Talman W. Rodocker

The accused, Robert Cropearedwolf, pleaded guilty to manslaughter after an incident where he pushed an elderly man, Douglas Michael Finlay, who subsequently died due to complications from the fall exacerbated by pre-existing health conditions.

The court considered the low degree of force used, the accused's lack of intent to cause death or serious harm, his remorse, and significant Gladue factors stemming from a traumatic childhood in foster care and disconnection from his Indigenous heritage.

Aggravating factors included the victim's vulnerability, the random nature of the assault, and the accused's lengthy criminal record, though primarily for property offenses.

The court applied sentencing principles of denunciation, deterrence, and rehabilitation, emphasizing the need for restraint and the unique circumstances of Aboriginal offenders.

A sentence of 3 years (1095 days) was imposed, with credit for 498 days of pre-sentence custody, leaving 597 days (approx. 20 months) to be served, followed by 3 years of probation with conditions aimed at rehabilitation and community reintegration.

Abdirashid Adam was found guilty of manslaughter after a jury trial for the shooting death of Jovanh McKnollys.

The court determined the appropriate sentence, considering aggravating factors such as the planned confrontation, the use of a concealed, loaded firearm with an obliterated serial number, and the devastating impact on the victim's family.

Mitigating factors included the offender's educational and employment history, good rehabilitative prospects, genuine remorse, harsh pre-sentence detention conditions, and the impact of systemic anti-Black racism on his life experiences, particularly his decision to carry a firearm for safety.

The court emphasized that while social context evidence could mitigate the offender's responsibility, it did not mitigate the seriousness of the offence.

Deterrence and denunciation were deemed paramount.

The Crown sought 11 years, and the defence sought 5 years.

Tyriq Brooks was convicted of multiple offences, including three armed bank robberies and firearm possession.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the planned nature of the robberies, use of a real firearm, threats to victims, profound victim impact, the offender's significant role, and his criminal record including prior weapon prohibition.

Mitigating factors included his youth, family support, limited weight given to challenges as a young Black male, a late guilty plea to firearm possession, and harsh pre-trial custody conditions (Duncan credit).

The court emphasized deterrence and denunciation, imposing a global sentence of 10 years imprisonment, less enhanced pre-sentence custody.

Ancillary orders included a DNA order, lifetime weapon prohibition, non-communication order, and forfeiture.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his sentence of six months' custody, arguing the sentencing judge erred by imposing "real" custody instead of the agreed-upon "pre-sentence custody" as part of a joint submission.

The joint submission aimed to replicate a global resolution with prior charges, ensuring the appellant's time in custody was not extended.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge made an inadvertent error in principle by deviating from the reasonable joint submission.

The accused challenged the validity of search warrants issued for his apartment and vehicle on Charter grounds, arguing that the Information to Obtain (ITO) lacked sufficient grounds to justify the warrants.

The Crown conceded that the redacted ITO was insufficient and sought to rely on unredacted portions protected by informer privilege.

The court applied the Debot criteria to assess whether information from a confidential informant, combined with police investigation and the accused's criminal record, established reasonable and probable grounds to believe the accused unlawfully possessed a firearm.

The court found the information sufficiently compelling, credible, and corroborated to justify the warrant issuance.

The accused's section 8 Charter rights were not infringed.

The accused was charged with numerous offences following a police investigation and arrest that led to the discovery of a loaded firearm and a substantial quantity of cocaine in a bedroom.

The defence applied for exclusion of the evidence pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter.

The court conducted a blended voir dire and found that the warrantless search of the residence by police violated section 8 of the Charter.

The court excluded the firearm and cocaine from evidence, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The defendant applied to exclude evidence seized during a search warrant execution and incidental to arrest, alleging false and misleading statements in the Information to Obtain (ITO).

The Crown conceded some misrepresentations in the ITO regarding the defendant's past criminal history.

The court declined to hear the late-breaking application regarding the search incidental to arrest due to lack of proper notice but indicated it would be open to hearing it later with proper notice.

For the search warrant, the court excised the misleading statements from the ITO and, after allowing amplification of poor-quality images, found that sufficient grounds remained for the warrant's issuance.

The court also concluded that even if there was a Charter breach, the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, balancing the seriousness of the conduct, the impact on the accused, and society's interest in a merits-based adjudication of serious charges.

The defendant was charged with possession of fentanyl, a Schedule I drug, contrary to section 4(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The defendant brought a Charter application alleging that his detention and arrest were unconstitutional and the search was unreasonable, contrary to sections 9 and 8 of the Charter respectively.

The trial proceeded as a blended voir dire with all evidence taken together on both the trial and Charter application.

The central factual issue was whether the defendant threw down a baggie of fentanyl when exiting his vehicle.

