Marianne Zorić

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed Ms. Pepa’s appeal from Federal Court of Appeal and Federal Court judgments that upheld an Immigration Appeal Division ruling denying jurisdiction under s. 63(2) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

A majority held the IAD’s interpretation was unreasonable and concluded the only reasonable interpretation is that visa-holder status for this appeal right is assessed at the time of arrival in Canada, then remitted the matter to the IAD for determination of the removal-order appeal.

Rowe J. agreed the decision was unreasonable but would have remitted without declaring a single reasonable interpretation, while Côté and O’Bonsawin JJ. would have dismissed the appeal.

The moving parties, the Attorney General of Canada and others, brought a motion for leave to appeal an order of Morgan J. The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $5,000 to the responding party.

The plaintiff sought to amend his 13-year-old Statement of Claim to add a claim under section 15 of the Charter and to include Department of Justice (DOJ) employees as impugned actors.

The defendants opposed, citing prejudice due to delay and arguing the DOJ claim was not legally recognizable.

The court granted leave to add the section 15 Charter claim, finding it was not a new cause of action or that any limitation period was not plain and obvious.

However, the court dismissed the request to add DOJ employees, holding that lawyers acting in their professional capacity for the Crown are generally not personally liable for Charter breaches, distinguishing this from the role of Crown prosecutors in criminal cases.

Mohamed Mahjoub, subject to a security certificate and deportation order, sought habeas corpus in the Superior Court to challenge the indefinite conditions of his release, arguing Charter breaches.

The Minister moved to stay the application, citing lack of jurisdiction or, alternatively, the existence of an adequate appeal route and the comprehensive nature of the IRPA security certificate scheme (Peiroo exception).

The motion judge granted the stay.

Mahjoub appealed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the IRPA's security certificate review process, with its specialized Federal Court judges and special advocate system, constitutes a comprehensive and advantageous scheme for reviewing detention conditions, thus precluding habeas corpus, even though the motion judge erred regarding the adequacy of the appeal route.

Landmark decision reforming the framework for judicial review of administrative decisions.

The Court established a presumption that reasonableness is the applicable standard of review, rebuttable where the legislature has indicated a different standard (including by providing a statutory appeal mechanism) or where the rule of law requires correctness review on constitutional questions, general questions of central legal importance, or jurisdictional boundaries between administrative bodies.

The Court also provided extensive guidance on conducting reasonableness review.

On the merits, the Registrar's decision to cancel the respondent's citizenship certificate was found unreasonable, as the statutory exception denying citizenship by birth to children of foreign government employees was intended to apply only to individuals whose parents had been granted diplomatic privileges and immunities.

The appellant challenged the refusal of humanitarian and compassionate relief under s. 25(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act after unsuccessful refugee and risk-assessment proceedings.

The majority held that the officer unreasonably constrained discretion by treating 'unusual and undeserved or disproportionate hardship' as rigid legal thresholds rather than descriptive guidance.

The reasons emphasized holistic assessment, including mental health evidence, discrimination risk evidence, and the best interests of a directly affected child.

The appeal was allowed, the officer’s decision was set aside, and the matter was remitted for reconsideration.

A dissent would have upheld the refusal as reasonable under a stringent but flexible exceptional-relief framework.

Consolidated immigration appeals considered whether inadmissibility for people smuggling under s. 37(1)(b) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act captures all assistance to undocumented migrants or is limited by organized transnational criminality and material benefit.

The Court held the provision applies only where conduct furthers illegal entry for direct or indirect financial or other material benefit in the context of transnational organized crime.

Humanitarian and mutual aid, including assistance among asylum-seekers in collective flight to safety, does not itself constitute people smuggling under this provision.

The prior inadmissibility determinations were based on an unreasonable statutory interpretation and were remitted for reconsideration on the proper legal test.

The Court dismissed an appeal challenging a refusal of ministerial relief from inadmissibility under s. 34(2) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

It held that reasonableness is the applicable standard of review for this discretionary decision and accepted an interpretation of national interest focused mainly on national security and public safety, while not excluding other relevant factors.

The Court found the Minister’s reasons intelligible and justified on the evidentiary record, including sustained contact with an organization found to have engaged in terrorism and credibility concerns.

It further held that procedural fairness was satisfied and any legitimate expectations from published guidelines were met.

The Minister’s decision was allowed to stand.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his motion for partial summary judgment, which he had brought on the basis of issue estoppel relying on findings from a Federal Court security certificate proceeding.

During oral argument, the appellant conceded he was no longer appealing the correctness of the order dismissing the motion, but only sought to appeal the motion judge's conclusion that issue estoppel did not apply.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, holding that an appeal lies from an order and not from the reasons of the court below.

The Attorney General of Canada brought a motion to quash the appellant's appeal from a decision dismissing a motion for partial summary judgment.

The appellant had sought partial summary judgment using issue estoppel offensively, based on findings from a prior Federal Court decision quashing a security certificate against him.

The Court of Appeal held that the dismissal of the summary judgment motion was a final order, as it finally determined the question of issue estoppel and deprived the appellant of a substantive right.

The motion to quash the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant challenged an order refusing to dismiss or stay an action against the federal Crown arising from alleged interference with an immigration consulting business conducted outside Ontario.

The court interpreted s. 21(1) of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act and held that the requirement that the claim arise in the province applies to both para. (a) and para. (b), including superior courts in provinces without county or district courts.

Relying on the French version of the provision and the legislative history, the court concluded that Ontario lacked jurisdiction because the claims did not arise in Ontario.

The appeal was allowed, the action was dismissed without prejudice to proceeding in Federal Court, and no costs were awarded.