Thomas J. Prince

This is a costs endorsement following a contempt motion in a family law proceeding.

The applicant was partially successful on the contempt motion and sought full, substantial, or partial indemnity costs.

The court found a reasonable basis for the motion due to the respondent's poor communication, but also noted the applicant's somewhat oppressive requests.

The applicant was awarded fixed costs of $1,200, payable forthwith by the respondent.

The applicant brought a motion to continue a certificate of pending litigation on a property she previously resided in.

She claimed an interest in the property through an unproven constructive trust and alleged that the respondent's sale of the fire-damaged property to a third party was a fraudulent conveyance.

The court found the applicant's claim to an interest in the land to be tenuous and noted the absence of typical badges of fraud.

The motion was dismissed and the certificate of pending litigation was ordered vacated.

The Office of the Children’s Lawyer brought a motion to quash an appeal from a child protection decision granting Crown wardship, or alternatively for summary judgment dismissing the appeal.

The appellant parent challenged the motion judge’s findings of fact and alleged inaccuracies in the Society’s evidence but identified no specific errors of law.

The court held that while the appeal was not manifestly devoid of merit such that it should be quashed, the evidentiary record overwhelmingly supported the motion judge’s findings and no palpable and overriding error was identified.

Applying the summary judgment standard for appeals under the Family Law Rules, the court concluded it was plain and obvious that the appeal could not succeed.

Summary judgment dismissing the appeal was granted.

The Children's Aid Society applied for judicial review of a decision by the Child and Family Services Review Board, which found it had jurisdiction to hear a review of the Society's decision to remove a child from foster parents.

The foster parents had been fostering with a view to adopt, but the Society failed to complete the formal statutory requirements for an adoption placement, including registering the placement and notifying the child's Band.

The Divisional Court held that the judicial review was not premature given the urgency of the child's permanency planning.

The Court quashed the Board's decision, finding that without the formal statutory requirements being met, the child was not legally 'placed for adoption' under the Child and Family Services Act, and therefore the Board lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter.