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Accused's application to admit private records and text messages granted in part.
The accused, charged with sexual assault, brought an application under ss. 276 and 278.92 of the Criminal Code to admit private records and cross-examine the complainant on certain communications.
The Court admitted a redacted selfie and several text message exchanges relating to the relationship's breakdown and disputes over property, finding they were relevant to demeanour and potential motive to fabricate.
However, the Court refused to permit cross-examination on mutual accusations of infidelity, finding it lacked specific relevance and its minimal probative value was outweighed by prejudice and privacy concerns.
Crown application for out-of-province complainant to testify remotely via videoconference granted subject to conditions.
The Crown applied under s. 714.1 of the Criminal Code for an order permitting the complainant to testify remotely from Halifax at the accused's sexual assault trial in Toronto.
The accused opposed the application.
The court found that despite a barely sufficient evidentiary record, remote testimony was appropriate given the complainant's location, the cost of travel, and the impact on her emotional well-being.
The application was granted subject to conditions ensuring the solemnity of the proceedings and the integrity of the evidence.
Acquittal on all counts where complainant's evidence was too inconsistent to found conviction.
The accused was charged with two counts of sexual assault, one count of attempt to choke with intent to enable a sexual assault, and one count of uttering a threat to cause bodily harm, all arising from alleged incidents at a beauty salon.
The complainant was the sole direct witness and the defence called no evidence.
The court found the complainant's evidence to be riddled with material inconsistencies — particularly regarding the knife, prior incidents, and the events of March 5, 2022 — and found that her manner of testifying raised concerns about her reliability and candour.
Applying the reasonable doubt standard, the court found it would not be safe to convict on the evidence adduced and entered acquittals on all counts.
A youthful first offender receives a suspended sentence of 669 days and probation for a carjacking robbery.
The accused pleaded guilty to robbery committed on June 14, 2024, when he carjacked a vehicle at gunpoint on Parliament Street in Toronto while on a house arrest release order for an attempted murder charge.
The accused threatened the driver with a firearm (though none was found), forced him from the vehicle, and fled in the stolen car, colliding with other vehicles before abandonment.
The court imposed a suspended sentence of 669 days with 3 years probation, accounting for the accused's youth as a first offender, guilty plea, remorse, family support, and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions at Toronto South Detention Centre, while balancing denunciation and deterrence principles applicable to carjacking offences.
A refusal to provide a breath sample is provisional and not culpable when police unreasonably deny a detainee's request for internet access to find private counsel.
The defendant was charged with refusing to comply with a breath demand under section 320.15(1) of the Criminal Code.
The trial involved a directed verdict application and a Charter application alleging violations under sections 7, 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).
The court found that while the directed verdict application was dismissed, the defendant's refusal to provide a breath sample was provisional only, pending access to counsel.
The police failed to meet the reasonable diligence standard by denying the defendant's repeated requests for access to the internet to find private counsel.
The court found no actus reus for the refusal offence and acquitted the defendant.
The court accepted a joint submission of 5 years imprisonment for an offender who committed a violent crime spree fueled by substance abuse.
Joshua Sabourin pleaded guilty to 10 offences, including robbery, aggravated assault, sexual assault, and break and enter.
The parties jointly recommended a 5-year penitentiary sentence, minus pre-sentence custody, along with ancillary orders.
The court considered the facts, the offender's background (including substance abuse and potential intellectual disability), and legal principles of sentencing (denunciation, deterrence, totality, proportionality, parity).
Despite mitigating factors like the guilty plea, numerous aggravating factors, including a long criminal record, random selection of vulnerable victims, and lack of insight, warranted a significant sentence.
The court acceded to the joint recommendation, imposing concurrent sentences totaling 5 years, and ordered various ancillary measures including DNA submission, a lifetime weapon prohibition, and SOIRA registration.
The court dismissed the offender's sentencing appeal, upholding the conditional sentence for criminal harassment.
The appellant, Carlos Zamora, appealed his sentence for criminal harassment and failing to comply with a release order, seeking a conditional discharge instead of the conditional sentence of 90 days and 21 months probation imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.
The appeal was based on two grounds: that the sentencing judge placed undue emphasis on deterrence and failed to properly consider a conditional discharge, and that the judge misapprehended evidence regarding aggravating factors.
The Superior Court of Justice found no error in the sentencing judge's decision, affirming that the possibility of a conditional discharge was considered and that the aggravating factors were appropriately assessed.
The appeal was dismissed, and the original sentence was upheld.
