Megan Stephens

The appellant appealed his conviction on five counts (three counts of distributing intimate images without consent, one count of criminal harassment, and one count of sexual assault) on the basis that the trial judge erred in refusing to stay the conviction for delay contrary to s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The trial judge found that the net delay of 506 days did not exceed the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan by attributing 196 days to defence delay.

On appeal, the court reconsidered the attribution of three disputed periods of delay in light of subsequent Supreme Court and Court of Appeal decisions, ultimately finding that the net delay was 515 days, which remained within the reasonable time threshold for a provincial court trial.

The appellant appealed both his conviction for sexual assault and his sentence of two years and six months' imprisonment.

The trial judge found the appellant's testimony unreliable, evasive, inconsistent, and self-serving.

The trial judge also found that a text message sent by the appellant to the complainant after the incident, in which he said he was "sorry" multiple times, constituted an admission and was corroborative of the complainant's account.

The appellant argued that his use of the word "sorry" was culturally customary and not an apology.

The Court of Appeal found no basis for appellate intervention in the trial judge's credibility assessments and dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Mason Perry’s appeal from a lifetime driving prohibition imposed as an ancillary order following his conviction for dangerous driving causing death and dangerous driving.

The court reviewed the facts, sentencing principles, and comparable cases, finding that the sentencing judge did not err in principle and that the prohibition was not demonstrably unfit.

The court emphasized the individualized nature of sentencing, the importance of public protection, and the relevance of mental health as a mitigating factor.

The decision confirms that lifetime driving prohibitions, though rare, may be appropriate in serious cases, especially where public safety is at risk.

The appellant, convicted of sexual assault, brought an application before the Court of Appeal seeking production of post-charge police occurrence reports pertaining to the complainant.

The Court established a framework for third-party records applications brought for the first time on appeal, holding that while the Criminal Code's statutory regime does not strictly apply, its underlying principles must inform the appellate court's exercise of discretion.

The Court held that an applicant must first satisfy the two-part test for fresh evidence production, and if successful, the court must then weigh the statutory privacy factors.

The application was dismissed as the appellant failed to demonstrate a non-speculative link between the requested records and his proposed fresh evidence application.

The appellant appealed his conviction for four firearms-related charges, arguing that the trial judge improperly used judicial notice regarding drug subculture and the operational nature of firearms, and denied procedural fairness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusions were well-anchored in the evidence and that any comments about the drug industry were peripheral to the core reasoning, not constituting improper judicial notice or procedural unfairness.

Althea Reyes sought bail pending her appeal of convictions for fraud and impersonation, and the subsequent order collapsing her conditional sentence.

The court applied the three-part test under s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code.

The conviction appeal was deemed to have little merit as she had pled guilty.

While the appeal of the conditional sentence collapse was not frivolous, the applicant failed to persuade the court she would surrender if released, given her history of non-compliance and untruthfulness.

The proposed bail plan, particularly the post-treatment phase with a surety with her own criminal record and inadequate supervision plan, was deemed insufficient.

The court found her detention necessary in the public interest due to her extensive history of fraudulent activities and risk to public safety.

The application for bail pending appeal was denied.

The appellant, Gordon Morin, appealed his conviction and sentence for multiple counts of abuse against his domestic partner.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the conviction appeal, ordering a new trial.

The trial judge erred by improperly using the complainant's prior consistent text messages as corroborating her in-court testimony and contradicting the appellant's evidence, in violation of the hearsay rule and the rule against self-corroboration.

The trial judge failed to instruct herself on the permissible and impermissible uses of these statements, which was critical in a case turning on credibility.

The appellant appealed his convictions for discharging a firearm with intent to wound or prevent arrest and attempted murder, and his sentence.

The charges arose from a violent encounter with police where the appellant fired shots at officers during an arrest attempt.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's self-defence claim, finding he was lawfully arrested, used unreasonable force, and had no reasonable grounds to believe the police were acting unlawfully.

On appeal, the court found no error in the trial judge's credibility findings or the rejection of self-defence, including the assessment of the appellant's subjective fear of police.

The court also upheld the sentence, finding the trial judge properly considered the collateral consequences of the appellant's injuries (sustained during arrest) as not mitigating, given they flowed from his own conduct.

Furthermore, the court found the trial judge adequately weighed anti-Black racism and mental health issues as slight mitigators, and correctly applied principles regarding "Duncan credit" for pre-sentence custody.

Both the conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed her conviction for criminal harassment against her former domestic partner.

The trial judge had convicted the self-represented appellant after rejecting her evidence and accepting the complainant's evidence.

On appeal, the Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge failed to properly apply the third step of the W.(D.) test and provided insufficient reasons regarding the elements of the offence, specifically whether the complainant was repeatedly followed and whether the appellant had the requisite mens rea.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of child luring following an online sting operation.

