Howard Rubin

In a criminal appeal, the Court considered whether kidnapping under the Criminal Code is a continuing offence that includes the victim’s ongoing confinement after the initial taking.

The Court held that kidnapping continues in fact until the victim is freed and that a person who knowingly joins the confinement phase can be liable as a party under s. 21(1).

Applying those principles to the trial findings, the Court upheld the substituted kidnapping conviction.

The appellant Crown challenged a declaration that the emergency wiretap power in s. 184.4 of the Criminal Code violated section 8 of the Charter.

The Court held that warrantless interception in exigent circumstances can be constitutionally permissible where strict urgency conditions are met.

However, the provision lacked an adequate accountability mechanism, particularly after-the-fact notice to affected persons, and therefore failed constitutional minimum standards.

The infringement was not justified under section 1 because a notice requirement would not impair emergency police action while materially protecting privacy rights.

The appeal was dismissed and invalidity was suspended for 12 months to permit legislative revision.

The appellant pleaded guilty to producing marihuana in her home.

The trial judge imposed a conditional sentence and a fine, declining to order forfeiture of her home.

The Court of Appeal set aside the fine and ordered forfeiture, holding that forfeiture and imprisonment should be considered together as a global punishment.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and set aside the forfeiture order, holding that the forfeiture inquiry under s. 19.1(3) of the CDSA is a discrete and distinct inquiry from sentencing, and that partial forfeiture of real property may be ordered.

The Crown obtained an ex parte order for a judicial investigative hearing under s. 83.28 of the Criminal Code in relation to the Air India bombings.

The application judge ordered the hearing to be held in camera and kept secret.

A newspaper reporter discovered the proceedings and sought access.

The hearing judge dismissed the application for access.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the newspaper's appeal in part, holding that the open court principle applies to s. 83.28 hearings.

While the initial ex parte application was properly held in camera, the existence of the order and the constitutional challenge should have been public.

The investigative hearing itself must be presumptively open, subject to the Dagenais/Mentuck test for publication bans or in camera orders.

The Crown sought an ex parte order under s. 83.28 of the Criminal Code to compel a Named Person to attend a judicial investigative hearing and answer questions regarding the Air India bombings.

The Named Person challenged the constitutionality of s. 83.28, arguing it violated the right against self-incrimination under s. 7 of the Charter and compromised judicial independence.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the provision, finding it procedural in nature, thus applicable retrospectively.

The Court held that s. 83.28 includes adequate safeguards, such as derivative use immunity, which must be extended to extradition and deportation hearings to comply with s. 7.

The Court also found that the provision does not compromise judicial independence, as judges retain their role in protecting the witness's constitutional rights.

The respondent's liquor licence was suspended by the Liquor Control and Licensing Branch.

The respondent appealed to the Liquor Appeal Board, which upheld the suspension.

The Court of Appeal set aside the Board's decision, finding that its members lacked sufficient independence because they were appointed 'at pleasure'.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the degree of independence required of an administrative tribunal is determined by its enabling statute.

Since the legislature unequivocally provided for 'at pleasure' appointments, there was no room to import common law doctrines of independence.

The appellants, who were either charged or suspects in connection with an explosion and fire, were subpoenaed to testify at the preliminary inquiries of other accused persons separately charged with the same offence.

The appellants applied to quash the subpoenas, arguing that compelling them to testify would violate their right to silence under section 7 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the appellants were compellable witnesses and that section 5 of the Canada Evidence Act does not infringe section 7 of the Charter.

The Court found no evidence that the subpoenas were a form of pre-trial interrogation or otherwise objectionable, noting that the witnesses would be entitled to protections against self-incrimination at any subsequent proceedings against them.

The appellant was involved in a fatal motor vehicle accident and taken to a hospital.

While unconscious, a doctor took a blood sample for medical purposes despite the appellant's prior refusal.

The police subsequently obtained the blood alcohol test results from the doctor without a warrant.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the doctors were not acting as agents of the state, the police conduct in obtaining the medical information without a warrant violated the appellant's rights under section 8 of the Charter.

The Court excluded the evidence under section 24(2), allowed the appeal, and ordered a new trial on the criminal negligence charges.

The appellants were charged with conspiracy to traffic in narcotics.

At trial, wiretap evidence was excluded under s. 178.16(2) of the Criminal Code, resulting in acquittals.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial.

Before the new trial, the appellants applied to set aside the wiretap authorizations (a Wilson application).

The application was dismissed, and the Court of Appeal held it had no jurisdiction to hear an appeal from that dismissal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that there is no right of appeal from a Wilson application, the Charter does not guarantee such an appeal, and the issue of post-arrest wiretaps must be dealt with at trial.

The appellants were convicted of rape and indecent assault after engaging in sexual acts with a prostitute.

At trial, they argued that the complainant consented or, alternatively, that they held an honest but mistaken belief in her consent.

The trial judge left the defence of mistake of fact to the jury but instructed them that the belief must be supported by reasonable grounds.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the defence was properly left to the jury due to an 'air of reality' in the evidence, the trial judge erred in law by requiring reasonable grounds for the honest belief.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant's committal for trial was quashed before plea.

The Crown appealed but was unable to effect service, so the Attorney General preferred a direct indictment.

The trial judge dismissed the indictment on a plea of autrefois acquit.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the accused's appeal, holding that he was never in jeopardy on the first indictment and therefore not entitled to the plea of autrefois acquit.

The appellant was charged with conspiracy to import cocaine.

At trial, wiretap evidence was excluded because the police failed to disclose to the authorizing judge that a concurrent income tax investigation was ongoing and that information would be shared with tax authorities.

The trial judge acquitted the appellant, but the Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the existence of the tax investigation was irrelevant to the validity of the wiretap authorizations for the drug investigation.

The appellants were convicted of conspiracy to import cocaine based on evidence obtained from a room monitoring device.

Police officers had entered the residence of one of the appellants without consent to install the device, acting under an authorization that did not explicitly permit trespass.

The appellants argued the trespass rendered the interceptions not 'lawfully made' under the Criminal Code, making the evidence inadmissible.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the statutory scheme for electronic surveillance implicitly authorizes covert entry to install such devices when a judge grants an authorization.

The evidence was therefore lawfully obtained and admissible, and the appeals were dismissed.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal which quashed the convictions of the respondents on a charge of conspiracy to traffic in narcotics.

The issue concerned the validity of an order authorizing the interception of private communications.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing substantially with the majority of the Alberta Court of Appeal.

The applicants sought judicial release or a stay of sentence pending the Supreme Court of Canada's judgment on their appeals.

They had previously applied for judicial release to the Court of Appeal of British Columbia, which was dismissed by a chambers judge and a review was declined by the Chief Justice.

Assuming it had jurisdiction, the Supreme Court of Canada declined to grant the orders sought, noting that the lower court's denial was based on the specific circumstances of the applicants rather than a general rule against release upon a reserve of judgment.