The court dismissed the Crown's appeal, upholding a stay of proceedings for unreasonable trial delay.
The Crown appealed an order staying proceedings against the respondent for sexual assault, based on a breach of the respondent's s. 11(b) Charter right to a trial within a reasonable time.
The application judge found that the respondent's delay in electing mode of trial was reasonable due to outstanding essential disclosure, and that the COVID-19 pandemic did not contribute to the delay.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal, upholding the application judge's findings that the pre-election delay was not attributable to the defence and that the pandemic was not an exceptional circumstance in this case.
Police records of a young person's extrajudicial measures are not disclosable to the defence, but underlying facts of the incident may be disclosed and explored at a preliminary hearing.
The Crown sought directions regarding the disclosure of police records concerning a young person (M.A.) involved in an incident related to a murder charge against the accused.
The court determined that records pertaining to extrajudicial measures (EJM) taken with M.A. are presumptively non-disclosable under section 119(4) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) to protect the young person from stigmatization.
However, information about the underlying incident, such as a fight and its reason, and any animus between M.A. and the deceased, is disclosable and permissible for witness questioning, provided it does not reveal police involvement or EJM details.
The court suggested an Agreed Statement of Facts as a means to address the defence's need for full answer and defence without violating YCJA provisions.
A new trial was ordered due to misapprehension of evidence and uneven scrutiny of testimony.
The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting the complainant.
The appeal challenged the trial judge's assessment of credibility and reliability, alleging misapprehension of evidence, uneven scrutiny of Crown and defence evidence, and erroneous reliance on the complainant's apparent lack of animus.
The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge materially misapprehended evidence regarding the appellant's memory and exculpatory text messages, applied an uneven standard of scrutiny to the evidence, and improperly used the complainant's apparent lack of animus to bolster her credibility.
These errors, in their cumulative effect, detrimentally impacted the reasoning process and rendered the conviction unsafe.
The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.
Stay of proceedings granted for s. 11(b) delay; Crown failed to link pandemic to delayed disclosure.
The applicant, charged with aggravated assault and weapons offences, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to a total delay of nearly 24 months.
The Crown argued that a six-month deduction should be applied due to the Covid-19 pandemic.
The court found that the primary cause of the delay was the Crown's failure to provide essential disclosure, specifically CCTV footage, for over a year.
The court held that the Crown failed to establish a causal link between the pandemic and the delayed disclosure.
As the delay exceeded the 18-month Jordan ceiling without justification, the application was granted and a stay of proceedings was ordered.
A co-accused impliedly waives solicitor-client privilege by partially disclosing communications with trial counsel in an affidavit.
The Crown brought a motion for directions seeking a declaration that a co-accused, Jason Hamilton, had waived solicitor-client privilege over communications with his trial counsel regarding the accuracy and creation of an Agreed Statement of Facts.
Hamilton and the appellant, Haldane Smithen-Davis, were convicted based on this statement, and Smithen-Davis sought to reopen his appeal, relying on Hamilton's affidavit which challenged the statement's veracity and his counsel's advice.
Despite Smithen-Davis waiving his privilege, Hamilton refused.
The Court of Appeal found that Hamilton's partial and selective disclosure in his affidavit, and his reliance on it to explain his actions, constituted an implied waiver of privilege due to fairness.
The court ordered that Hamilton had waived privilege regarding the Agreed Statement of Fact's accuracy and origin, and directed cross-examination on these issues.
Defendant acquitted of breaching release order because Crown failed to negate the surety exception.
The defendant was charged with breaching a release order by being outside his residence contrary to a curfew condition.
He brought a Charter application to exclude evidence, alleging breaches of ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).
The court heard the Charter application and the trial concurrently.
The Charter application was dismissed, as the court found no Charter violations during the traffic stop and subsequent investigation.
However, the defendant was acquitted at trial because the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the female passenger in the vehicle was not one of the defendant's sureties, which was an exception to his curfew condition.
The officer's investigation into the passenger's identity was deemed insufficient to negate this exception.
Police occurrence reports intertwined with the allegations ruled first-party disclosure, not third-party records.
The accused, charged with sexual assault, brought a motion seeking disclosure of police occurrence reports and investigative notes relating to interactions between the complainant, the accused, and the police shortly after the alleged offence.
The Crown argued the materials were third-party records subject to the regime under section 278.1 of the Criminal Code.
The court held that the records were intertwined with the allegations, constituted the fruits of the investigation, and did not carry a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Consequently, the court ruled the materials were first-party disclosure governed by Stinchcombe and ordered their production.