Christopher Webb

At a case conference for a contempt of court proceeding, the respondent appeared with newly retained counsel.

On consent, the matter was adjourned to allow counsel to prepare.

The court discharged the previously appointed amicus curiae, as the respondent was no longer self-represented.

The court also amended the title of proceeding to reflect the criminal nature of the contempt proceeding, while noting it would remain a sub-bundle in the civil file.

The appellant, Marko Tubic, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The court found that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient in explaining how after-the-fact conduct evidence justified a murder conviction over manslaughter, and that the trial judge erred by referring to an unconstitutional objective standard of fault ('ought to have known') under s. 229(c) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown appealed an order staying proceedings against the respondent for sexual assault, based on a breach of the respondent's s. 11(b) Charter right to a trial within a reasonable time.

The application judge found that the respondent's delay in electing mode of trial was reasonable due to outstanding essential disclosure, and that the COVID-19 pandemic did not contribute to the delay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal, upholding the application judge's findings that the pre-election delay was not attributable to the defence and that the pandemic was not an exceptional circumstance in this case.

The appellant, R.V., appealed his sentence for sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching.

Following the Supreme Court of Canada's restoration of his convictions, the case was remitted to the Court of Appeal for Ontario to consider the sentence appeal.

Fresh medical evidence, filed with the Crown's consent, revealed the appellant had terminal cancer with a very bleak prognosis.

In light of these exceptional circumstances, the Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the original term of imprisonment and probation order, and substituting an 18-month conditional sentence order.

Other orders from the trial judge remained in force.

Shane Wood appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, arson, and offering an indignity to a body.

The appeal raised three grounds: the trial judge's failure to admit defence evidence (hearsay statements of Kim Rolph-Smith), improper jury instructions on after-the-fact conduct, and inadequate handling of juror misconduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's exclusion of the hearsay evidence due to lack of reliability, no fatal omissions in the jury instructions on after-the-fact conduct, and that a juror inquiry was not warranted given the nature of the juror's note and the trial judge's corrective instruction.

The appellant, Davide Duncan, appealed his conviction for aiding or abetting the importation of cocaine and conspiracy to import cocaine.

The appeal raised two main issues: the admissibility of wiretap evidence, challenged on the basis of alleged misleading or fraudulent affidavits used to obtain the authorization, and the trial judge's instructions to the jury regarding the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge did not err in allowing amplification or excision of the affidavit errors, as they were not deliberate and the affiant acted in good faith.

The court also upheld the finding that the wiretap authorization fell within the criminal organization exception under s. 186(1.1) of the Criminal Code, negating the need to prove investigative necessity.

Finally, the court found no error in the trial judge's jury instructions on the burden of proof.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant Crown appealed after the Court of Appeal quashed the respondent's convictions for sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching, finding them inconsistent with an acquittal on sexual assault arising from the same conduct.

The majority of the Supreme Court held that a legal error in the trial judge's jury instructions — misdirecting the jury that the 'force' required for sexual assault differed from the 'touching' required for the other two offences — materially bore on the acquittal while leaving the convictions untouched, thereby reconciling the apparent inconsistency.

The majority restored the convictions, set aside the acquittal, and entered a stay of proceedings on the sexual assault charge pursuant to s. 686(8) of the Criminal Code.

Brown and Kasirer JJ. dissented in part, arguing that the only available remedy on a Crown appeal from a jury acquittal is a new trial, and that the majority's framework invites improper speculation into jury deliberations contrary to the scheme of the Criminal Code and the Court's prior decision in R. v. J.F.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter in the stabbing death of her former boyfriend.

At trial, the Crown cross-examined its own key witness on a prior inconsistent statement without bringing an application under section 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act, and subsequently used the inconsistency to impeach the witness's credibility during closing submissions.

The trial judge permitted this use and instructed the jury accordingly.

The Court of Appeal held that this improper cross-examination and the subsequent use of the evidence prejudiced the appellant's defence, rendering the trial unfair.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, Gordon Hartling, appealed his conviction for aggravated assault, assault, resisting arrest, and two counts of breach of probation, and his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no misapprehension of forensic evidence, proper admission of spontaneous utterances, and no ineffective assistance of counsel.

However, the court stayed one breach of probation charge due to the Kienapple principle (same conduct grounding both charges) and allowed the sentence appeal in part, reducing the total sentence by five months.

This reduction was a remedy for an unreasonable 14-month post-verdict delay in sentencing, primarily caused by institutional resource issues in obtaining a Gladue report, which the court found not to be an exceptional circumstance.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence following guilty pleas to sexual interference, child luring, and making child pornography.

He argued the sentencing judge erred in finding the predicate offence was a serious personal injury offence and in considering his history of domestic violence as part of a repetitive pattern of behaviour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sexual abuse of a child involved the use of violence and inflicted severe psychological damage.

The court also admitted fresh evidence of the appellant's rehabilitative progress but concluded it did not render the indeterminate sentence unreasonable given his high risk of reoffending.

A young person was convicted of manslaughter, aggravated assault, careless use of a firearm, and possession of a firearm without licence or registration following a judge-alone trial.

The appellant appealed the convictions for manslaughter, aggravated assault, and careless use of a firearm, claiming self-defence.

The trial judge rejected the self-defence claim, finding that the appellant fired his gun at retreating attackers and therefore acted unreasonably.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made a palpable and overriding error in finding that the appellant knew his attackers were retreating before he fired the first shot, and that the trial judge failed to properly apply the objective reasonableness standard for self-defence by imposing an unreasonably high burden on the appellant to weigh his response to a nicety within five seconds of being attacked.

