Bernard Laprade

During an extradition hearing, the appellant disclosed in camera that he was a confidential police informer.

The extradition judge appointed an amicus curiae and subsequently ordered that media counsel and representatives be granted access to the amicus documents, subject to confidentiality undertakings, to argue whether the proceedings should remain in camera.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that informer privilege is absolute and non-discretionary, subject only to the innocence at stake exception.

The Dagenais/Mentuck test for discretionary publication bans does not apply.

The extradition judge erred in ordering the disclosure of privileged information to the media.

The appellants, foreign nationals and a permanent resident, were detained under security certificates issued pursuant to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA).

They challenged the constitutionality of the IRPA's certificate scheme, which allows for detention and deportation based on secret evidence not disclosed to the named person.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the procedure for determining the reasonableness of a certificate infringes section 7 of the Charter because it denies the named person the right to know the case to meet, and is not saved by section 1.

The Court also found that the lack of prompt review for the detention of foreign nationals infringes sections 9 and 10(c) of the Charter.

The Court struck down the offending provisions but suspended the declaration of invalidity for one year to allow Parliament to amend the law.

The appellants, permanent residents ordered deported for serious criminality, appealed their removal orders under the former Immigration Act, triggering automatic stays.

Before their appeals were heard, the new Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) came into force.

Section 196 of the IRPA discontinued pending appeals for serious criminals unless they had been 'granted a stay'.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that 'granted a stay' refers only to actively ordered stays, not automatic statutory stays.

Applying principles of bilingual statutory interpretation, the Court found the narrower English version aligned with Parliament's intent to expedite the removal of serious criminals.

The Court also dismissed arguments that the retroactive removal of the appeal right violated section 7 of the Charter, concluding that deportation does not inherently implicate section 7 interests and the transitional scheme did not breach principles of fundamental justice.

The respondents brought a motion for a permanent stay of proceedings in an immigration deportation appeal, alleging abuse of power by federal ministers and institutional bias on the part of the Supreme Court of Canada.

The motion relied on claims that the decision to pursue the appeal was improperly influenced and that the voluntary recusal of one judge tainted the entire Court.

The Court held that a stay is a drastic remedy reserved for the clearest cases of abuse of process and found no factual or legal basis for either allegation.

It also reaffirmed the presumption of judicial impartiality and rejected the proposition that one judge’s recusal compromises the integrity of the whole court.

The motion was dismissed with costs.

The Crown obtained an ex parte order for a judicial investigative hearing under s. 83.28 of the Criminal Code in relation to the Air India bombings.

The application judge ordered the hearing to be held in camera and kept secret.

A newspaper reporter discovered the proceedings and sought access.

The hearing judge dismissed the application for access.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the newspaper's appeal in part, holding that the open court principle applies to s. 83.28 hearings.

While the initial ex parte application was properly held in camera, the existence of the order and the constitutional challenge should have been public.

The investigative hearing itself must be presumptively open, subject to the Dagenais/Mentuck test for publication bans or in camera orders.

The Crown sought an ex parte order under s. 83.28 of the Criminal Code to compel a Named Person to attend a judicial investigative hearing and answer questions regarding the Air India bombings.

The Named Person challenged the constitutionality of s. 83.28, arguing it violated the right against self-incrimination under s. 7 of the Charter and compromised judicial independence.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the provision, finding it procedural in nature, thus applicable retrospectively.

The Court held that s. 83.28 includes adequate safeguards, such as derivative use immunity, which must be extended to extradition and deportation hearings to comply with s. 7.

The Court also found that the provision does not compromise judicial independence, as judges retain their role in protecting the witness's constitutional rights.

The RCMP obtained a warrant to search a lawyer's office for billing records related to a client suspected of money laundering.

The search was conducted without notice to the lawyer and lasted 13.5 hours.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the search was unreasonable under s. 8 of the Charter because the police failed to minimize the impairment of solicitor-client privilege and failed to notify the lawyer.

The Court also held that information about a lawyer's fees and disbursements is presumptively protected by solicitor-client privilege, as it arises out of the solicitor-client relationship.

The appellants' locked safe was stolen from their restaurant and later recovered by police.

An officer investigating the appellants for suspected tax violations, who was not involved in the theft investigation, photocopied documents from the safe without a warrant and forwarded them to Revenue Canada.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the appellants retained a residual expectation of privacy in the stolen safe's contents.

The officer's actions constituted an unreasonable search under s. 8 of the Charter.

