Ryan Dorsman

The offender pleaded guilty to dangerous operation of a conveyance and failure to stop after an accident.

He drove into a parked vehicle, fled at high speed while weaving dangerously through traffic, and struck a second parked vehicle.

The Crown sought jail time followed by probation and a driving prohibition.

The defence sought a conditional sentence of imprisonment.

The court imposed a custodial sentence, finding that the gravity of the offences, the intentional and cavalier nature of the driving conduct, the offender's criminal and driving record, and the prevalence of dangerous driving incidents in the community warranted incarceration rather than a conditional sentence, despite the offender's youth and rehabilitative potential.

A young person, T.M., challenged the constitutionality of sections 42(2)(p) and 42(5)(a) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA).

These provisions limit the availability and duration of deferred custody and supervision orders (DCSOs) for offences involving serious bodily harm, making them unavailable for youth in such cases and capping their duration at six months.

The Crown sought to dismiss the application.

The court found that these provisions violate sections 15 (equality) and 7 (liberty and fundamental justice) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court reasoned that the provisions deny young persons a benefit (a community-based custodial sentence option) that is available to similarly situated adults, thereby perpetuating the disadvantage arising from their diminished moral blameworthiness and forcing youth into potentially harsher custodial sentences.

The court declared the impugned sections invalid.

The appellant, Omer Strickland, appealed his conviction for assault causing bodily harm and his sentence of six months incarceration.

The appeal against conviction was based on the trial judge's alleged failure to provide sufficient assistance to him as a self-represented accused.

The appeal against sentence argued that the sentence was unfit, minimizing rehabilitative potential, lack of prior record, and remorse.

The court dismissed both appeals, finding that the trial judge provided adequate assistance within judicial limits and that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit given the aggravating factors.