Lucas Price

The defendant was charged with multiple drug trafficking and firearm offences.

He admitted to trafficking cocaine and possessing proceeds of crime, and cocaine for trafficking.

The contested charges were possession of a firearm and possession of fentanyl for trafficking.

The court found the defendant guilty of the firearm charges, rejecting his explanation that the firearm belonged to another individual, Bogdan, due to inconsistencies in his testimony and strong circumstantial evidence (defendant's bank card and personal ornaments found with the firearm).

However, the court acquitted the defendant of the fentanyl charge, finding reasonable doubt due to weaknesses in the prosecution's evidence regarding the location and association of the fentanyl with the defendant's documents, despite the defendant's impaired credibility.

The defendant was charged with possession of cocaine for the purposes of trafficking.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, including the defendant operating his vehicle where cocaine was found in the centre console.

The court applied the principles of reasonable doubt and constructive possession, emphasizing that vehicle ownership does not create a presumption of knowledge or possession.

Due to numerous gaps in the prosecution's evidence, including lack of forensic links, inconsistent vehicle control, and insufficient investigation into other potential users, the court found reasonable doubt regarding the defendant's knowledge and control of the cocaine.

The defendant was acquitted.

This criminal case involved a pre-trial Garofoli application challenging the validity of three search warrants obtained under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The applicant alleged breaches of his s. 8 Charter rights against unreasonable search and seizure, arguing that the Informations to Obtain (ITOs) contained deliberate misrepresentations and omissions by the affiant officer.

The court found that the affiant deliberately or recklessly misled the issuing justice, rendering the ITOs unreliable after excisions and amplifications.

Key issues included false assertions about the applicant's residence, exaggerated claims about his criminal history, and misleading descriptions of surveillance videos.

The court concluded that the warrants were invalid and, applying the Grant factors under s. 24(2) of the Charter, excluded the evidence (cocaine and a firearm) due to the serious nature of the Charter-infringing conduct and its impact on the applicant's rights, despite society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

Acquittals were entered on all charges.

The applicants brought several pre-trial Charter motions alleging unlawful arrest, excessive force, lost evidence, and delays in implementing their right to counsel.

The Crown conceded a breach of section 10(b) due to a delay in providing access to counsel, but the court declined to exclude the drug evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding the breach was not causally connected to the discovery of the evidence and exclusion would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

All other Charter applications were dismissed, as the court found the officers had reasonable grounds for the warrantless arrests, did not use excessive force, and were not unacceptably negligent in failing to preserve video evidence.

The defendant was found guilty of two counts of possession of controlled substances (cocaine and fentanyl) for the purpose of trafficking and one count of possessing proceeds of crime.

The Crown sought a sentence of 6 years, while the defence sought 3 years.

The court weighed the significant aggravating factors of trafficking highly toxic fentanyl in a public area while accompanied by a child against the mitigating factors of the defendant's good prospects for rehabilitation and lack of a serious related criminal record.

The court sentenced the defendant to a total of 5 years in prison.

The accused was charged with drug trafficking offences after police executed a search warrant at his residence and seized approximately 1kg of cocaine from a safe.

At trial, the accused brought a Charter application arguing his s. 10(b) right to counsel and s. 8 right against unreasonable search were violated due to delays in facilitating access to a lawyer, questioning before he spoke to counsel, and an unjustified level 3 (strip) search at the police station.

The court found breaches of both s. 10(b) and s. 8.

However, applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court concluded the breaches were on the less serious end of the spectrum, had minimal impact on the accused as they did not lead to the discovery of the evidence, and society's interest favoured adjudication on the merits.

The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

The accused was charged with drug trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime after police responded to a 911 call about a man with a firearm.

Upon arriving at the scene, police observed the accused briefly interacting with the firearm suspect and placed the accused under investigative detention, which quickly escalated to an arrest on the order of another officer.

A pat-down search of the accused's satchel revealed cocaine and marijuana.

At trial, the accused argued his Charter rights under ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) were violated.

The court found that while the initial investigative detention was lawful, the subsequent arrest lacked reasonable grounds, rendering the arrest and search unlawful, and there was a minor delay in providing the right to counsel.

However, applying the Grant framework, the court concluded the breaches were not serious, had limited impact, and society's interest favoured adjudication on the merits, thus dismissing the application to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2).

The accused was stopped for speeding.

The police officer smelled burnt marijuana and questioned the accused about cannabis, eventually searching the accused's vehicle and satchel under the Cannabis Control Act, finding cocaine.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging breaches of his ss. 7, 8, and 10(b) rights.

The court found that the officer lacked reasonable grounds for the search, rendering it unlawful under s. 8, and that there was an unreasonable delay in providing access to counsel under s. 10(b).

The court also found the officer gave misleading testimony.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) and dismissed the charge.

The court sentenced Vuk Peric after he pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, involving a total of 82.63 grams.

The offences occurred while he was on bail for prior drug-related charges.

The central issue was determining a proportionate sentence, considering the principle of totality with a previously imposed four-year sentence for other offences.

The court balanced aggravating factors, such as the nature and quantity of fentanyl, re-offending while on bail, and a significant criminal record, against mitigating factors, including guilty pleas, harsh pre-trial detention conditions during the pandemic, and his struggles with addiction and challenging personal background.

The court imposed concurrent four-year sentences for the current offences, to run consecutively to the prior sentence, resulting in a functional equivalent of an eight-year global sentence.

After pre-sentence credit, 14.5 months remained to be served.

