Urszula Kaczmarczyk

The Court dismissed an appeal challenging a refusal of ministerial relief from inadmissibility under s. 34(2) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

It held that reasonableness is the applicable standard of review for this discretionary decision and accepted an interpretation of national interest focused mainly on national security and public safety, while not excluding other relevant factors.

The Court found the Minister’s reasons intelligible and justified on the evidentiary record, including sustained contact with an organization found to have engaged in terrorism and credibility concerns.

It further held that procedural fairness was satisfied and any legitimate expectations from published guidelines were met.

The Minister’s decision was allowed to stand.

The appellants, the Attorneys General of Canada and Ontario, appealed a decision regarding the enforcement of sponsorship debts against eight sponsors whose relatives received social assistance.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the government has a duty to collect the full sponsorship debt, it retains a limited discretion to defer enforcement based on a sponsor's circumstances.

In exercising this discretion, the government owes a minimal duty of procedural fairness to notify the sponsor, allow them to explain their circumstances, consider those circumstances, and notify them of the decision.

The Court found that Ontario's debt collection policy did not improperly fetter its discretion and met the requirements of procedural fairness.

The moving parties brought motions within an ongoing family law appeal.

The Court of Appeal granted an order directing the Office of the Children's Lawyer to represent the child on the appeal.

The court set strict timelines for the filing of fresh evidence and factums to ensure the appeal could proceed on its scheduled dates, emphasizing the best interests of the child.

The respondent mother was ordered to permit the OCL reasonable access to the child.

The respondent, a citizen of India, was convicted of criminal negligence causing death after street racing.

A removal order was issued.

He appealed to the Immigration Appeal Division (IAD) for special relief on humanitarian and compassionate grounds under s. 67(1)(c) of the IRPA.

The IAD denied relief.

The Federal Court dismissed the judicial review, applying patent unreasonableness.

The Federal Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, applying reasonableness simpliciter.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Minister's appeal, restoring the IAD decision.

The Court held that the Dunsmuir standard of review analysis applies to judicial review under s. 18.1 of the Federal Courts Act, and the appropriate standard for the IAD's decision was reasonableness.

The IAD's decision fell within a range of reasonable outcomes.

The appellants, foreign nationals and a permanent resident, were detained under security certificates issued pursuant to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA).

They challenged the constitutionality of the IRPA's certificate scheme, which allows for detention and deportation based on secret evidence not disclosed to the named person.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the procedure for determining the reasonableness of a certificate infringes section 7 of the Charter because it denies the named person the right to know the case to meet, and is not saved by section 1.

The Court also found that the lack of prompt review for the detention of foreign nationals infringes sections 9 and 10(c) of the Charter.

The Court struck down the offending provisions but suspended the declaration of invalidity for one year to allow Parliament to amend the law.

The appellants applied for permanent residence in Canada under the investor and self-employed classes.

Both applications were denied because their dependent children had intellectual disabilities that medical officers concluded would cause excessive demands on Canada's social services.

The visa officers refused to consider the families' wealth and willingness to pay for private social services.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeals, holding that the legislation requires an individualized assessment.

A family's ability and willingness to attenuate the burden on the public purse are relevant factors in determining whether a disabled child might reasonably be expected to cause excessive demands on social services.

The appellant purchased the assets of the Nova Scotia Power Corporation (NSPC) upon its privatization and sought to deduct capital cost allowances.

The Minister of National Revenue denied the deductions on the basis that NSPC, as a Crown agent, was immune from income tax legislation.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that NSPC was an agent of the Crown acting within its purposes, as expressly provided by the provincial Power Corporation Act, and was therefore entitled to Crown immunity under the federal Interpretation Act.

The appellant, a Convention refugee from Iran, was suspected of being an assassin for the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security.

The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration issued an opinion under s. 53(1)(b) of the Immigration Act that the appellant constituted a danger to the security of Canada and faced only a minimal risk of harm if deported.

The appellant challenged the decision and the constitutionality of the deportation provisions.

Applying the framework from the companion case of Suresh, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the appellant did not make out a prima facie case of a substantial risk of torture.

The Court found the Minister's decision was not patently unreasonable and that the appellant was provided with adequate procedural protections consistent with the principles of fundamental justice.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a Convention refugee from Sri Lanka, faced deportation on security grounds due to alleged membership in a terrorist organization.

The Minister issued an opinion declaring him a danger to the security of Canada without providing him a copy of the immigration officer's memorandum or an opportunity to respond.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that deporting a refugee to face a substantial risk of torture generally violates section 7 of the Charter.

The Court found that the appellant had established a prima facie case of a risk of torture and was denied the required procedural safeguards.

The appeal was allowed and the case remanded to the Minister for reconsideration.

The appellant, a woman with Canadian-born dependent children, was ordered deported.

She applied for an exemption based on humanitarian and compassionate considerations, which was denied without formal reasons, though she was later provided with the notes of the investigating immigration officer.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the duty of procedural fairness applied and required the provision of reasons, which was satisfied by the officer's notes.

However, the notes demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias and the decision was an unreasonable exercise of discretion because it failed to give serious weight and consideration to the best interests of the appellant's children.

The appellant claimed Convention refugee status but was granted permanent residence.

He was later convicted of conspiracy to traffic in a narcotic and sentenced to eight years in prison.

He renewed his refugee claim, but the Immigration and Refugee Board excluded him under Article 1F(c) of the Convention, finding him guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the standard of review for the Board's decision on this question of law is correctness.

The Court concluded that drug trafficking, while a serious crime, does not constitute a serious, sustained, and systemic violation of fundamental human rights amounting to persecution, and therefore does not fall within the Article 1F(c) exclusion.

The appeal was allowed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Federal Court of Appeal regarding the interpretation of s. 11(3) of the Immigration Regulations, 1978.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, agreeing with the dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeal and the trial judge's interpretation of the provision.

The decision of the Court of Appeal was set aside and the trial judge's order was restored.