Susan Adams

Following a judge-alone trial resulting in convictions for trafficking in a controlled substance (cocaine), possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, and possession of a firearm while prohibited by court order, the court imposed sentence.

The offender had a prior record including a 2008 drug trafficking conviction and two weapons prohibition orders in force.

The court received an Impact of Race and Culture Assessment addressing systemic anti-Black racism and the offender's disadvantaged upbringing in a marginalized community.

Despite finding those systemic factors attenuated the offender's moral blameworthiness to some degree, the court rejected a conditional sentence, finding insufficient evidence of rehabilitative efforts since the last conviction and that the offender had demonstrated a complete disregard for prior court orders.

The court imposed a total custodial sentence of four years and 160 days, reflecting consecutive terms for the firearm, prohibition breach, and trafficking offences, with credits for pre-sentence custody, bail restrictions, and a Charter breach relating to the right to counsel.

This ruling addresses the admissibility of evidence in a first-degree murder trial.

The Crown sought to introduce "gang evidence" (rap videos, social media posts, and expert testimony) to establish motive and party liability, and an intercepted telephone communication as an admission.

The court found the gang evidence's probative value to be tenuous, as the deceased was not a gang member, and its prejudicial effect (moral prejudice, reasoning prejudice, and risk of unconscious bias against young Black men) significantly outweighed any probative value.

Consequently, the gang evidence and related expert testimony were deemed inadmissible.

However, the intercepted communication, despite its ambiguity, was found to have sufficient probative value as a potential admission and limited prejudicial effect, thus rendering it admissible.

The accused, Isiaha Gordon-Brown, pleaded guilty to five counts including trafficking in cocaine and fentanyl, possession of a prohibited firearm device, possession of a loaded restricted handgun, and possession of proceeds of crime.

He proceeded to a judge-alone trial on one count of drug trafficking in association with a criminal organization (the "Jungle Gang").

The court found him guilty on the criminal organization count based on circumstantial evidence demonstrating his association with the gang and his senior role in drug trafficking within their territory.

The court then proceeded to sentencing, considering aggravating factors such as the dangerous nature of the drugs and firearms, the commercial scale of trafficking, and the accused's senior position, balanced against strong mitigating factors including his lack of prior record, early guilty plea, and significant rehabilitative efforts in custody.

A total sentence of 15 years was imposed, reduced to 11 years by the totality principle, and further reduced by 31 months for pre-sentence custody, resulting in a remaining sentence of 8 years and 5 months.

The accused, Jonathan Salazar-Blanco, was charged with conspiracy to commit murder.

The Crown alleged he conspired to find and kill Alex Vinogradsky in Costa Rica, motivated by tow-truck business disputes and retaliation for shootings.

The defence argued Salazar-Blanco merely pretended to agree to the scheme without genuine intent.

The court found Salazar-Blanco's police statement largely incredible but concluded that, despite his dishonesty, there was a reasonable doubt as to whether he truly intended to carry out the conspiracy's objective.

The court found no reliable evidence of motive or concrete acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, leading to an acquittal.

The applicant sought an order compelling the Crown to provide electronic disclosure in a searchable and indexed format, arguing that the current disclosure was not meaningful or reasonably accessible, thereby compromising his right to make full answer and defence.

The disclosure, comprising over 300,000 pages, was largely in unsearchable PDF format and poorly organized.

The court found that the Crown had failed to provide meaningful disclosure, violating the applicant's Charter rights.

While declining to order re-disclosure of previously provided documents, the court mandated that all future PDF documents, both type-written and hand-written, must be disclosed in a machine-readable format to ensure reasonable accessibility.

The offender was convicted of two counts of second degree murder and two counts of wounding following an unprovoked public shooting.

The Crown sought consecutive periods of parole ineligibility totaling 30 years, while the defence sought concurrent periods of 12 years.

The court considered the offender's Indigenous background, difficult upbringing, and extensive criminal record.

