Dean D. Paquette

The applicant, convicted of multiple sexual assaults, intentionally failed to report to the provincial sex offender registry to challenge the constitutionality of Christopher's Law.

He argued that the mandatory registration and lifetime reporting provisions violated s. 7 of the Charter.

Applying the Supreme Court's reasoning in Ndhlovu, the court found that both provisions were overbroad because they captured offenders who posed no increased risk of reoffending.

The court rejected the Crown's argument that the provincial registry's focus on time-sensitive investigations justified the overbreadth under s. 1.

The provisions were declared unconstitutional as applied to the applicant, and the charge of failing to report was stayed.

The defendant was charged with careless driving causing bodily harm under section 130(3) of the Highway Traffic Act following a collision on August 2, 2023, on the Queen Elizabeth Way in Oakville.

The defendant merged onto the highway from the Third Line on-ramp and collided with a motorcycle driven by the victim, who suffered life-altering injuries.

The prosecution relied primarily on eyewitness testimony and collision reconstruction evidence.

The defendant was acquitted after the court found reasonable doubt regarding whether the defendant's driving fell below the standard of an ordinarily prudent driver, particularly given evidence of erratic driving by the motorcycle operator before the collision.

The accused, F.(D.), was convicted of sexually assaulting his wife.

The court sentenced him to three years' imprisonment, rejecting the defence's request for a conditional sentence order.

The decision emphasizes the breach of trust inherent in intimate partner sexual assault, particularly involving an intoxicated and vulnerable victim.

The court relied on the Ontario Court of Appeal's established sentencing range of three to five years for such offences and considered the significant harm to the victim, the accused's substance abuse issues, and his moral blameworthiness.

Ancillary orders included DNA sampling, a victim fine surcharge, weapons prohibition, and sex offender registry registration.

This decision addresses the issue of consent in a sexual assault trial where the complainant had no memory of the sexual activity due to intoxication.

The court carefully analyzes the circumstantial evidence, including the complainant’s testimony, prior consistent statements, and an online conversation between the parties.

The judge applies established legal principles on consent, capacity, and the evidentiary value of prior consistent statements, ultimately finding the accused guilty based on the totality of the circumstantial evidence proving non-consent beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant, Madeline Di Santo, was charged with careless driving causing bodily harm under section 130(3) of the Highway Traffic Act following a collision with a pedestrian.

The defendant pleaded not guilty.

The court, after a one-day trial, found that the prosecution failed to prove the actus reus of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

The judge determined that the defendant was not driving at an unreasonable speed, had an advance green light, and the complainant pedestrian was outside the crosswalk, leading to the conclusion that the defendant's driving did not fall below the standard of a reasonably prudent driver.

The collision was deemed an accident, and the charge was dismissed.

A young person, T.M., challenged the constitutionality of sections 42(2)(p) and 42(5)(a) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA).

These provisions limit the availability and duration of deferred custody and supervision orders (DCSOs) for offences involving serious bodily harm, making them unavailable for youth in such cases and capping their duration at six months.

The Crown sought to dismiss the application.

The court found that these provisions violate sections 15 (equality) and 7 (liberty and fundamental justice) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court reasoned that the provisions deny young persons a benefit (a community-based custodial sentence option) that is available to similarly situated adults, thereby perpetuating the disadvantage arising from their diminished moral blameworthiness and forcing youth into potentially harsher custodial sentences.

The court declared the impugned sections invalid.

The defendant, K.R., was charged under s. 162.1(1) of the Criminal Code for knowingly publishing intimate images of the complainant, G.I., without consent.

The images, which depicted G.I.'s genitalia and sexual activity, were posted to military Facebook groups.

The central issue was whether G.I. had a reasonable expectation of privacy in these images at the time of recording and publication, as required by s. 162.1(2)(b) and (c).

The court found that G.I. did not have such an expectation, given his prior widespread distribution of the images on dating sites (Grindr, Scruff) and Pornhub, and his provision of a Facebook password to the defendant.

Applying the contextual assessment from R. v. Jarvis, the court concluded that the Crown failed to prove the privacy element of the offence.

K.R. was found not guilty.

Omar Bataineh was found guilty after trial of failing to stop after an accident resulting in death.

The Crown sought 12-18 months jail, while the defence requested a conditional sentence.

The court found that Bataineh was aware he struck the victim, stopped briefly away from the scene, and then deliberately drove past the scene again without stopping.

Despite his good character and stated remorse, the court noted a lack of insight into his behaviour, as he described himself as a victim.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, the court sentenced Bataineh to 12 months in custody, a three-year driving prohibition, and one year of probation.

The defendant, Trevor Henry, pled guilty to careless driving causing death and bodily harm under the Highway Traffic Act.

The collision resulted in the death of Nancy Fleming and life-altering injuries to William Fleming.

The court considered sentencing principles of deterrence, proportionality, and restraint, along with aggravating factors (devastating impact on victims' family) and mitigating factors (guilty plea, remorse, no prior similar driving offences).

The court imposed a global sentence of 45 days intermittent imprisonment, a 2-year non-reporting probation order, and a 2-year driver's licence suspension, emphasizing that the sentence denounces the driving conduct and serves general and specific deterrence.

The accused brought a s. 11(b) Charter application for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay was 20.9 months (637 days), exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court cases.

The court deducted 21 days for defence-caused delay but found no basis to deduct time for the COVID-19 pandemic without specific evidentiary foundation.

The Crown failed to rebut the presumption of unreasonable delay or demonstrate that the case was particularly complex.

The court found a breach of the accused's s. 11(b) Charter right and entered a stay of proceedings.

