Sierra Skoropada

The accused pleaded guilty to one count of possession of child pornography.

The court imposed a sentence of 3 years, reduced by 3.5 months for harsh pre-sentence custody conditions and further reduced by 16.5 months for time already served (11 months credited at 1.5:1), resulting in a further 16 months to be served.

The court considered extensive aggravating factors including the size of the collection (3,324 images and 65 videos), the nature of the material depicting real children in graphic sexual acts, active participation in the child pornography subculture through trading and chat communications, and mitigating factors including the accused's guilty plea, cooperation with police, sincere remorse, and traumatic childhood involving sexual and physical abuse.

After trial convictions for sexual interference, sexual exploitation, and sexual assault involving two adolescent victims, the court imposed a 12-year penitentiary sentence.

The offender had exploited a position of familial and spiritual authority over the victims, using prolonged religious grooming to facilitate repeated sexual abuse over several years, including repeated intercourse and one victim's pregnancy and abortion.

Applying the governing sentencing principles for sexual offences against children, the court held that denunciation and deterrence were paramount, identified numerous significant aggravating factors, and treated youth, first-offender status, and positive rehabilitative prospects as mitigating.

Consecutive sentences were appropriate for the separate victims, but the aggregate sentence was reduced under the totality principle.

DNA, weapons prohibition, non-communication, SOIRA, and tailored s. 161 prohibitions were ordered, except for a broader location-based s. 161(1)(a) order.

The defendant, charged under the Highway Traffic Act, brought a lost evidence application under sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

He alleged that police improperly handled and stored his dashcam and memory card, leading to the loss of crucial video evidence that would have supported his defence.

The Crown argued that the defendant failed to prove a Charter breach, specifically that no evidence was lost or that police acted negligently.

The court dismissed the application, finding no violation of the defendant's Charter rights, as there was no evidence that footage existed or was lost due to police negligence.

The defendant brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s.11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay in a Highway Traffic Act charge involving a fatality.

The total elapsed time from information laid to trial completion was 62 months, significantly exceeding the 18-month Jordan ceiling.

However, the court meticulously analyzed the chronology, deducting periods attributable to defence delay (e.g., failure to retain counsel, changing resolution intentions, non-attendance), joint delay, and exceptional circumstances (pandemic shutdown, mistrial due to counsel conduct, illnesses).

After these deductions, the net delay attributable to the Crown or institutional factors was found to be 7.6 months (232.5 days), or at most 14 months under an alternative calculation.

As the net delay remained below the 18-month ceiling, the application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

This judgment concerns a trial for a Highway Traffic Act offence where the defendant was charged with making a right turn not in safety, resulting in a pedestrian fatality.

The court heard testimony from civilian and expert police witnesses.

The defence challenged witness credibility, identity, and the correctness of the HTA section under which the defendant was charged.

The court found the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care in making the turn, striking and killing a pedestrian who was properly crossing.

The defence of due diligence was rejected, and a conviction was entered against the defendant under section 142(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The defendant, Olavo Williams-Cordeiro, was charged with careless driving causing death and stunt driving following a high-speed incident on Highway 403.

The court found that the defendant, along with a motorcyclist and another car, were engaged in a joint enterprise of racing, driving at speeds significantly exceeding the limit (up to 193 km/hr for the defendant's vehicle).

The motorcyclist collided with a vehicle lacking rear lights and died.

The court determined that the defendant's driving behaviour, characterized by excessive speed, tandem driving, and dangerous lane changes in the dark, fell below the standard of a reasonably prudent driver, constituting careless driving.

The court rejected the defence argument that the collision occurred through no fault of the defendant, emphasizing that the dangerous activity of racing created a foreseeable risk, and the presence of a vehicle without lights was a foreseeable highway hazard.

The defendant was found guilty of both charges, with the Kienapple principle to be considered for sentencing.

The accused was tried on six historical charges involving two complainants, including sexual interference, sexual exploitation, and sexual assault.

The Crown applied to have the complainants' testimony admitted as similar fact evidence between the counts.

The court admitted the similar fact evidence, finding its probative value outweighed any prejudice.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court rejected the accused's testimony and accepted the evidence of the complainants.

The court found the accused guilty on all six counts, concluding he used his position of religious authority and trust to sexually abuse the complainants.

Rajvinder Singh appealed his conviction for operating a conveyance while impaired by alcohol.

At trial, he was acquitted of the over 80 mg charge due to a Charter violation (s. 10(b) right to counsel in Punjabi).

On appeal, Singh argued the trial judge erred in finding him impaired, primarily by challenging credibility assessments of witnesses and alleging misapprehension of evidence, including video recordings.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons were reasonable and well-supported by the evidence, and that no palpable or overriding errors in credibility findings or factual assessments were demonstrated.

The court reiterated the high standard for appellate intervention on factual findings and credibility.

The accused was charged with impaired operation and excess blood alcohol concentration following a motor vehicle collision.

At trial, the accused brought a Charter application alleging breaches of his rights under ss. 8 and 10(b).

The court found that the police unnecessarily delayed advising the accused of his right to counsel and failed to take breath samples as soon as practicable.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the breath test results under s. 24(2), resulting in an acquittal on the over 80 charge.

However, based on civilian and emergency personnel evidence of the collision and the accused's physical signs of impairment, the court found the accused guilty of impaired operation.

The defendant was charged with breaching a release order by being outside his residence contrary to a curfew condition.

He brought a Charter application to exclude evidence, alleging breaches of ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).

The court heard the Charter application and the trial concurrently.

The Charter application was dismissed, as the court found no Charter violations during the traffic stop and subsequent investigation.

However, the defendant was acquitted at trial because the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the female passenger in the vehicle was not one of the defendant's sureties, which was an exception to his curfew condition.

The officer's investigation into the passenger's identity was deemed insufficient to negate this exception.

Crown appeal from acquittal on a charge of operating a motor vehicle without insurance contrary to section 2(1)(a) of the Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act.

The respondent was also charged with failing to surrender an insurance card contrary to section 3(1) of the same Act.

The respondent paid the set fine for the section 3(1) offence before trial on the section 2(1)(a) charge.

The trial judge acquitted on the section 2(1)(a) charge, finding the Crown had not proven the absence of insurance beyond a reasonable doubt.

The respondent also sought a stay of the section 2(1)(a) charge based on the Kienapple principle against multiple convictions.

The appeal court found that section 3(1) is a lesser included offence within section 2(1)(a), but that the respondent's prior conviction on the lesser offence does not bar prosecution for the more serious offence.

The court also found that the Crown need not prove the absence of insurance; rather, once the Crown establishes the respondent was operating the vehicle and could not produce proof of valid insurance upon demand, the offence is complete.

The respondent failed to adduce any evidence of valid insurance or due diligence.

The acquittal was set aside and a conviction was entered.