Sheila J. Greckol

The appellants challenged Alberta human rights legislation that omitted sexual orientation from the prohibited grounds of discrimination after a dismissed employee was denied access to the provincial human rights complaint process.

The Court held that the Charter applies to underinclusive legislation and that the omission created a discriminatory denial of the equal benefit and protection of the law contrary to s. 15(1).

The respondents failed to justify the omission under s. 1, including at the pressing and substantial objective stage of the Oakes analysis.

Applying Schachter, the Court held that reading in “sexual orientation” to the impugned provisions was the appropriate remedy.

The appeal was allowed and the cross-appeal dismissed with costs.

The appellant challenged a university policy requiring retirement at age 65 as age discrimination contrary to provincial human rights legislation.

The majority held that, although the policy was prima facie discriminatory, the employer established that the practice was reasonable and justifiable under the statutory defence because it furthered tenure, academic renewal, planning, and retirement objectives, and no obvious less impairing alternative would achieve the same results in the university context.

The Court also held that the statutory appeal scheme permitted appellate courts to reassess the factual record without the usual curial deference to the board of inquiry or reviewing judge.

The dissent would have applied a stricter human rights standard, given deference to the board's factual findings, and held the policy unjustified.

The appellant union went on strike contrary to directives of the provincial Labour Relations Board that had been filed with the Court of Queen's Bench.

The union was found in criminal contempt of the orders and fined $400,000.

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the union argued it lacked status to be found in criminal contempt, that the common law offence of criminal contempt violated the Charter, and that a provincial board directive could not give rise to criminal contempt.

The Court dismissed the appeal, holding that unions have status to be found in criminal contempt, the offence does not violate the Charter as the distinction between civil and criminal contempt rests on the concept of public defiance, and the provincial legislation validly made the board's directive enforceable as an order of the court.

Appeal from an Alberta labour reference concerning whether statutory prohibitions on strikes and lockouts, coupled with compulsory arbitration for public servants, hospital employees, firefighters, and police officers, infringed freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter.

The majority held that s. 2(d) protects the freedom to associate but does not constitutionalize collective bargaining or the right to strike, and therefore the impugned provisions were not inconsistent with the Constitution Act, 1982.

The dissent would have held that s. 2(d) protected collective bargaining and strike activity, subject to s. 1, and that the impugned schemes were not justified except potentially for truly essential services.

The appeal was dismissed, with the constitutional questions answered against the appellants except that the final abstract exclusion question was not answered.