M.S. brought an application under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that his right to trial within a reasonable time had been infringed, as the expected completion date of his trial for historical sexual offences exceeded the presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown argued for deductions for defense delay and exceptional circumstances due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court found no deductible defense delay but determined that the delay caused by the adjournment of the first trial date due to COVID-19 directives constituted an exceptional circumstance.

After deducting this period, the total delay fell below the Jordan threshold.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The accused, Hal Clayton, was arrested for driving with a suspended license, leading to a vehicle search that uncovered controlled substances.

Clayton brought a Charter application alleging violations of his s. 8 (unlawful search) and s. 10(b) (right to counsel) rights.

The court found that the vehicle search was a pretextual search, not genuinely for a driver's license, and thus unlawful.

Additionally, the police violated the accused's right to counsel by delaying advisement of rights and by questioning him after he had requested a lawyer but before he had access to one.

Applying the Grant analysis, the court determined that the serious and cumulative nature of the Charter breaches by multiple officers outweighed society's interest in admitting the evidence.

Consequently, all evidence found during the search was excluded from the trial.

The defendant was charged with making an unsafe left turn contrary to section 142(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The defendant's vehicle collided with an eastbound motorcycle, resulting in the death of the motorcycle driver.

The court found that the defendant's vehicle crossed the centre line into the path of oncoming traffic without first ensuring the movement could be made safely.

The defendant did not testify and raised no defence.

The court convicted the defendant of the offence, finding that the prosecution proved the actus reus beyond a reasonable doubt and that the defendant failed to establish a due diligence defence.

This is an application by the Crown under sections 486.1(1), 486.2(1), and 715.1 of the Criminal Code of Canada regarding the admissibility of a videotaped statement of the complainant in an alleged sexual assault case.

The primary issue was whether the videotaped statement, made approximately 3 years and 5.5 months after the alleged incident, was recorded within "a reasonable time" as required by section 715.1.

The court considered the objectives of section 715.1, reasons for delay, and the impact on the complainant's recollection, distinguishing the facts from other cited cases.

The court found the delay reasonable given the complainant's age at the time of the assault (12) and the common reluctance of sexual assault victims to report incidents, allowing the Crown's application.

The defendant pleaded guilty to one count of possession of child pornography, two counts of sexual interference, and two counts of making child pornography.

The Crown proceeded by indictment on all charges.

The sentencing court imposed a global sentence of five years and three months imprisonment, less credit for pre-sentence custody.

The court found that denunciation and deterrence were the primary sentencing objectives given the serious nature of the offences involving the sexual abuse and exploitation of young children.

The defendant had abused the trust of close friends by sexually abusing their children and recording the abuse.

The court also imposed ancillary orders including a lifetime sex offender registration requirement, a lifetime prohibition on contact with children under 16, and restrictions on Internet use.

This criminal trial involved three accused (Adeel Safdar, Shaheen Safdar, and Aatif Safdar) charged with various assaults and uttering threats against Sara Salim, Adeel's wife.

The central issue was whether Sara's extensive injuries were inflicted by the accused or were self-inflicted due to mental illness, as she initially claimed.

The court found Adeel Safdar guilty of two counts of aggravated assault related to breaking Sara's jaw and permanently disfiguring her ear, based on Sara's testimony corroborated by expert medical evidence.

Shaheen Safdar and Aatif Safdar were found not guilty of all charges due to reasonable doubt, as Sara's testimony against them lacked sufficient corroboration and suffered from inconsistencies.

This mid-trial ruling addresses the Crown's application regarding alleged violations of the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

The Crown contended that the defence adduced evidence without first confronting Crown witnesses, particularly the complainant, Sara Salim, during cross-examination.

The court found four specific instances where the defence's failure to cross-examine on substantial matters constituted a breach of the rule, while dismissing the majority of the Crown's 16 alleged violations as either insubstantial or generally covered by the extensive cross-examination.

As a remedy, the court permitted the Crown to recall the complainant or other witnesses for reply testimony, declining the Crown's request for an adverse inference against the accused's credibility.

The applicant, charged with numerous drug trafficking and organized crime offences, sought a bail review under s. 520(1) of the Criminal Code to vacate a detention order.

The applicant argued the justice of the peace erred in law by rejecting the proposed sureties and conflating drug trafficking with trafficking for a criminal organization.

The Superior Court found no error in law, noting the overwhelming evidence of the applicant's high-ranking position in a mafia organization and the massive scale of the drug transactions.

The court upheld the detention on both the secondary and tertiary grounds, concluding that release would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The Crown applied to admit evidence of prior discreditable conduct or similar fact evidence in a sexual assault trial.

The accused was charged with sexual assault on July 24, 2015.

The Crown sought to introduce evidence of a prior incident occurring seven years earlier.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the prejudicial effect was limited, the Crown failed to establish sufficient probative value to outweigh any prejudice.

The court noted that the single prior incident was temporally remote, the similarities between the incidents were limited, and the defence position was one of complete denial rather than consent or innocent association.

The applicant, charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, brought a Charter application to exclude evidence seized from his vehicle pursuant to a search warrant.

He argued the Information to Obtain (ITO) lacked sufficient grounds and relied on an uncorroborated confidential informant tip.

He also argued the indictment violated the single transaction rule under s. 581 of the Criminal Code by combining drugs seized from his person upon arrest with drugs later seized from his vehicle.

The court dismissed the application, finding the ITO contained sufficient corroborated grounds to justify the warrant.

The court also held that the single transaction rule was not violated, as the seizures occurred on the same day and formed part of a continuous series of acts.