Rebecca Manjula Edward

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit following a single-vehicle accident on January 15, 2011.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of evidence, alleging violations of sections 8 and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court dismissed the Charter application and found the accused guilty on both counts.

The court found that police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest and make a breathalyzer demand, that the accused's right to counsel was properly respected, and that the Crown proved impairment and the blood alcohol readings beyond a reasonable doubt.

The over 80 charge was stayed on the basis of the Kienapple principle, with conviction entered on the impaired operation charge.

The accused brought a pretrial application seeking a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay of approximately 22¾ months between arrest and the start of trial.

The court applied the framework from R. v. Morin and assessed the length of delay, waiver, reasons for delay, and prejudice to the accused.

Much of the delay was attributed to neutral intake periods, inherent time requirements of the case, and systemic delay within accepted administrative guidelines.

Although the accused remained in pretrial custody for nearly 22 months, the court found the delays adequately explained and largely unavoidable.

Balancing the accused’s liberty interests against the strong societal interest in adjudicating serious firearms and drug trafficking charges, the court held that the right to be tried within a reasonable time was not breached.

The accused was charged with impaired driving after being stopped while driving the wrong way on Adelaide Street West in downtown Toronto with blood alcohol readings of 230 and 232 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The Crown's evidence of impairment was undisputed.

The sole issue was whether the accused possessed the requisite mens rea.

The accused testified that he consumed only two drinks voluntarily and suggested that his unattended drink may have been drugged, causing him to lose cognitive awareness of subsequent alcohol consumption.

The court found that the evidence raised a reasonable doubt regarding whether the impairment resulted from voluntary consumption, and acquitted the accused.