Marina Stefanovic

In a complex constitutional case regarding irregular migrant rights to healthcare, a dispute arose during case management over who should bear the cost of producing voluminous third-party medical records.

The plaintiff provided authorizations for the records but argued she could not afford the substantial third-party fees (e.g., $12,105 for one hospital).

The court held that the plaintiff satisfied her disclosure obligations under the Rules of Civil Procedure by providing the authorizations.

Applying principles of proportionality and noting the public interest nature of the litigation and the plaintiff's impecuniosity, the court ordered that if Canada wishes to obtain the records, it must pay the third-party fees at first instance.

The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking a declaration that the defendant waived litigation privilege over a 'Proffer' document provided to the Attorney General of Canada for national security vetting under s. 38 of the Canada Evidence Act.

The court held that while the document was created for the dominant purpose of litigation, the defendant's stated intention of using it to promote trial efficiency constituted a waiver of privilege vis-à-vis the trial judge.

The court ordered the unredacted Proffer to be provided to the judge and established a comprehensive trial protocol, including the appointment of amicus curiae and advance vetting of sensitive evidence, to balance national security concerns with trial fairness.

The moving parties, the Attorney General of Canada and others, brought a motion for leave to appeal an order of Morgan J. The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $5,000 to the responding party.

The plaintiff sought to amend his 13-year-old Statement of Claim to add a claim under section 15 of the Charter and to include Department of Justice (DOJ) employees as impugned actors.

The defendants opposed, citing prejudice due to delay and arguing the DOJ claim was not legally recognizable.

The court granted leave to add the section 15 Charter claim, finding it was not a new cause of action or that any limitation period was not plain and obvious.

However, the court dismissed the request to add DOJ employees, holding that lawyers acting in their professional capacity for the Crown are generally not personally liable for Charter breaches, distinguishing this from the role of Crown prosecutors in criminal cases.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his action against the respondents for damages related to his HIV infection, which he alleged was linked to a sponsorship undertaking given to the federal government.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the action was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Court declined to entertain new arguments regarding exceptions to the limitation period raised for the first time on appeal.

Furthermore, the Court found no evidence establishing a causal link between the government's actions and the appellant's infection.

The plaintiff alleged that his former spouse knowingly infected him with HIV and sued multiple defendants, including the federal Crown, an immigration medical examiner, and the employer of the spouse.

The defendants brought motions for summary judgment dismissing the claims.

The court held that the action was statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002 because the plaintiff had sufficient knowledge of material facts when he was diagnosed as HIV‑positive in March 2004 but commenced the action in 2008.

The court further held that neither the federal government nor the immigration physician owed a private law duty of care to the plaintiff under the Anns/Cooper framework, and there was no evidentiary basis for negligence or vicarious liability against the nightclub employer.

The claims against all moving defendants were dismissed.

The appellant, Lafarge Canada Inc., sought a Bullock order regarding costs.

The Court of Appeal declined to make the order, noting that the appellant should have known the inclusion of the successful insurers as respondents on the appeal was unnecessary, as evidenced by the appellant abandoning the appeal against most of them at the end of oral argument.

The Court requested further submissions on whether the successful insurers should receive partial or substantial indemnity costs and whether costs should be fixed or assessed.

The plaintiffs, homeowners, sued Bertrand and Lafarge for damages resulting from defective concrete foundations caused by fly ash supplied by Lafarge.

The trial judge found Lafarge 80% liable and Bertrand 20% liable for approximately $20,000,000 in damages.

This appeal concerns the insurance coverage disputes between Bertrand, Lafarge, and their numerous primary and excess insurers.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the defective foundations constituted property damage under the CGL policies, that the continuous trigger theory applied to trigger all policies from 1986 to 1992, and that certain excess insurers had a duty to contribute to defence and third-party costs.

The appeal by Guardian Insurance was allowed regarding its duty to defend, but all other appeals and cross-appeals were dismissed.

The Applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and received statutory accident benefits.

The Insurer terminated weekly income benefits on March 31, 1993.

The Applicant sought arbitration for further weekly income benefits, supplementary medical and rehabilitation expenses, and housekeeping and child care expenses.

The arbitrator found that the Applicant was not substantially unable to perform her essential tasks and dismissed the claim for further weekly income benefits.

The arbitrator awarded certain supplementary medical and rehabilitation expenses, including transportation and a club membership, but denied the claim for housekeeping and child care expenses due to insufficient evidence.

The Applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and claimed statutory accident benefits.

The Insurer disputed his entitlement to weekly income benefits for a specific week, the amount claimed for lost income while attending physiotherapy, and his entitlement to chiropractic treatment.

The Arbitrator held that subsection 16(2) of the Schedule precluded the Applicant from receiving weekly income benefits for the week in question because he had returned to work for more than 90 days after the two-year anniversary of the accident.

The Arbitrator found the time claimed for physiotherapy attendance was reasonable, except for the week he was not working, but declined to order repayment.

The claim for chiropractic treatment was denied due to insufficient medical evidence.