Joanne Julie Bruno

The Crown appealed a conditional discharge sentence imposed on the respondent for assault with a weapon, weapons dangerous, and carrying a concealed weapon.

The respondent had attacked a pregnant dental clinic staff member with a knife.

The sentencing judge had imposed a conditional discharge, largely due to the respondent's 126 days of pre-trial custody and mental health issues.

The Superior Court found the sentencing judge erred by not giving sufficient weight to the victim's impact, failing to acknowledge aggravating factors (planning, weapon use), and misapplying the pre-trial custody credit in the context of a conditional discharge.

The court determined the conditional discharge was demonstrably unfit, set it aside, and imposed a sentence of 189 days custody (deemed served due to pre-trial custody with enhanced credit) and varied the probation order to include reporting and counselling conditions.

This is an appeal from a conviction for sexual assault.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's findings on three grounds: inferring the complainant's non-impairment without expert evidence, alleged improper conduct by the Crown regarding the complainant's prior relationship, and uneven scrutiny of the appellant's and complainant's testimony.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge was entitled to accept the complainant's evidence regarding non-impairment, that the Crown's submission, while potentially improper, caused no prejudice as the prior relationship's nature was irrelevant to consent, and that the trial judge's differential treatment of argumentativeness and assessment of inconsistencies did not constitute reversible error or uneven scrutiny.

The applicant sought leave to extend the time to file a notice of appeal from his conviction for assault with a weapon, entered following a guilty plea.

He argued his plea was uninformed regarding potential deportation consequences.

The court applied the test for extending time to appeal and found the applicant lacked a bona fide intention to appeal within the prescribed time, failed to properly account for the delay, and his counsel did not act diligently.

Furthermore, the court found the applicant's claims regarding his lack of knowledge of immigration consequences lacked credibility and contradicted the record from the plea hearing.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions for impaired operation and having a blood alcohol concentration over the legal limit, arguing police lacked reasonable grounds for arrest (sections 8 and 9 Charter) and that delayed advice of the right to counsel (sections 10(a) and 10(b) Charter) warranted exclusion of evidence under section 24(2).

The court found police had reasonable grounds for arrest.

While acknowledging Charter breaches due to interpreter delay, the court re-evaluated the section 24(2) analysis, finding the trial judge erred in underestimating the breach's impact but ultimately concluding that admission of evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his assault conviction, arguing the trial judge erred by granting only a 20-minute adjournment after the Crown made late disclosure of a photograph and text messages during the complainant's cross-examination.

The Superior Court found that while the trial judge's adjournment decision was based on improper principles and a faulty factual foundation, the defence was not prejudiced.

The defence was able to fully cross-examine the complainant on the new evidence, meaning no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred.

The appeal was dismissed under the curative proviso.

The appellant appealed her convictions for assault, threatening, mischief, and forcible entry on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel.

She alleged her trial lawyer was unprepared, failed to provide proper advice, brought a meritless stay application, and sexually harassed her.

The Superior Court of Justice found that while the appellant did not demonstrate the verdict would have been different, trial counsel's pervasive incompetence and sexual harassment of the appellant compromised the fairness of the trial, amounting to a constructive denial of the assistance of counsel.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, a religious teacher, appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference against a 10-year-old student.

He argued the trial judge erred by failing to address inconsistencies and implausibilities in the complainant's evidence, improperly using a prior consistent statement to bolster credibility, and conflating the absence of a motive to fabricate with positive proof of no motive.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge adequately addressed the evidence, properly used the prior consistent statement as circumstantial evidence, and correctly addressed the motive to fabricate in response to the defence's cross-examination.

The applicant pleaded guilty to assault causing bodily harm in 2015 and received a suspended sentence.

He later learned that the conviction constituted 'serious criminality' under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, creating a likely insurmountable barrier to his application for permanent resident status.

He brought a motion for an extension of time to appeal his conviction and sentence, arguing he was not informed of the immigration consequences at the time of his plea.

The court granted the extension, finding the applicant had a reasonable explanation for the delay, the proposed appeal had merit based on an uninformed plea and ineffective assistance of counsel, and the interests of justice favoured granting the extension.

The applicant sought leave to extend the time to file an appeal of his conviction and sentence for assault causing bodily harm.

He argued that he was unaware of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea and that he was unfit to stand trial.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant was aware of the immigration consequences, the delay was unexplained, and the proposed appeal lacked merit as he had been properly found fit to stand trial and a conditional discharge was disproportionate to the offence.

The appellant, Janos Rweyemanu Rutaihwa, appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient, failed to resolve material inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence, and took improper judicial notice regarding the nature of the sexual intercourse.

The appeal court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credible and reliable evidence, which was found to have "remarkable particularity." The court also found no misapprehension of the appellant's evidence regarding alcohol consumption or improper judicial notice, concluding that the trial judge's findings were supported by the evidence and that the appellant's evidence was unreliable.