The court imposed a life sentence with a total parole ineligibility period of 22 years for the murders, and concurrent 7-year sentences for the wounding counts.

The applicant, charged with conspiracy to import and traffic firearms after 25 handguns were found in her vehicle's gas tank at a border crossing, sought a review of her detention order under ss. 520 and 525 of the Criminal Code.

She argued there were errors of law at the original bail hearing, a material change in circumstances including health issues, and presented a plan for house arrest.

The court dismissed the application, finding the Crown's case formidable and concluding that detention remained justified on the tertiary grounds to maintain confidence in the administration of justice given the gravity of the firearms offences.

During a murder trial, the Crown sought to admit statements made by the deceased victim to a police officer shortly after he was shot.

The victim provided a description of the shooter while pleading for his life.

The court ruled that the statements were not admissible as dying declarations because the victim did not have a settled expectation of death.

However, the court admitted the statements under the common law exception for spontaneous declarations, finding that the victim's mind was dominated by the shock of the shooting.

Alternatively, the court held the statements were admissible under the principled approach to hearsay due to sufficient circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.

The Crown applied for an order permitting a surviving victim of a shooting to testify behind a screen pursuant to s. 486.2 of the Criminal Code.

The witness suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and experienced significant anxiety about facing the accused.

The court granted the application, finding that the witness's mental disorder would make testifying difficult and that a screen would facilitate a full and candid account without interfering with the proper administration of justice.

The defendant, Paul Weeden, was charged with aggravated assault and gun-related offences stemming from a shooting incident outside a Toronto club.

The central issue at trial was the identification of Weeden as the shooter.

The Crown relied on surveillance images, clothing evidence, a rented Dodge Dart, and intercepted communications.

The court found significant similarities between Weeden and the man in surveillance footage and found the intercepted communications to be powerful circumstantial evidence.

Despite some frailties in the Crown's case, the court concluded that the totality of the evidence established Weeden's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant, Paul Weeden, sought to exclude evidence obtained by police, arguing violations of his s. 8 Charter rights against unreasonable search and seizure.

Police entered and cleared Weeden's apartment without a warrant, kicked in a locked bedroom door, and remained inside to "freeze" the apartment while awaiting a search warrant.

The court found that exigent circumstances justified the initial entry and the forced entry into the bedroom, and that no search occurred before the warrant.

However, the court determined that police violated Weeden's s. 8 rights by remaining inside the apartment after it was cleared, as exigent circumstances no longer existed.

Applying the R. v. Grant framework, the court found the Charter breach was committed in good faith, the impact on Weeden's privacy was significant but mitigated by the limited nature of the intrusion, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits, particularly for drug-related charges, favored inclusion.

Ultimately, the evidence was deemed admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

Three airport workers were convicted by a jury of conspiracy to import and importing 30 kilos of cocaine.

They used their security clearance to facilitate the importation by retrieving a specific cargo container.

The court found their moral culpability exceeded that of mere couriers due to the breach of trust and threat to airport security.

After considering the significant delay in bringing the case to trial and their exemplary conduct on bail, the court sentenced each accused to 11 years' imprisonment.

During a jury trial for importing cocaine, the Crown sought to introduce secondary evidence of lost computer records tracking a cargo container.

The original records had been lost by police and purged by the company.

The court allowed the witness to testify to his recollection of the records under the best evidence rule, finding the loss was in good faith.

However, the court refused to allow a police officer to testify about what the witness told him in 2007, ruling that the defence's cross-examination did not amount to an allegation of recent fabrication that would justify admitting a prior consistent statement.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and sexual assault of a person under 14 based on alleged incidents occurring in the early 1990s within a crowded family household.

The complainant identified the accused primarily through voice recognition and described several nighttime incidents.

The court found the identification evidence weak and noted significant inconsistencies between the complainant’s initial report to police and later sworn testimony.

