Iacobucci

The parties cohabited for approximately 10 years.

Following separation, the respondent applied for a declaration that the definition of 'spouse' in s. 2(g) of the Nova Scotia Matrimonial Property Act was unconstitutional for failing to provide her with the presumption of an equal division of matrimonial property, in violation of s. 15(1) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the exclusion of unmarried cohabiting persons of the opposite sex from the Act is not discriminatory within the meaning of s. 15(1).

The distinction does not affect the dignity of these persons and respects the fundamental personal autonomy and choice of individuals who decide not to marry.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing that the trial judge erred in his charge to the jury on reasonable doubt.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, agreeing with the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeal that the charge, read as a whole, gave rise to a reasonable likelihood that the jury misapprehended the correct standard of proof.

A new trial was ordered.

The sole shareholder and directing mind of two corporations altered a cheque payable to one corporation by adding the second corporation as a payee.

He deposited the unendorsed cheque into the second corporation's account at the appellant bank.

The first corporation subsequently went into receivership, and its receiver brought an action in conversion against the bank.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the bank was not liable in conversion because the sole shareholder, as the directing mind of the first corporation, had the authority to direct the bank to deposit the funds into the second corporation's account.

Since the bank acted with the authorization of the rightful owner, there was no wrongful interference.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal that allowed the accused's appeal from his conviction for sexual assault.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal that the trial judge did not err in finding the similar fact evidence inadmissible.

Two Indian bands, the Wewaykum (Campbell River) and Wewaikai (Cape Mudge), claimed each other's reserve lands, alleging the federal Crown breached its fiduciary duty during the reserve creation process in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

Both bands sought declarations and equitable compensation.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, holding that the Crown fulfilled its fiduciary obligations by acting with loyalty, good faith, and ordinary prudence.

The Court found that both bands had historically acknowledged the other's entitlement to their respective reserves, making equitable relief inappropriate due to laches and acquiescence.

Furthermore, the Court ruled that the bands' claims were statute-barred by the applicable limitation periods.

The respondent commenced an action in Quebec claiming damages for loss of performance incentives and reputation after a satellite it helped manufacture was damaged during testing.

The appellants, all domiciled in the United States, brought declinatory motions challenging the jurisdiction of the Quebec courts under the Civil Code of Québec.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Quebec courts had jurisdiction because the respondent suffered damage to its reputation at its Quebec facility.

The Court further held that the 'real and substantial connection' test is subsumed within the Code's provisions and that the appellants failed to establish that another forum was clearly more appropriate under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

The appellants challenged the validity of the respondents' patent for the use of AZT in the treatment and prophylaxis of HIV/AIDS.

The appellants argued that the patent lacked utility at the time of application, claimed more than was invented, and failed to name NIH scientists as co-inventors.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the utility of AZT was established through the doctrine of sound prediction at the time of the patent application.

The Court also found that the prophylactic claims were soundly predicted and that the NIH scientists were not co-inventors because they merely verified the respondents' inventive concept.

The appellant requested access to personal information held by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS).

CSIS refused to disclose the information, claiming exemptions under the Privacy Act for national security and foreign confidences.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of s. 51 of the Privacy Act, which mandates in camera and ex parte hearings when these exemptions are claimed.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the mandatory ex parte provision did not violate s. 7 of the Charter.

However, the mandatory in camera provision violated s. 2(b) of the Charter and was not saved by s. 1 because it was overly broad.

The Court read down s. 51(2)(a) to apply only to the ex parte submissions.

On a cross-appeal, the Court held that the law enforcement exemption in s. 22(1)(b) is not limited to current investigations.

The appellant taxpayer was audited by revenue officials who obtained documents and statements using their statutory requirement powers.

The file was subsequently transferred to special investigations, and the taxpayer was charged with tax evasion.

The Supreme Court of Canada applied the principles from R. v. Jarvis to determine when the audit became an investigation engaging the taxpayer's Charter rights.

The Court concluded that the investigation commenced after a specific meeting, meaning evidence gathered prior to that point was admissible, while evidence gathered afterward using audit powers violated the Charter and was subject to exclusion under s. 24(2).

The appeal was dismissed and the order for a new trial was confirmed.

The Crown obtained a restraint order and special warrants of seizure against the respondents' real property and motor vehicles, alleging they were proceeds of crime from a stolen car parts operation.

The reviewing judge quashed the orders, finding the underlying search warrants were based on an illegal search by a provincial licensing agency.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal in part, holding that while a restraint order is a seizure under section 8 of the Charter and a reviewing judge can examine underlying warrants, the reviewing judge erred in excluding the agency's information.

The restraint order and warrants were restored, except for 24 vehicles seized without authorization.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder.

