Paul C. Bourque

The accused was charged with sexual assault.

At trial, he argued that the complainant consented or that he had an honest but mistaken belief in her consent.

The trial judge refused to put the mistaken belief defence to the jury, finding no 'air of reality' to it, and the accused was convicted.

The Court of Appeal overturned the conviction.

On appeal by the Crown, the Supreme Court of Canada restored the conviction, holding that the trial judge correctly withheld the defence from the jury because there was no evidence capable of supporting an honest belief that the complainant was actually consenting at the time of the assault.

The appellants, who were either charged or suspects in connection with an explosion and fire, were subpoenaed to testify at the preliminary inquiries of other accused persons separately charged with the same offence.

The appellants applied to quash the subpoenas, arguing that compelling them to testify would violate their right to silence under section 7 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the appellants were compellable witnesses and that section 5 of the Canada Evidence Act does not infringe section 7 of the Charter.

The Court found no evidence that the subpoenas were a form of pre-trial interrogation or otherwise objectionable, noting that the witnesses would be entitled to protections against self-incrimination at any subsequent proceedings against them.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal that quashed the accused's conviction for manslaughter.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, agreeing with the dissenting reasons in the Court of Appeal that the majority erred in setting aside the conviction.

The conviction at trial was restored, and the matter was remitted to the Court of Appeal to deal with the sentence appeal.

The accused shot and killed a woman sleeping in his apartment while suffering from a paranoid delusion that she was part of a conspiracy to kill him.

At trial, he raised the defence of insanity under s. 16(1) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge convicted him of second degree murder, finding that while he subjectively believed his act was justified, he retained the general capacity to know right from wrong.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that s. 16(1) exempts an accused from criminal responsibility if a mental disorder deprives them of the capacity to rationally apply their knowledge of right and wrong to the specific act committed.

The appellant union went on strike contrary to directives of the provincial Labour Relations Board that had been filed with the Court of Queen's Bench.

The union was found in criminal contempt of the orders and fined $400,000.

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the union argued it lacked status to be found in criminal contempt, that the common law offence of criminal contempt violated the Charter, and that a provincial board directive could not give rise to criminal contempt.

The Court dismissed the appeal, holding that unions have status to be found in criminal contempt, the offence does not violate the Charter as the distinction between civil and criminal contempt rests on the concept of public defiance, and the provincial legislation validly made the board's directive enforceable as an order of the court.

The accused's company received a duplicate cheque by mistake from a client for services already paid.

Knowing of the mistake, the accused deposited the cheque and transferred the funds to himself.

He was convicted of theft at trial, but the Court of Appeal set aside the conviction on the basis that property in the funds had passed to him under civil law.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that where a transferor mistakenly transfers property and the recipient knows of the mistake, property does not pass for the purpose of the criminal law if the law of property creates a right of recovery.

The accused's conversion of the funds with intent to deprive the owner constituted theft.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder based on circumstantial evidence and a recorded conversation with a friend who visited him in custody.

The friend, acting at the behest of the police and wearing a body pack, elicited statements from the appellant that undermined his lawyer's advice to remain silent.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the friend was acting as a state agent and that the elicitation of the statements violated the appellant's right to silence under section 7 of the Charter.

The Court concluded that the admission of the conscripted evidence would render the trial unfair and bring the administration of justice into disrepute under section 24(2), and declined to apply the curative proviso, ordering a new trial.