Joanne Julie Bruno

The Crown appealed a conditional discharge sentence imposed on the respondent for assault with a weapon, weapons dangerous, and carrying a concealed weapon.

The respondent had attacked a pregnant dental clinic staff member with a knife.

The sentencing judge had imposed a conditional discharge, largely due to the respondent's 126 days of pre-trial custody and mental health issues.

The Superior Court found the sentencing judge erred by not giving sufficient weight to the victim's impact, failing to acknowledge aggravating factors (planning, weapon use), and misapplying the pre-trial custody credit in the context of a conditional discharge.

The court determined the conditional discharge was demonstrably unfit, set it aside, and imposed a sentence of 189 days custody (deemed served due to pre-trial custody with enhanced credit) and varied the probation order to include reporting and counselling conditions.

This is an appeal from a conviction for sexual assault.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's findings on three grounds: inferring the complainant's non-impairment without expert evidence, alleged improper conduct by the Crown regarding the complainant's prior relationship, and uneven scrutiny of the appellant's and complainant's testimony.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge was entitled to accept the complainant's evidence regarding non-impairment, that the Crown's submission, while potentially improper, caused no prejudice as the prior relationship's nature was irrelevant to consent, and that the trial judge's differential treatment of argumentativeness and assessment of inconsistencies did not constitute reversible error or uneven scrutiny.

The appellant appealed convictions for impaired operation and having a blood alcohol concentration over the legal limit, arguing police lacked reasonable grounds for arrest (sections 8 and 9 Charter) and that delayed advice of the right to counsel (sections 10(a) and 10(b) Charter) warranted exclusion of evidence under section 24(2).

The court found police had reasonable grounds for arrest.

While acknowledging Charter breaches due to interpreter delay, the court re-evaluated the section 24(2) analysis, finding the trial judge erred in underestimating the breach's impact but ultimately concluding that admission of evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Janos Rweyemanu Rutaihwa, appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient, failed to resolve material inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence, and took improper judicial notice regarding the nature of the sexual intercourse.

The appeal court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credible and reliable evidence, which was found to have "remarkable particularity." The court also found no misapprehension of the appellant's evidence regarding alcohol consumption or improper judicial notice, concluding that the trial judge's findings were supported by the evidence and that the appellant's evidence was unreliable.

The appellant appealed his conviction for uttering a threat to cause death, assault with a weapon, and failing to comply with an undertaking, arguing the trial judge erred in rejecting his self-defence claim and in assessing evidence.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh evidence, which was denied for lack of due diligence and cogency.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the W.D. framework, thoroughly considered all evidence, and provided cogent reasons for rejecting the appellant's credibility and self-defence claim.

The court affirmed the trial judge's factual findings and credibility assessments, concluding there was no legal error or misapprehension of evidence.

The accused pleaded guilty to being unlawfully in a dwelling on April 18, 2020, break and enter with intent to commit an indictable offence on April 19, 2020, and failure to comply with a probation order.

The central issue was the calculation of enhanced presentence custody credit, particularly regarding lockdown conditions at Toronto South Detention Centre and COVID-19 pandemic impacts.

The court imposed an 18-month global sentence with enhanced presentence custody credit totalling 18 months, resulting in immediate release on probation.

The judgment addresses systemic failures in the detention centre's provision of personal protective equipment to vulnerable detainees.

The defendant, a 52-year-old early childhood educator with 27 years of experience, was charged with assault causing bodily harm after a four-year-old child in her care fell off a cot during naptime and sustained a lip injury requiring seven stitches.

The Crown alleged the defendant intentionally lifted or moved the child's bed to teach him a lesson for jumping on it.

The defendant maintained her conduct was accidental—that her foot inadvertently slid under the bed while she was attempting to protectively grab the child's legs to prevent him from falling.

The court found the defendant not guilty, determining that while her account strained credulity, it might reasonably be true and left the court in reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant's contact with the bed was intentional or merely accidental.