Applying the framework from R. v. W.D., the court concluded that the accused’s denial was credible and that the evidence raised a reasonable doubt as to guilt.

The accused was acquitted on both counts.

Following jury convictions for conspiracy to import and importation of large quantities of opium, the court determined appropriate sentences under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and Criminal Code.

The offences involved three sophisticated shipments of opium concealed in commercial goods imported from Iran, totalling more than 120 kilograms and valued in the millions of dollars.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence given the scale of the operation, the organized nature of the scheme, and the dangerous nature of Schedule I drugs.

Mitigating factors included the offenders’ lack of prior criminal records, family support, and time spent in harsh pre‑sentence custody conditions.

Global sentences of 14 years’ imprisonment for one offender and 12 years’ imprisonment for the other were imposed, with enhanced credit for pre‑sentence custody.

The Crown applied to qualify a translator as an expert to provide opinion evidence interpreting intercepted Farsi audio recordings into English in a criminal prosecution.

The defence challenged the proposed expert’s qualifications and alleged potential bias arising from his role assisting police investigators.

Applying the admissibility test for expert opinion evidence from R. v. Mohan, the court found the translator possessed sufficient proficiency in both Farsi and English and had relevant training and experience conducting translations for police wiretap investigations.

The court rejected the allegation of bias and concluded the translation evidence was necessary for the jury to understand the intercepted communications.

The translator was therefore qualified to provide expert opinion evidence interpreting the Farsi recordings.

The accused brought a Charter motion seeking exclusion of intercepted communications on the basis that police installed a probe in a rental vehicle without a warrant, allegedly violating the right against unreasonable search and seizure under s. 8 of the Charter.

The defence argued there were no reasonable grounds to believe the accused would be driving the vehicle when the probe was installed.

The court reviewed surveillance evidence, rental records, and intercepted communications indicating the accused had been driving the prior rental vehicle and was listed as a driver on the lease.

The court found police had reasonable grounds to believe the accused would use the replacement rental vehicle.

The Charter application was dismissed and the intercepted evidence was not excluded.

The accused brought an application seeking leave to cross-examine a police affiant on an affidavit supporting a wiretap authorization under sections 185 and 186 of the Criminal Code.

They argued the affidavit lacked full and frank disclosure, relied improperly on confidential informants without adequate credibility assessments, contained unsupported assertions, and failed to demonstrate investigative necessity.

The court reviewed the Garofoli framework and held that cross‑examination is only permitted where there is a reasonable likelihood that questioning would undermine a statutory precondition to the authorization.

The court found the affidavit sufficiently corroborated by independent police investigation and shipments of seized opium, and held informer privilege limited further disclosure about confidential sources.

Concluding that the applicants failed to establish any reasonable likelihood that cross‑examination would discredit the basis for the authorization, the court dismissed the application.

In a murder prosecution, the Crown sought admission of two out-of-court statements made by the deceased shortly before her death.

One statement was overheard during a telephone conversation between the deceased and the accused, while the second was a contemporaneous explanation given by the deceased to her mother immediately after the call.

The court held that the telephone statements were admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule to demonstrate the deceased’s attitude toward sexual contact with the accused.

The second statement, tendered for the truth of its contents, satisfied the principled hearsay exception because necessity was established by the declarant’s death and threshold reliability was supported by corroborating evidence and contemporaneity.

The probative value of the statements outweighed potential prejudice, and concerns about propensity reasoning did not justify exclusion.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, sought to exclude statements made to undercover officers during transport and to a detective during an interview.

He argued the statements were involuntary because police provided cigarettes as an inducement and failed to provide his prescribed anti-anxiety and anti-psychotic medication, breaching his section 7 Charter rights.

The court found the statements were voluntary, as the accused was in control and the circumstances were not oppressive.

The court also found no section 7 breach, as there was no causal connection between the lack of medication and the accused's decision to speak or his subsequent suicide attempt.

The motion to exclude the evidence was denied.