The accused challenged the validity of two search warrants issued under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act on the basis that they violated section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court conducted a Garofoli application to determine whether reasonable and probable grounds existed for the issuance of the warrants.

The accused also brought a constitutional challenge to the "Step Six" procedure and sought the appointment of amicus curiae.

The court rejected the constitutional challenge, declined to appoint amicus, and found that the warrants could have been issued based on credible, compelling, and corroborated information from a confidential informant combined with independent police investigation, including OPP wiretap evidence of firearms trafficking.

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and breach of recognizance after police found him with crack cocaine in a bathroom of an apartment.

He appealed the convictions, arguing that the police violated his Charter rights under sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) by unlawfully entering the apartment and detaining him.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the appellant lacked standing to assert a section 8 claim as he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment, and that his brief detention and subsequent arrest did not violate his section 9 or 10 rights.

Jeffrey Rebelo was charged with possession of marijuana and cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime following a police surveillance and search warrant execution.

The trial included a voir dire on the admissibility of the accused's statements.

The court ruled that utterances made upon arrest were admissible, but a subsequent videotaped statement was inadmissible due to concerns about voluntariness, specifically inducements related to the arrest of his parents and girlfriend.

The court found the accused guilty on all counts, concluding that the Crown proved knowledge and control of the drugs and that the seized cash constituted proceeds of crime, based on direct and circumstantial evidence.

The applicant brought a Charter motion under sections 8 and 24(2) to quash a search telewarrant and exclude evidence seized from his residence.

The warrant was based on information from a confidential informant.

After applying the Step Six procedure from Garafoli to review redacted portions of the Information to Obtain, the court assessed the informant's tips based on their compelling nature, credibility, and police corroboration.

The court found the information sufficient to justify the warrant.

The court also dismissed the applicant's argument that the police improperly used a telewarrant, finding that personal attendance before a justice was impracticable under the circumstances.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of ammunition without a license, and possession of proceeds of crime.

He argued the verdict was unreasonable because the evidence was entirely circumstantial, and that the trial judge erred in assessing circumstantial evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding compelling circumstantial evidence linking the appellant to the drugs, cash, and ammunition, and concluding the trial judge did not make the error identified in R. v. Bui.

The offender was sentenced following convictions for multiple drug trafficking offences involving large quantities of MDMA, methamphetamine, heroin, ketamine, and marijuana, as well as firearm offences including possession of a loaded handgun, unlawful storage, and possession while prohibited.

Police executing a search warrant discovered approximately 39,000 individual drug doses valued at about $675,000, drug trafficking paraphernalia, cash proceeds, and a loaded firearm with ammunition in plain view.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence for serious drug trafficking and firearm possession offences.

Applying principles of proportionality, consecutive and concurrent sentencing, and the totality principle, the court imposed a global sentence of seven years' imprisonment.

After credit for pre-sentence custody at a 2:1 rate and credit for a related prior sentence, the net remaining sentence was 39 months.

The accused was charged with multiple offences including possession of drugs for the purpose of trafficking and possession of a loaded firearm after police executed a search warrant at an apartment.

The accused argued he did not have possession of the items as he had been kicked out of the apartment by the lessee a week prior.

The court found that circumstantial evidence, including the accused's ongoing access, personal belongings, and statements to undercover officers, proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he had knowledge and a measure of control over the illicit items.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

The appellants were convicted by a jury of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine and possession of proceeds of crime.

They appealed their convictions on the grounds that jurors were exposed to extrinsic information (including internet searches and old newspaper articles) during the trial, and that the trial judge erred in her instructions on the co-conspirator hearsay exception.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reasonable possibility that the extrinsic information affected the verdict given the trial judge's instructions and the nature of the information.

The court also upheld the trial judge's conspiracy instructions as compliant with the Carter and Mapara framework.

The accused, charged with multiple drug and firearms offences, brought a motion to invalidate a search warrant and exclude evidence under sections 8 and 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused argued that the Information to Obtain (ITO) contained material errors and misleading statements, and that a dynamic, unannounced entry was unjustified.

The court found that despite minor errors, the ITO contained sufficient reliable evidence to justify the issuance of the warrant, including undercover drug purchases and observations linking the accused to the searched apartment.

The court concluded there was no section 8 Charter breach, and alternatively, that the evidence should not be excluded under section 24(2) as the police acted in good faith and the evidence was highly reliable.

The application was dismissed.

The court dismissed a Garofoli application challenging a residential search warrant obtained on the basis of confidential informant information in a cocaine trafficking investigation.

Applying the Garofoli framework and the Debot criteria, the court held that the informant's tip was compelling, sufficiently corroborated, and ultimately credible despite the source being a first-time informer with a criminal record and motive for consideration.

Minor errors and one excised reference in the information to obtain did not undermine the warrant's validity.

In the alternative, the court held that the seized cocaine and cash would not have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

Convictions were entered on both counts by agreement once the evidence was admitted.

The Crown charged two accused jointly with possessing cocaine (crack and powder) for the purpose of trafficking, possessing $13,000 in proceeds of crime, and possessing marijuana for the purpose of trafficking.

The accused Ward-Jackson faced additional charges of possession of marijuana for trafficking and possession of $120 as proceeds of crime.

Following a search warrant execution at their residence, the Crown relied on circumstantial evidence to establish possession.

The trial judge found that while residency and bedroom occupancy could be inferred, the Crown failed to establish knowledge and control of the drugs and money beyond a reasonable doubt.

The judge emphasized the critical distinction between evidence and facts, and the necessity of establishing primary facts before drawing further inferences.