causing death and dangerous driving causing death following a motor vehicle collision on Highway 427 in Toronto on August 16, 2010, which resulted in the death of the front passenger, Allison Stachyra.

At the preliminary inquiry, the Crown presented evidence of the accused's manner of driving, including testimony from civilian witnesses describing dangerous driving behavior, and expert evidence from a collision reconstruction specialist.

The defence argued that intervening factors, including the passenger's failure to wear a seatbelt and the possibility that the passenger grabbed the steering wheel, broke the chain of causation.

The court found sufficient evidence to commit the accused to trial on the charge of dangerous driving causing death, applying the minimal threshold test for committal.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defence brought a Charter application alleging multiple breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, including: failure to comply with the "forthwith" requirement for the roadside screening device demand; improper calibration of the approved screening device; failure to inform the accused of his right to counsel; and arbitrary detention following the investigation.

The court found multiple Charter breaches and excluded the breath test evidence, resulting in acquittal.

The accused pleaded guilty to mischief and breach of probation arising from a disturbance at a Toronto Dominion Bank on April 30, 2012.

The Crown sought an assessment to determine whether the accused was not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD).

Following a psychiatric assessment by Dr. Angus McDonald and testimony, the court found that the accused was suffering from schizoaffective psychosis with paranoid features and was incapable of appreciating the nature and quality of his actions and unable to know that his conduct was wrong at the time of the offences.

The court made a finding of NCRMD and remitted the matter to the Ontario Review Board for disposition.

The applicant brought a motion for a stay of proceedings based on unreasonable delay contrary to section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The applicant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding eighty milligrams per one hundred millilitres of blood on November 8, 2011, and was charged on November 9, 2011.

The trial was scheduled for March 18-19, 2013, representing an overall delay of approximately 16 months and 9 days.

The applicant argued that Crown delay in providing disclosure and institutional delay totalled approximately 15 months and 10 days.

The Crown argued that after accounting for neutral intake and preparation periods, the actual attributable delay was approximately 8 months and 25 days.

The court found that Crown delay totalled approximately 111 days and institutional delay after trial date was set totalled approximately 7 months and 6 days, for a total of just under 11 months of attributable delay.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the delay, while significant, was not unreasonable in the context of a complex drinking and driving case involving Charter breaches and did not result in sufficient prejudice to warrant a stay of proceedings.

A 20-year-old first-time offender pleaded guilty to assault with a weapon and dangerous driving arising from an incident on the Gardiner Expressway in which he displayed a BB gun at another vehicle, causing the other driver to swerve and nearly collide with other vehicles.

The Crown sought four to six months custody plus ancillary orders.

The defence sought an absolute discharge.

The court granted an absolute discharge on both counts, finding that the offender's momentary lapse in judgment was completely out of character, that he presented a low risk of recidivism, and that the ancillary orders provided sufficient protection for the public interest.

The accused brought a motion for a stay of proceedings under section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging a breach of his right to trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b).

The accused was charged with falsely representing himself to be a peace officer on October 12, 2010.

The information was sworn on November 12, 2010, and the trial was scheduled to proceed on March 27, 2012, representing an overall delay of sixteen months.

The court applied the framework established in R. v. Morin and subsequent jurisprudence, including R. v. Lahiry, to calculate the delay.

The court found that the total period of unjustified delay was five and a half months, consisting of four and a half months of institutional delay and one month of Crown delay, which fell well within the eight to ten month guidelines for the Ontario Court of Justice.

The court found no significant prejudice to the accused and concluded that the societal interest in hearing the matter on the merits outweighed any prejudice suffered.

The motion was dismissed.