The court found the defendant not guilty, acquitting him due to reasonable doubt regarding whether the officer observed what he claimed to have observed, despite finding the officer's evidence generally credible.

The accused was convicted of luring a child by means of telecommunication contrary to s. 172.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and procuring the sexual services of a person under 18 years contrary to s. 212(4) of the Criminal Code.

The accused engaged in text communications with an undercover police officer posing as a 16-year-old girl, arranged for paid sexual services including unprotected intercourse and fellatio for $100, and attended a hotel to meet the purported minor.

The Crown sought 12-18 months custody; the defence sought the statutory minimum of 6 months.

The court imposed 9 months for luring and 6 months concurrent for procuring, along with probation, SOIRA registration, and a s. 161 order.

The accused was found guilty of sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching involving a 13-year-old complainant.

This decision addresses sentencing, including the constitutionality of mandatory minimum sentences, the fit and proportionate sentence, and the application of the Kienapple rule.

The court found the one-year mandatory minimum sentences for these offences unconstitutional, imposed a 15-month imprisonment sentence for sexual interference, and stayed the other convictions.

The accused was charged with operation of a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol and failing to stop at the scene of an accident to avoid civil or criminal liability.

The Crown's case relied on breath samples taken more than two hours after the alleged offence and expert toxicology evidence.

The defence raised a bolus drinking theory, arguing that the accused consumed a large quantity of alcohol immediately before driving, such that his blood alcohol concentration was below the legal limit at the time of operation.

On the failure to remain charge, the issue was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused left the scene with intent to escape liability.

The court found the accused not guilty on both counts, accepting his evidence regarding the timing and pattern of alcohol consumption and finding reasonable doubt regarding his intent in leaving the scene, particularly given his voluntary return within 35 minutes.

The accused, Derek Oppong, brought a Corbett application to prohibit the Crown from cross-examining him on his criminal record if he testified.

The Crown sought to introduce the full record for credibility.

The court applied the Corbett factors, balancing probative value against prejudicial effect, considering the nature and remoteness of convictions, similarity to current charges, and the defense's attack on the Crown witness's character.

The court ultimately edited the record, prohibiting cross-examination on assault and robbery convictions, but permitting it on theft under, fail to comply, and threatening death convictions, to avoid an unbalanced portrayal of the accused's character to the jury.

The Crown applied for two orders regarding witness D.H. in a criminal trial: to permit D.H. to testify via closed-circuit television (CCTV) under s. 486.2(2) of the Criminal Code, and to admit D.H.'s video statement under s. 715.1 of the Criminal Code.

The court granted both applications, finding that CCTV testimony was necessary due to an attempt by gang members to intimidate D.H. in the courtroom, which interfered with the proper administration of justice.

The court also found that admitting D.H.'s video statement was appropriate given D.H.'s age at the time of the offence and the short timeframe between the incident and the statement.

Three inmates were charged with assault causing bodily harm to a fellow inmate at Maplehurst Correctional Centre on November 19, 2014.

The Crown sought to introduce video evidence of the assault with identification testimony from a correctional officer.

The court held a voir dire to determine the admissibility of the identification evidence under the Leaney test.

The court found that while the officer had prior acquaintance with the accused and was in a better position than the trier of fact to make identifications, the threshold reliability of the identification evidence was not established because the Crown relied on a Historical Unit Assignment document that was demonstrably inaccurate.

The document showed 35 inmates in a unit with a maximum capacity of 32, and showed inmates in cells where they were not actually housed.

Without reliable evidence of which inmates were assigned to which cells, the officer's identification methodology—tracking blurry figures back to assigned cells—could not meet the reliability threshold.

The charges were dismissed.

Pre‑trial motions concerning severance and the admissibility of similar fact evidence in a multi‑count indictment arising from four bank robberies and an attempted armoured truck robbery.

The Crown sought to rely on evidence from separate robberies as similar fact evidence to establish identity, motive, and intent.

The court held that evidence of the second, third, and fourth robberies was admissible count‑to‑count on the issue of identity for one accused due to significant similarities and linking evidence, but evidence from the first robbery was not sufficiently similar.

The court further ruled that the bank robbery evidence was not admissible as similar fact evidence to prove motive or intent regarding the attempted armoured truck robbery.

Applying the severance factors in R. v. Last, the court ordered the armoured truck counts severed from the bank robbery counts and also severed the first robbery from the remaining robbery counts.

The accused was charged with possession of oxycodone, possession of oxycodone for the purpose of trafficking, and failure to comply with his recognizance.

The accused pleaded guilty to the failure to comply charge but brought a Charter application to exclude evidence of the drugs seized by police.

The court found that the accused was arbitrarily detained in violation of section 9 of the Charter and that the search of his person was unreasonable in violation of section 8 of the Charter.

The court excluded the drug evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was acquitted on the first two counts.