At his trial, the Crown cross-examined him extensively on incriminating statements he had made while testifying at his brother's separate trial for the same murder, where he had invoked section 5 of the Canada Evidence Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the cross-examination violated section 13 of the Charter because there was a realistic danger that the prior testimony could be used to incriminate him, not merely to test his credibility.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was charged with first degree murder and denied bail under s. 515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

He challenged the constitutionality of the provision, arguing it violated the right not to be denied reasonable bail without just cause under s. 11(e) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the portion of s. 515(10)(c) permitting detention 'on any other just cause being shown' is unconstitutionally vague and violates s. 11(e).

However, the Court severed this phrase and upheld the remainder of the provision, which allows bail to be denied where necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Supreme Court of Canada heard three appeals concerning the constitutionality of s. 488.1 of the Criminal Code, which sets out a procedure for determining claims of solicitor-client privilege in relation to documents seized from a law office under a warrant.

The Court held that s. 488.1 violates s. 8 of the Charter because it more than minimally impairs solicitor-client privilege.

The provision allows privilege to be lost through the inaction of the lawyer, requires the naming of clients, lacks notice to clients, imposes strict time limits without judicial discretion, and permits the Attorney General to inspect documents before privilege is determined.

The Court struck down s. 488.1 and established common law guidelines for law office searches.

The appellant, a Canadian citizen, was arrested and detained for eight days pursuant to a provisional arrest warrant requested by Germany for extradition purposes.

He sued Germany for damages for personal injuries (mental distress, denial of liberty, damage to reputation) resulting from his arrest.

Germany claimed sovereign immunity under the State Immunity Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that Germany did not waive its immunity by initiating the extradition process, as the civil action was separate.

Furthermore, the 'personal injury' exception in s. 6(a) of the Act applies only to physical injury, not to the mental distress or loss of liberty claimed by the appellant.

The action against Germany was dismissed.

The respondents were injured in a motor vehicle accident with an underinsured motorist.

They entered into a limits agreement with the tortfeasor, agreeing not to pursue damages beyond his policy limits, without notifying their own insurer.

The respondents then sought to recover the remainder of their damages from their insurer under the SEF 44 Endorsement.

The insurer denied the claim, arguing the limits agreement interfered with its subrogation rights and meant the respondents were no longer 'legally entitled to recover' from the tortfeasor.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the limits agreement did not preclude the respondents' claim against their insurer, as 'legally entitled to recover' refers to the right of action at the time of the accident, and the insurer's subrogation rights had not yet arisen.

The appellant, a cult leader, was convicted of multiple sexual offences against teenage girls.

At trial, the judge admitted evidence of each count as similar fact evidence for the others, and restricted the defence from cross-examining one complainant on the absence of references to sexual abuse in her teenage diary.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the admission of the similar fact evidence, finding its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect.

However, the Court held that the trial judge erred in restricting the cross-examination on the diary, as the complainant's privacy interest did not substantially outweigh the accused's right to make full answer and defence.

A new trial was ordered for the counts relating to that specific complainant, while the other convictions were upheld.

The accused was charged with sexual assault causing bodily harm.

At trial, the Crown introduced similar fact evidence from the accused's former wife regarding alleged past assaults to show a propensity for non-consensual, painful sex.

The accused argued the evidence was highly prejudicial and that the former wife and the complainant had colluded.

The trial judge admitted the evidence and left the issue of collusion to the jury, resulting in a conviction.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that the similar fact evidence was wrongly admitted because its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value, and the trial judge erred in law by failing to resolve the issue of collusion as a condition precedent to admissibility.

The appellant was tried by a jury for attempted murder.

The jury intended to return a guilty verdict, but due to the foreman's stuttering or coughing, the trial judge and others heard 'not guilty'.

The verdict was recorded as not guilty, and the jury and accused were discharged.

Shortly after, a court officer discovered the error.

The trial judge reconvened the jury over the next few days and eventually changed the recorded verdict to guilty.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while a trial judge has a narrow post-discharge jurisdiction to correct a verdict if it does not require the jury to reconsider its decision, this jurisdiction is lost if there is a reasonable apprehension of bias.

Given the jury's extensive dispersal and potential exposure to media, a reasonable apprehension of bias existed.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The respondent filed complaints with the Commissioner of Official Languages regarding language rights violations.

During the investigation, witnesses were promised confidentiality.

The respondent later requested access to the personal information in the investigation files under the Privacy Act.

The Commissioner refused to disclose certain interview notes, relying on the exemption in s. 22(1)(b) of the Privacy Act for information that could reasonably be expected to be injurious to lawful investigations.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the exemption can apply to concluded investigations to protect future ones, the Commissioner failed to establish a reasonable expectation of injury in this specific case.

The Court ordered the disclosure of the personal information but denied access to non-personal information.

The appellants claimed that lands set aside for the Ross River Band in the Yukon Territory constituted a reserve under the Indian Act, entitling them to a tax exemption.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that no reserve was legally created because there was no intention to create a reserve on the part of Crown agents with the authority to bind the Crown.

The Court found that while lands were set aside for the band's use, the statutory framework and royal prerogative require both an act of setting apart and a clear intention to create a reserve, which was absent in this case.