The court allowed the appeal and entered acquittals on all three appealed charges.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence following a trial before a judge of the Superior Court of Justice sitting without a jury.

The appellant was convicted of sexual interference and sentenced to 10 months imprisonment.

The offence was alleged to have occurred in a hotel room in Ottawa.

On appeal from conviction, the appellant advanced three grounds: misapplication of the rule in Browne v. Dunn and failure to analyze the complainant's motive to fabricate; uneven scrutiny of evidence between the appellant and complainant; and failure to properly apply the W.(D.) principles.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal from conviction, finding the trial judge's findings of fact were open on the evidence and not contaminated by misapprehensions or uneven scrutiny.

On sentence, the appellant conceded the sentence fell within the appropriate range.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal from sentence but set aside the victim surcharge.

The appellant was convicted of sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching but acquitted of sexual assault, all charges arising from the same facts and evidence.

The appellant appealed on the ground that the verdicts were inconsistent and therefore unreasonable.

The Crown cross-appealed the acquittal, arguing that confusing jury instructions explained the inconsistency.

A five-judge panel was convened to resolve conflicting authorities regarding the role of jury instructions in inconsistent verdict analysis.

The majority held that the Supreme Court's guidance in R. v. F. (J.) provides authoritative direction: if the Crown wishes to respond to an inconsistent verdict argument by asserting that an acquittal resulted from legal error in instructions, it must appeal the acquittal.

The majority found the instructions legally correct and declined to order a retrial, instead entering acquittals on the conviction counts.

The dissent would have allowed both appeals and ordered a new trial on all counts, finding the charge confusing when viewed as a whole.

The appellant was convicted of impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing death, operating a motor vehicle with over 80 mg of alcohol per 100 ml of blood, and two counts of driving while impaired causing bodily harm, following a head-on collision that resulted in one death and injuries to two passengers.

The appellant appealed on four grounds: alleged violation of s. 8 Charter rights regarding blood sample seizure; alleged violation of s. 10(b) Charter rights regarding access to counsel; alleged misapprehension of evidence regarding a third vehicle; and alleged error in rejecting evidence of bolus drinking prior to the collision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the convictions.

The appellant was convicted of impaired driving causing bodily harm and operating a motor vehicle with excess alcohol causing bodily harm following a multi-vehicle accident on Dixie Road in Mississauga on October 19, 2013.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sought leave to introduce fresh evidence suggesting that another individual, "Volodya," was the actual driver of the van.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the motion to admit fresh evidence and the appeal, finding that the fresh evidence failed to meet the cogency component of the test for admission and that the verdict was not unreasonable.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder following a violent altercation at a house party.

The appellant, then 19 years old, stabbed and killed a partygoer during a confrontation.

The appeal raised three main issues: (1) whether the appellant's police statement was voluntary despite repeated assertions of the right to silence and police suggestions regarding credibility at trial; (2) whether the trial judge erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the defence of others under section 34 of the Criminal Code; and (3) whether the trial judge's instructions on self-defence were unbalanced and failed to present evidence supporting the appellant's version of events.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred on all three grounds and allowed the appeal, ordering a new trial.

The Crown appealed acquittals on a 28-count indictment involving prohibited firearms, devices, and weapons, theft, damage to a police vehicle, and breach of probation.

The respondent's left palm print was found on paper in a stolen police vehicle from which firearms, magazines, and OC spray were taken.

Three days later, the respondent was found with similar distinctive items.

The trial judge rejected the palm print evidence in isolation and acquitted on all counts.

The appellate court found the trial judge erred by failing to consider the palm print evidence in the context of the cumulative effect of all evidence.

The court allowed the appeal, entered a conviction on the OC spray count (which the respondent conceded), and ordered a new trial on the remaining counts.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on a charge of aggravated assault arising from a shooting incident.

The respondent was charged with attempted murder, aggravated assault, and firearms offences.

The Crown's theory was that the respondent intended to shoot another individual and that transferred intent applied.

The respondent's defence was that the gun fired accidentally while being waved to calm those present.

The trial judge refused to instruct the jury on liability for assault through threat of force under s. 265(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, finding it inconsistent with the Crown's primary theory and unduly complex.

The appellate court found this refusal was an error, as the Crown was entitled to have the jury instructed on alternative legal routes to liability even if accepting the respondent's version of events.

Two appellants, T.F. and M.W., appealed their convictions for first degree murder in the execution-style killing of their friend Tyrone Bracken.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, based on text messages, video surveillance, and post-offence conduct.

The trial judge found that the appellants participated in a pre-arranged plan to murder the victim.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred in using post-offence conduct to infer their participation and intent, committed a Villaroman error by reversing the burden of proof, and misapprehended evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly used the appellants' failure to express shock or horror at the killing as circumstantial evidence of their knowledge and participation in a planned murder.

An appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code against the Ontario Review Board's disposition dated June 30, 2017.

The appellant did not contest the Board's finding that he remained a significant threat to public safety or the disposition that he remain detained at the General Forensic Unit at CAMH.

However, he contended the Board acted unreasonably by not including a delegation of authority permitting community living in supervised accommodation when the Hospital deemed it appropriate, as had been included in the previous 2016 disposition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision was reasonable and entitled to deference, as the evidence clearly showed the appellant was not ready for community living at the time of the hearing.