The Court excluded the evidence under s. 24(2), finding that the officer's disregard for regular police procedures and failure to leave the investigation to taxation authorities rendered the breach sufficiently serious that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appellant, a member of the Armed Forces, was charged with trafficking in narcotics.

The President of the Standing Court Martial ordered a stay of proceedings based on the defence of entrapment.

The Court Martial Appeal Court quashed the stay, finding the President misunderstood the test for entrapment.

On appeal as of right to the Supreme Court of Canada, the Court found no reversible error in the President's decision, allowed the appeal, and restored the stay of proceedings.

The appellant was convicted of trafficking in narcotics.

His motion for a stay of proceedings based on entrapment was dismissed at trial.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, ordering a new trial limited solely to the issue of entrapment due to the Crown's failure to disclose a police informant's notes.

The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, arguing the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction to order a limited new trial.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that under s. 686(8) of the Criminal Code, a court of appeal has the power to order a new trial limited to the issue of entrapment because entrapment is a distinct proceeding that does not affect the underlying finding of guilt.

The appellants appealed a decision regarding the issuance of search warrants under the Competition Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, adopting the reasons of the Federal Court of Appeal which held that the Act does not provide for an appeal from the issuance of search warrants.

The appellants appealed their convictions, arguing that evidence obtained during an open-space search violated their rights under section 8 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada assumed, without deciding, that the search was unreasonable.

However, the Court upheld the Court of Appeal's finding that the admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal which had reversed a trial judge's finding that evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, agreeing with the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeal that the majority erred in reversing the trial judge's finding, as there was no error in principle.

The conviction was restored.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal that set aside his acquittal on a charge of possession of narcotics for the purpose of trafficking and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that even if the narcotic was found in violation of the appellant's Charter rights, admitting the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute under the principles enunciated in R. v. Collins.

The appellant, a commissioned officer in the Canadian Armed Forces, was charged with being absent without leave after failing to report to a new posting.

She argued that she honestly believed she had resigned from the Armed Forces and therefore lacked the requisite mens rea.

She also challenged the constitutionality of the General Court Martial under s. 11(d) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the structure of the General Court Martial infringed s. 11(d) of the Charter, applying its concurrent decision in R. v. Généreux.

The Court also noted that an honest mistake about the legal consequences of one's actions does not constitute a defence to the charge.

The appellant, a member of the Canadian Armed Forces, challenged convictions entered by a General Court Martial on the basis that the military tribunal lacked the independence required by s. 11(d) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court held that s. 11 applies to General Court Martial proceedings and that a separate military justice system is constitutionally permissible, but found that the tribunal's structure at the time lacked sufficient security of tenure, financial security, and institutional independence.

The court further held that the infringement was not justified under s. 1.

The appellant's ss. 7 and 15 arguments failed, and evidence obtained through a constitutionally defective search was nevertheless admissible under s. 24(2).

A new trial was ordered.

The appellants, A, B, and C, sought an order of certiorari to quash a subpoena compelling A to testify in a criminal trial, or alternatively, a remedy under s. 24(1) of the Charter due to perceived threats to their security.

B and C were living outside Canada.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, holding that a Charter remedy was not available to persons outside Canada.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the Superior Court erred in failing to consider the safety of the appellants and in finding that remedies were unavailable to persons outside the country in these special circumstances.

A new hearing was directed.

The appellant and an accomplice committed an armed robbery during which the accomplice shot and killed a client.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder under the constructive murder provisions of s. 213(d) of the Criminal Code, despite testifying he believed the gun was unloaded.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 213(d) violates sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter because it allows for a murder conviction without proof beyond a reasonable doubt of at least objective foreseeability of death.

The provision was not saved by section 1, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was ordered to pay a fine or serve a three-month term of imprisonment.

A warrant of committal was issued and executed after he had already served terms of imprisonment pursuant to other warrants.

The appellant applied for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that executing warrants in succession illegally made concurrent sentences consecutive.

The Superior Court and Court of Appeal dismissed the application relying on s. 649(4) of the Criminal Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal for the reasons stated by the Court of Appeal.

The appellant appealed a conviction for contempt of court arising from statements made at trial questioning the impartiality of the trial judge.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and entered an acquittal.

The Court adopted the dissenting reasons of Mayrand J.A. in the Court of Appeal of Quebec, which found that the statements did not constitute contempt and the proper procedure was not followed.