The Crown applied to exclude the public from the courtroom pursuant to section 486(1) of the Criminal Code while the complainant testified at a preliminary inquiry.

The accused was charged with multiple offences including extortion, sexual assault, invitation to touch, permitting a person under 16 to be in premises for sexual activity, sexual interference, and defamatory libel.

The complainant, a member of the Afghan community, feared serious repercussions including physical violence and social isolation if her identity became known.

The court granted the Crown's application, finding that the complainant had a genuine and objectively reasonable fear for her physical safety and that excluding the public was necessary for the proper administration of justice.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation and excess alcohol on December 6, 2012.

He brought a motion under sections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms seeking a stay of proceedings on the grounds that his right to a trial within a reasonable period of time had been infringed.

The total delay from charge to expected trial conclusion was approximately 16 months.

The court analyzed the delay by considering the length of delay, periods waived by the defence, reasons for the delay (inherent time requirements, accused's actions, Crown's actions, and institutional resource limitations), prejudice to the accused, and the balance between the accused's interests and society's interests in a trial on the merits.

The court found that the delay attributable to the Crown was 7.5 months, which fell below the Askov/Morin guidelines of 8-10 months.

Although the defendant suffered significant prejudice in terms of stress, anxiety, and physical health impacts, the court concluded that this prejudice was outweighed by society's strong interest in a trial on the merits for serious charges involving impaired driving and personal injury.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with impaired operation and excess alcohol following a motor vehicle collision.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of breath sample evidence, alleging violations of sections 8 and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found that while the officer had reasonable suspicion to demand an Approved Screening Device test, the officer breached the accused's section 10(b) rights by failing to provide a Prosper warning and obtain an unequivocal waiver when the accused changed his mind about contacting counsel.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The Crown charged two defendants with assault causing bodily harm to Christopher Marcos, who was savagely beaten outside a nightclub in Toronto's Entertainment District on June 18, 2011.

The victim recalled little of the incident and could not identify his assailants.

The Crown's case rested entirely on the testimony of four Toronto Police Service officers who claimed to have witnessed the assault.

The sole issue was the identity of the perpetrators.

The defendants did not testify.

The court found that while the police witnesses may have observed an assault, their evidence fell short of the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt required for conviction due to significant inconsistencies in their accounts, the problematic manner in which their notes were prepared collaboratively, and the absence of any blood evidence on either defendant despite the victim being severely bloodied.

The offender was sentenced following a jury conviction for sexual assault causing bodily harm, forcible confinement, uttering threats, and assault with a weapon arising from a prolonged violent assault against the complainant in the offender’s apartment.

The evidence included physical injuries, corroborating forensic evidence, a recording captured by the complainant during the assault, and a whispered 911 call made after the offender fell asleep.

The court considered aggravating factors including the prolonged and violent nature of the sexual assaults, use of a weapon, psychological harm to the complainant, and evidence of a prior incident involving aggression toward a woman.

Applying sentencing principles under s. 718 of the Criminal Code and reviewing comparable authorities, the court concluded that denunciation and deterrence were paramount.

A global custodial sentence of five years was imposed, less credit for pre‑sentence custody, together with ancillary orders.

The accused brought a motion for a stay of proceedings under section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging a breach of his right to trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b).

The accused was charged with falsely representing himself to be a peace officer on October 12, 2010.

The information was sworn on November 12, 2010, and the trial was scheduled to proceed on March 27, 2012, representing an overall delay of sixteen months.

The court applied the framework established in R. v. Morin and subsequent jurisprudence, including R. v. Lahiry, to calculate the delay.

The court found that the total period of unjustified delay was five and a half months, consisting of four and a half months of institutional delay and one month of Crown delay, which fell well within the eight to ten month guidelines for the Ontario Court of Justice.

The court found no significant prejudice to the accused and concluded that the societal interest in hearing the matter on the merits outweighed any prejudice suffered.

The motion was dismissed.