Ravi Sahota

The defendant was charged with impaired driving, driving with excess alcohol, and mischief following a late-night incident on October 16, 2024, involving an argument with his spouse, consumption of alcohol, and a minor collision between his ATV and his spouse's vehicle on their rural property driveway.

The Crown proved the defendant's blood alcohol concentration exceeded the legal limit through breath samples taken at 3:32 a.m. and 3:58 a.m., both showing truncated readings of 170 milligrams per 100 milliliters of blood.

The defendant was found guilty of driving with excess alcohol but acquitted of impaired driving and mischief due to insufficient evidence of impairment at the time of driving and lack of intent regarding the property damage.

The Ontario Court of Justice considered a drink-driving case involving Keith Maiato, focusing on alleged Charter violations under sections 8, 9, and 10(a).

The court analyzed whether the police had reasonable grounds for arrest and whether the Defendant was properly informed of the reasons for detention.

The court found no breach of s. 10(a) or s. 9, concluding that the arrest was lawful and supported by reasonable grounds.

However, the court found the Defendant’s admissions to the Qualified Technician were not voluntary due to the manner in which the breath demand was explained, leading to exclusion of those admissions.

Without the Defendant’s admissions, the prosecution failed to prove identity and impairment beyond a reasonable doubt, resulting in acquittal.

In this decision, the Ontario Court of Justice acquitted Franco Tomasone of the charge of refusing to provide a breath sample under s. 320.15(1) of the Criminal Code.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Tomasone unequivocally refused to comply with a lawful approved screening device (ASD) demand.

The judge emphasized the statutory immediacy requirement for providing breath samples but recognized that some flexibility is warranted when confusion arises, particularly when the right to counsel is suspended during an ASD demand.

The court also found that the officer did not have objectively reasonable grounds to suspect Tomasone had alcohol in his body at the time of the demand, rendering the demand unlawful.

The decision highlights the importance of the timing and clarity of demands and refusals in impaired driving investigations.

Brian Arsenault pleaded guilty to failing to stop after an accident where he knew or was reckless as to whether it resulted in bodily harm, contrary to s. 320.16(2) of the Criminal Code.

The incident involved striking a pedestrian, Christine Williamson, and then leaving the scene and later making a false report.

The Crown sought a 15-month carceral sentence, while the defence sought an 18-month conditional sentence.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the victim's profound psychological trauma, the offender's bad driving, and the false accident report, and mitigating factors such as an early guilty plea, genuine remorse, and strong rehabilitative prospects.

The judge imposed an 18-month conditional sentence, with the first nine months under house arrest, a 2-year driving prohibition, a DNA order, and a victim fine surcharge, finding that this sentence could achieve denunciation and deterrence while promoting rehabilitation.

The appellant, Omer Strickland, appealed his conviction for assault causing bodily harm and his sentence of six months incarceration.

The appeal against conviction was based on the trial judge's alleged failure to provide sufficient assistance to him as a self-represented accused.

The appeal against sentence argued that the sentence was unfit, minimizing rehabilitative potential, lack of prior record, and remorse.

The court dismissed both appeals, finding that the trial judge provided adequate assistance within judicial limits and that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit given the aggravating factors.

The applicant, charged with having excess blood alcohol, applied for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay under the *R. v. Jordan* framework.

The court determined the total delay by including a 28-day pre-charge period, resulting in 19 months and 4 days.

After subtracting 62 days of defence delay, the net delay was 17 months and 2 days, which is below the 18-month presumptive ceiling.

However, the court found that the applicant demonstrated meaningful steps to expedite the proceedings and that the case took "markedly longer" than it should have for a straightforward two-day trial, even considering the court's busy schedule and the pandemic's impact.

The application for a stay was granted.

The accused, Danielle Anderson, was charged with operating a motor vehicle with over 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.

She sought to exclude breath test evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, alleging violations of ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) related to the "forthwith" requirement for Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand and test, immediate right to counsel (RTC) upon arrest, and taking Approved Instrument (AI) breath samples "as soon as practicable." The court found that the ASD demand and test were made forthwith, the RTC was provided promptly upon arrest, and the police acted reasonably in taking breath samples.

The Charter application was dismissed, and the accused was found guilty of the "Over 80" charge.

The applicant, Sharabil Mohamed, sought a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter due to an alleged infringement of his s. 11(b) right to a speedy trial.

The total delay from the information being sworn to the anticipated trial conclusion was 944 days (31 months and 1 day), exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for Ontario Court matters.

The court deducted 14 days for defence-caused delay and 349 days for exceptional circumstances related to the COVID-19 pandemic and its impact on court scheduling in the Region of Peel.

After deductions, the remaining delay was 581 days (19 months and 2 days), still above the presumptive ceiling.

The Crown failed to rebut the presumption of unreasonableness with further exceptional circumstances.

Consequently, the application for a stay of proceedings was granted.

The applicant brought a motion alleging a breach of their right to a timely trial under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The applicant was charged with sexual assault on February 24, 2019, and was arrested on March 2, 2019.

Trial dates were initially set for April 6-9, 2020, but were adjourned due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

New trial dates were set for January 4-7, 2021.

The central issue was how much delay attributable to the pandemic should be deducted from the total delay calculation.

The applicant argued that only three months (the period of court closure) should be deducted, while the Crown argued that the entire nine-month period from the first trial date to the second trial date should be deducted as an exceptional circumstance.

The court found that reasonable measures to mitigate the delay had been taken and deducted nine months from the net delay, resulting in a remaining delay of 12 months and 21 days, below the presumptive 18-month ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The application was dismissed.