The appellant appealed his conviction for uttering a threat to cause death, assault with a weapon, and failing to comply with an undertaking, arguing the trial judge erred in rejecting his self-defence claim and in assessing evidence.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh evidence, which was denied for lack of due diligence and cogency.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the W.D. framework, thoroughly considered all evidence, and provided cogent reasons for rejecting the appellant's credibility and self-defence claim.

The court affirmed the trial judge's factual findings and credibility assessments, concluding there was no legal error or misapprehension of evidence.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle.

The charge arose from the respondent's driving after she crashed into a condominium lobby window.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred in law by conflating the actus reus and mens rea analyses and failing to conduct a proper risk assessment.

The Superior Court of Justice found no error, holding that the trial judge properly assessed the circumstances and correctly concluded the driving was neither dangerous nor a marked departure from the standard of care.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed her conviction for driving with a blood alcohol level over 80mg.

She argued the trial judge erred in allowing the Crown to recall a witness, in finding she was the driver, and in finding reasonable and probable grounds for her arrest.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's procedural discretion, factual findings on identification, or conclusion that objective grounds existed for the arrest.

The court also upheld the trial judge's alternative finding that the breath samples would be admissible under section 24(2) of the Charter even if a breach had occurred.

The appellant, an inmate serving a life sentence, was convicted of assaulting two jail guards.

At trial, he represented himself and brought a Charter application alleging severe mistreatment by correctional officers following the assault, including being left in handcuffs for hours, denied food and washroom access, and having his property destroyed.

The trial judge dismissed the Charter application, concluding he had no jurisdiction to grant a stay of proceedings for state misconduct that occurred after the events giving rise to the charges.

On appeal, the Superior Court of Justice found this was an error of law, as courts have the authority to order a stay for post-offence state misconduct.

The convictions were quashed and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of refusing to provide a breath sample.

The trial judge had acquitted the respondent after finding a reasonable doubt regarding the validity of the officer's demand, based on concerns about the officer's credibility regarding the smell of alcohol.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge did not conflate objective reasonableness with proof beyond a reasonable doubt, properly assessed the factors for reasonable suspicion, and provided sufficient reasons for his credibility findings.

The applicants sought certiorari to quash an order committing them to stand trial for attempted murder and related offences concerning an unidentified passenger in a taxi.

They conceded there was sufficient evidence to commit them regarding the identified passenger, but argued there was no evidence they targeted the unidentified passenger.

The reviewing court found that circumstantial evidence, including a plural racial slur and continued shooting after the identified passenger was hit, provided the requisite scintilla of evidence to support the committal.

The application was dismissed.

The accused pleaded guilty to being unlawfully in a dwelling on April 18, 2020, break and enter with intent to commit an indictable offence on April 19, 2020, and failure to comply with a probation order.

The central issue was the calculation of enhanced presentence custody credit, particularly regarding lockdown conditions at Toronto South Detention Centre and COVID-19 pandemic impacts.

The court imposed an 18-month global sentence with enhanced presentence custody credit totalling 18 months, resulting in immediate release on probation.

The judgment addresses systemic failures in the detention centre's provision of personal protective equipment to vulnerable detainees.

The defendant, a 52-year-old early childhood educator with 27 years of experience, was charged with assault causing bodily harm after a four-year-old child in her care fell off a cot during naptime and sustained a lip injury requiring seven stitches.

The Crown alleged the defendant intentionally lifted or moved the child's bed to teach him a lesson for jumping on it.

The defendant maintained her conduct was accidental—that her foot inadvertently slid under the bed while she was attempting to protectively grab the child's legs to prevent him from falling.

The court found the defendant not guilty, determining that while her account strained credulity, it might reasonably be true and left the court in reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant's contact with the bed was intentional or merely accidental.

The Crown applied to exclude the public from the courtroom pursuant to section 486(1) of the Criminal Code while the complainant testified at a preliminary inquiry.

The accused was charged with multiple offences including extortion, sexual assault, invitation to touch, permitting a person under 16 to be in premises for sexual activity, sexual interference, and defamatory libel.

The complainant, a member of the Afghan community, feared serious repercussions including physical violence and social isolation if her identity became known.

The court granted the Crown's application, finding that the complainant had a genuine and objectively reasonable fear for her physical safety and that excluding the public was necessary for the proper administration of justice.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation and excess alcohol on December 6, 2012.

He brought a motion under sections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms seeking a stay of proceedings on the grounds that his right to a trial within a reasonable period of time had been infringed.

The total delay from charge to expected trial conclusion was approximately 16 months.

The court analyzed the delay by considering the length of delay, periods waived by the defence, reasons for the delay (inherent time requirements, accused's actions, Crown's actions, and institutional resource limitations), prejudice to the accused, and the balance between the accused's interests and society's interests in a trial on the merits.

The court found that the delay attributable to the Crown was 7.5 months, which fell below the Askov/Morin guidelines of 8-10 months.

Although the defendant suffered significant prejudice in terms of stress, anxiety, and physical health impacts, the court concluded that this prejudice was outweighed by society's strong interest in a trial on the merits for serious charges involving impaired driving and personal injury.

The application was dismissed.