Crystal O’Donnell

The judgment creditor brought a motion for directions regarding enforcement of a writ of seizure and sale and related garnishment proceedings against the judgment debtor.

A mortgagee who was not a party to the action sought an adjournment to permit filing further materials and cross‑examinations, while opposing the judgment creditor’s request that any proceeds of sale of the debtor’s property be paid into court pending determination of mortgage priority issues.

The court found several concerning circumstances surrounding the mortgage assignment, including its timing after registration of the writ and the non‑arm’s‑length relationship between the mortgagor and mortgagee.

To preserve the rights of all parties while related family law, power of sale, and enforcement proceedings continued, the court granted the adjournment but imposed a condition that sale proceeds be paid into court if the property sold.

The Children's Aid Society applied for judicial review of a decision by the Child and Family Services Review Board, which found it had jurisdiction to hear a review of the Society's decision to remove a child from foster parents.

The foster parents had been fostering with a view to adopt, but the Society failed to complete the formal statutory requirements for an adoption placement, including registering the placement and notifying the child's Band.

The Divisional Court held that the judicial review was not premature given the urgency of the child's permanency planning.

The Court quashed the Board's decision, finding that without the formal statutory requirements being met, the child was not legally 'placed for adoption' under the Child and Family Services Act, and therefore the Board lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter.

The appellant police officer appealed a finding of guilt for discreditable conduct and the resulting penalty.

Prior to the hearing, the parties submitted a consent motion requesting an order revoking the hearing officer's decisions, citing a failure by the complainant to disclose relevant evidence.

The Commission noted that counsel failed to provide written argument, factums, or evidence to support the motion, and failed to address the Commission's jurisdiction to grant such relief on consent.

The Commission held that it cannot simply rubber-stamp a joint submission and directed counsel to file the required materials by a specified date, failing which the motion would be dismissed. (An amending order later corrected the name of the respondent's counsel in the original decision).

The appellant, Lafarge Canada Inc., sought a Bullock order regarding costs.

The Court of Appeal declined to make the order, noting that the appellant should have known the inclusion of the successful insurers as respondents on the appeal was unnecessary, as evidenced by the appellant abandoning the appeal against most of them at the end of oral argument.

The Court requested further submissions on whether the successful insurers should receive partial or substantial indemnity costs and whether costs should be fixed or assessed.

The plaintiffs, homeowners, sued Bertrand and Lafarge for damages resulting from defective concrete foundations caused by fly ash supplied by Lafarge.

The trial judge found Lafarge 80% liable and Bertrand 20% liable for approximately $20,000,000 in damages.

This appeal concerns the insurance coverage disputes between Bertrand, Lafarge, and their numerous primary and excess insurers.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the defective foundations constituted property damage under the CGL policies, that the continuous trigger theory applied to trigger all policies from 1986 to 1992, and that certain excess insurers had a duty to contribute to defence and third-party costs.

The appeal by Guardian Insurance was allowed regarding its duty to defend, but all other appeals and cross-appeals were dismissed.