He appealed, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and seeking to raise the issue of entrapment for the first time on appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the ineffective assistance claim, finding no reasonable probability of a different trial outcome.

However, the court allowed the entrapment issue to be pursued at a new trial, citing the Supreme Court's recent decision in R. v. Ramelson, which provided clearer guidelines for internet sting operations.

The court found that the record did not definitively show compliance with these new guidelines and that the Crown would not suffer procedural prejudice by allowing the issue to be heard.

The conviction was quashed, and a new trial was ordered solely on the issue of entrapment.

The appellant sought leave to appeal the termination of his conditional sentence order, which directed him to serve the remaining eight and a half months in custody due to a second breach.

The appellant argued the sentencing judge overemphasized the presumption of termination and failed to consider proportionality and restraint.

The Court of Appeal found no error, affirming that the sentencing judge properly considered all circumstances, including the deliberate nature of the breach and the appellant's repeated non-compliance.

The Court concluded that the resulting sentence was not disproportionate or in violation of the jump principle, considering the original "crime spree" offences and the global sentence served.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The accused, T.K., charged with sexual interference and sexual assault, brought an application under section 278.4 of the Criminal Code seeking production of the complainant's and witnesses' electronic communications and photos/videos from a specific period.

The defence argued these records were relevant to the accused's belief regarding the complainant's age and consent.

The Crown and witnesses opposed, citing privacy and arguing the records were not necessary for full answer and defence.

The court, applying section 278.5(2) factors, found potential relevance and ordered the records to be produced for judicial review to determine if they are necessary for full answer and defence, balancing privacy interests against the accused's right to defence.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 15 years for attempted murder, along with 1.5 years consecutive on two counts of failure to comply with probation.

The appellant had repeatedly harassed a female acquaintance, was convicted of criminal harassment, and subsequently appeared at her home armed with weapons and homemade bombs.

During a confrontation, he stabbed a family member multiple times, inflicting serious injuries.

The Court of Appeal upheld the attempted murder sentence as appropriate and within the sentencing range for such offences, but allowed the appeal in part by making the failure to comply sentences concurrent rather than consecutive, reducing the overall sentence from 16.5 years to 16 years before credit for pre-sentence custody.

The appellant was convicted of four counts of sexual interference and four counts of sexual assault of his daughter between ages 11 and 14.

The four counts of sexual assault were stayed pursuant to the Kienapple principle.

He was sentenced to 18 months in addition to pre-trial custody.

On appeal, the appellant challenged his convictions on two grounds: alleged infringement of his Charter right to trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) due to an 11-month adjournment, and alleged errors in the trial judge's credibility analysis of the complainant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no Charter breach and no error in the trial judge's credibility findings.

The applicant was convicted of first-degree murder of his wife following a jury trial.

He sought judicial interim release pending appeal, which was initially denied.

Three years later, he brought a second application for bail, citing new grounds of appeal, fresh evidence regarding a potential third-party suspect, and the passage of time as material changes in circumstances.

The Crown conceded that the appeal was arguable but opposed release on public interest grounds.

The court granted the application, finding that the interests of reviewability outweighed the interests of enforcement, particularly given the serious new ground relating to defence counsel's removal from the record, the substantial fresh evidence regarding an alternative suspect, the applicant's four years of incarceration pending appeal, and the imminent scheduling of the appeal hearing.

The applicant, convicted of sexual assault and sexual exploitation, brought a Charter challenge against s. 742.1 of the Criminal Code, which prohibits conditional sentences for serious personal injury offences.

The applicant argued the provision violated s. 7 (overbreadth) and s. 12 (cruel and unusual punishment) of the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, finding the provision was rationally connected to its purpose of denunciation and deterrence, and did not impose a grossly disproportionate sentence on the applicant or reasonably hypothetical offenders.

The Court dismissed the Crown appeal and upheld an order for a new trial on second degree murder, holding that the jury charge contained reversible errors on the use of post-offence conduct evidence for intent and that the curative proviso did not apply.

Current and former sex workers challenged three Criminal Code provisions prohibiting bawdy-houses, living on avails, and public communication for prostitution purposes.

The Court held the provisions deprived security of the person by materially increasing risks of violence and preventing safety-enhancing measures, and that the deprivations were not in accordance with fundamental justice due to gross disproportionality and overbreadth.

The Court affirmed that lower courts may revisit precedent when a new legal issue or significant evidentiary change is shown, and confirmed deference to trial findings on social and legislative facts absent palpable and overriding error.

Section 210 (as related to prostitution), section 212(1)(j), and section 213(1)(c) were declared unconstitutional.

Invalidity was suspended for one year to permit legislative response.