Stacey Nichols

The appellant appealed a proposal by the Registrar to revoke his registration as a salesperson under the Real Estate and Business Brokers Act, 2002.

The Registrar alleged that the appellant facilitated the trading of an individual whose registration had been previously revoked for cause.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal found that the appellant allowed the unregistered individual to use his name and brokerage to conduct multiple real estate transactions, and failed to represent the best interests of his clients.

The Tribunal concluded that the appellant's conduct provided reasonable grounds to believe he would not act in accordance with law, integrity, and honesty.

The appeal was dismissed and the Registrar was directed to carry out the proposal to revoke the appellant's registration.

Sentencing for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after conviction at trial, arising from the seizure of 326 grams of cocaine during a vehicle stop.

The court held that denunciation and deterrence were the paramount sentencing objectives for a serious cocaine trafficking offence, and declined to treat the offender's unproven statement that he was merely a courier as a mitigating fact under s. 724(3) of the Criminal Code.

Although the offender was a first offender with strong family support, good character, and excellent rehabilitative prospects, there were no offence-specific mitigating circumstances.

A penitentiary sentence of two and a half years was imposed, and a conditional sentence was held to be unavailable and, in any event, inappropriate.

The 76-year-old appellant pleaded guilty to fraud over $5,000 involving a breach of trust against a friend.

She was initially sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment and ordered to pay $84,336.41 in restitution.

On appeal, the court admitted fresh evidence that the appellant had made full restitution after selling her house.

Given her age, poor health, and the Crown's original position supporting a conditional sentence upon restitution, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and imposed a 15-month conditional sentence.

The accused brought an application under s. 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms seeking to exclude cocaine discovered in the rear cargo area of his vehicle during a traffic stop.

The accused alleged that police arbitrarily detained him and conducted a warrantless search of his vehicle, breaching ss. 9 and 8 of the Charter.

The court found the stop was lawfully conducted under s. 216 of the Highway Traffic Act for the purpose of investigating unlicensed driving and related road safety concerns.

The judge accepted the officer’s evidence that the cocaine was observed through the tinted rear window in plain view, rather than discovered during a physical search.

As no Charter breaches occurred, the application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

Following jury convictions for conspiracy to import and importation of large quantities of opium, the court determined appropriate sentences under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and Criminal Code.

The offences involved three sophisticated shipments of opium concealed in commercial goods imported from Iran, totalling more than 120 kilograms and valued in the millions of dollars.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence given the scale of the operation, the organized nature of the scheme, and the dangerous nature of Schedule I drugs.

Mitigating factors included the offenders’ lack of prior criminal records, family support, and time spent in harsh pre‑sentence custody conditions.

Global sentences of 14 years’ imprisonment for one offender and 12 years’ imprisonment for the other were imposed, with enhanced credit for pre‑sentence custody.

The Crown applied to qualify a translator as an expert to provide opinion evidence interpreting intercepted Farsi audio recordings into English in a criminal prosecution.

The defence challenged the proposed expert’s qualifications and alleged potential bias arising from his role assisting police investigators.

Applying the admissibility test for expert opinion evidence from R. v. Mohan, the court found the translator possessed sufficient proficiency in both Farsi and English and had relevant training and experience conducting translations for police wiretap investigations.

The court rejected the allegation of bias and concluded the translation evidence was necessary for the jury to understand the intercepted communications.

The translator was therefore qualified to provide expert opinion evidence interpreting the Farsi recordings.

The accused brought an application seeking leave to cross-examine a police affiant on an affidavit supporting a wiretap authorization under sections 185 and 186 of the Criminal Code.

They argued the affidavit lacked full and frank disclosure, relied improperly on confidential informants without adequate credibility assessments, contained unsupported assertions, and failed to demonstrate investigative necessity.

The court reviewed the Garofoli framework and held that cross‑examination is only permitted where there is a reasonable likelihood that questioning would undermine a statutory precondition to the authorization.

The court found the affidavit sufficiently corroborated by independent police investigation and shipments of seized opium, and held informer privilege limited further disclosure about confidential sources.

Concluding that the applicants failed to establish any reasonable likelihood that cross‑examination would discredit the basis for the authorization, the court dismissed the application.

The respondents challenged the constitutionality of three Criminal Code provisions relating to prostitution: operating a common bawdy-house, living on the avails of prostitution, and communicating for the purpose of prostitution.

The application judge struck down all three provisions as violating section 7 of the Charter.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the striking down of the bawdy-house provision (suspended for 12 months) and read in an exploitation requirement to the living on the avails provision.

However, the Court of Appeal reversed the application judge's decision on the communicating provision, finding it did not violate the principles of fundamental justice and was a justified limit on freedom of expression, binding the lower court to the Supreme Court's previous decision in the Prostitution Reference.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of drugs for the purpose of trafficking, arguing that the search of his vehicle violated s. 8 of the Charter and that the trial judge's reasons on the issue were inadequate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the unchallenged evidence established the search was incidental to the appellant's arrest.

Although the trial judge's reasons were inadequate, this deficiency did not prevent meaningful appellate review.

The appellants appealed a judgment regarding a mortgage dispute involving s. 22 and s. 36 of the Mortgages Act and a tax issue.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's comprehensive reasons and findings of fact were open to him and there was no basis to interfere.

Costs were awarded to the respondents.