Joanne Julie Bruno

The accused was charged with impaired operation and excess alcohol following a motor vehicle collision.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of breath sample evidence, alleging violations of sections 8 and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found that while the officer had reasonable suspicion to demand an Approved Screening Device test, the officer breached the accused's section 10(b) rights by failing to provide a Prosper warning and obtain an unequivocal waiver when the accused changed his mind about contacting counsel.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The Crown charged two defendants with assault causing bodily harm to Christopher Marcos, who was savagely beaten outside a nightclub in Toronto's Entertainment District on June 18, 2011.

The victim recalled little of the incident and could not identify his assailants.

The Crown's case rested entirely on the testimony of four Toronto Police Service officers who claimed to have witnessed the assault.

The sole issue was the identity of the perpetrators.

The defendants did not testify.

The court found that while the police witnesses may have observed an assault, their evidence fell short of the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt required for conviction due to significant inconsistencies in their accounts, the problematic manner in which their notes were prepared collaboratively, and the absence of any blood evidence on either defendant despite the victim being severely bloodied.

The offender was sentenced following a jury conviction for sexual assault causing bodily harm, forcible confinement, uttering threats, and assault with a weapon arising from a prolonged violent assault against the complainant in the offender’s apartment.

The evidence included physical injuries, corroborating forensic evidence, a recording captured by the complainant during the assault, and a whispered 911 call made after the offender fell asleep.

The court considered aggravating factors including the prolonged and violent nature of the sexual assaults, use of a weapon, psychological harm to the complainant, and evidence of a prior incident involving aggression toward a woman.

Applying sentencing principles under s. 718 of the Criminal Code and reviewing comparable authorities, the court concluded that denunciation and deterrence were paramount.

A global custodial sentence of five years was imposed, less credit for pre‑sentence custody, together with ancillary orders.

The accused pleaded guilty to second degree murder and attempted murder arising from a street stabbing that killed one victim and seriously injured another.

The court considered the factors under s. 745.4 of the Criminal Code for determining the period of parole ineligibility, including the character of the offender, the nature of the offence, and the surrounding circumstances.

Aggravating factors included the unprovoked knife attack on unarmed strangers in a public place and the offender’s role as the aggressor.

Mitigating factors included youth, remorse, family support, and the guilty plea.

The court imposed life imprisonment for second degree murder with a 12‑year parole ineligibility period and a concurrent 10‑year sentence for attempted murder.

The accused brought a motion for a stay of proceedings under section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging a breach of his right to trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b).

The accused was charged with falsely representing himself to be a peace officer on October 12, 2010.

The information was sworn on November 12, 2010, and the trial was scheduled to proceed on March 27, 2012, representing an overall delay of sixteen months.

The court applied the framework established in R. v. Morin and subsequent jurisprudence, including R. v. Lahiry, to calculate the delay.

The court found that the total period of unjustified delay was five and a half months, consisting of four and a half months of institutional delay and one month of Crown delay, which fell well within the eight to ten month guidelines for the Ontario Court of Justice.

The court found no significant prejudice to the accused and concluded that the societal interest in hearing the matter on the merits outweighed any prejudice suffered.

The motion was dismissed.