Margaux Peck

The appellant was convicted of dangerous driving causing bodily harm following a motor vehicle collision in Mississauga.

He appealed on two grounds: first, that the 31-month delay from charge to trial violated his Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time under the new framework established in R. v. Jordan; and second, that the trial judge erred in finding the actus reus of dangerous driving by impermissibly inferring excessive speed from the consequences of the driving rather than the manner of driving.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the delay was reasonable for a transitional case and that the trial judge properly focused on the manner of driving in establishing the actus reus.

The applicant brought a motion under sections 15 and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms seeking a stay of proceedings for impaired driving and over 80 operation charges.

The applicant, who has multiple disabilities including visual impairment (alternating exotropia), ADHD, and significant scarring from chemical burns, alleged that state actors (Crown, court clerks, accessibility coordinator, and police) failed to provide timely and independent disability accommodation, resulting in differential treatment contrary to section 15.

The applicant argued that inadequate accommodation led to his failure to appear on two occasions, resulting in unnecessary strip searches.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the conduct of state actors is subject to Charter scrutiny under Eldridge, the applicant failed to establish a factual foundation for a section 15 breach.

The accused pleaded guilty to theft under s. 322 of the Criminal Code, having misappropriated $14,200 from her elderly mother's bank account while acting as power of attorney.

The victim, an 83-year-old widow suffering from dementia, was residing in long-term care.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of one year to be served in the community, followed by three years of probation.

The sentence emphasized the aggravating factor of breach of trust and the vulnerability of the victim, while considering the accused's age, lack of prior criminal record, and character references.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with over 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood following an incident on March 15, 2014.

The Crown invited acquittal on the impaired driving charge due to insufficient evidence of actual impairment.

The trial focused on Charter violations: whether the arrest and breath demand were made on reasonable and probable grounds (Section 8), whether breath samples were taken as soon as practicable, and whether the accused's detention for a show cause hearing was lawful (Section 9).

The court found the arrest was made without sufficient grounds, the breath samples were obtained in violation of Section 8 rights, and the detention was unlawful and arbitrary based solely on the accused's status as a non-citizen.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence under Section 24(2) and granted a stay of proceedings based on systemic police training failures regarding release provisions.

This is a preliminary inquiry decision concerning charges of human trafficking, procuring for prostitution, and related offences against two accused.

The court applied the test from Arcuri to determine whether sufficient evidence existed to commit the accused to trial.

The judge found sufficient evidence on multiple counts relating to the exploitation of vulnerable women in the sex trade, including evidence of control, direction, and influence over complainants' movements and earnings.

The court committed both accused on various counts while discharging others where insufficient evidence was presented.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with exceeding the legal blood alcohol limit, contrary to sections 253(1)(a) and (b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused was found sleeping in the driver's seat of a parked vehicle in a parking lot.

The Crown relied on the presumption in section 258(1)(a) that an accused found in the driver's seat is presumed to have care or control unless they satisfy the court they did not intend to drive.

The accused testified he deliberately pulled over after realizing he was too impaired and fatigued to continue driving, and intended to wait for his girlfriend to pick him up.

The trial judge found the accused credible and determined he had rebutted the presumption.

The Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a realistic risk the accused would change his mind and drive.

The accused was acquitted of both charges.

The Crown charged two defendants with assault causing bodily harm to Christopher Marcos, who was savagely beaten outside a nightclub in Toronto's Entertainment District on June 18, 2011.

The victim recalled little of the incident and could not identify his assailants.

The Crown's case rested entirely on the testimony of four Toronto Police Service officers who claimed to have witnessed the assault.

The sole issue was the identity of the perpetrators.

The defendants did not testify.

The court found that while the police witnesses may have observed an assault, their evidence fell short of the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt required for conviction due to significant inconsistencies in their accounts, the problematic manner in which their notes were prepared collaboratively, and the absence of any blood evidence on either defendant despite the victim being severely bloodied.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit following a single-vehicle accident on January 15, 2011.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of evidence, alleging violations of sections 8 and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court dismissed the Charter application and found the accused guilty on both counts.

The court found that police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest and make a breathalyzer demand, that the accused's right to counsel was properly respected, and that the Crown proved impairment and the blood alcohol readings beyond a reasonable doubt.

The over 80 charge was stayed on the basis of the Kienapple principle, with conviction entered on the impaired operation charge.

The accused was charged with driving while having over 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood following a RIDE program stop.

The central issue was the admissibility of breath samples obtained at the police station.

The defence argued the samples were taken in violation of section 8 Charter rights and that the Crown failed to establish statutory compliance under the Criminal Code.

The court found that the officer lacked reasonable grounds to believe the approved screening device was in proper working order, thereby violating the accused's section 8 rights.

Applying the section 24(2) test from R. v. Grant, the court excluded the breath test results and acquitted the accused.

The appellant appealed a conviction for refusal to provide a roadside breath sample, arguing that the trial judge improperly used his silence as evidence of guilt.

The appeal challenged references made by the trial judge to the appellant’s failure to explain his inability to provide a sample at the roadside and his decision not to testify at trial or during a Charter motion alleging lost evidence.

The court held that comments about the absence of testimony on the Charter motion were permissible because the burden rested on the accused in that context.

The court further held that the trial judge’s observation that no defence evidence contradicted the officers’ testimony did not improperly use silence as proof of guilt, but merely noted the unchallenged nature of the Crown’s case.

The appeal was dismissed.