Megan Stephens

The accused, charged with sexual assault and assault in the context of an intimate partner relationship, brought an application under sections 276 and 278.92 of the Criminal Code to introduce text messages and evidence of an ongoing sexual relationship with the complainant.

The defence argued the evidence was necessary to challenge the complainant's police statement, which described the accused as controlling and the relationship as non-consensual or coerced.

The court granted the application, finding the evidence highly probative to the complainant's credibility and the fundamental coherence of the defence narrative, as it directly contradicted the complainant's description of the relationship.

The evidence was admitted subject to strict limitations to prevent twin-myth reasoning.

The appellants were convicted by a jury of procuring a person to provide sexual services and receiving a material benefit from sexual services.

On appeal, they argued the trial judge misdirected the jury on the essential elements of the offences.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the jury was not properly instructed that exercising control, direction, or influence over a person's movements generally requires proof of more than an isolated act and involves an assessment of the power dynamic in the relationship.

The misdirection on the procuring counts also undermined the material benefit convictions.

The Court declined to apply the curative proviso, allowed the appeals, and ordered new trials.

The appellant appealed his conviction on five counts (three counts of distributing intimate images without consent, one count of criminal harassment, and one count of sexual assault) on the basis that the trial judge erred in refusing to stay the conviction for delay contrary to s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The trial judge found that the net delay of 506 days did not exceed the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan by attributing 196 days to defence delay.

On appeal, the court reconsidered the attribution of three disputed periods of delay in light of subsequent Supreme Court and Court of Appeal decisions, ultimately finding that the net delay was 515 days, which remained within the reasonable time threshold for a provincial court trial.

The appellant appealed both his conviction for sexual assault and his sentence of two years and six months' imprisonment.

The trial judge found the appellant's testimony unreliable, evasive, inconsistent, and self-serving.

The trial judge also found that a text message sent by the appellant to the complainant after the incident, in which he said he was "sorry" multiple times, constituted an admission and was corroborative of the complainant's account.

The appellant argued that his use of the word "sorry" was culturally customary and not an apology.

The Court of Appeal found no basis for appellate intervention in the trial judge's credibility assessments and dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal.

The appellant, convicted of sexual assault, brought an application before the Court of Appeal seeking production of post-charge police occurrence reports pertaining to the complainant.

The Court established a framework for third-party records applications brought for the first time on appeal, holding that while the Criminal Code's statutory regime does not strictly apply, its underlying principles must inform the appellate court's exercise of discretion.

The Court held that an applicant must first satisfy the two-part test for fresh evidence production, and if successful, the court must then weigh the statutory privacy factors.

The application was dismissed as the appellant failed to demonstrate a non-speculative link between the requested records and his proposed fresh evidence application.

The appellant appealed his conviction for four firearms-related charges, arguing that the trial judge improperly used judicial notice regarding drug subculture and the operational nature of firearms, and denied procedural fairness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusions were well-anchored in the evidence and that any comments about the drug industry were peripheral to the core reasoning, not constituting improper judicial notice or procedural unfairness.

Althea Reyes sought bail pending her appeal of convictions for fraud and impersonation, and the subsequent order collapsing her conditional sentence.

The court applied the three-part test under s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code.

The conviction appeal was deemed to have little merit as she had pled guilty.

While the appeal of the conditional sentence collapse was not frivolous, the applicant failed to persuade the court she would surrender if released, given her history of non-compliance and untruthfulness.

The proposed bail plan, particularly the post-treatment phase with a surety with her own criminal record and inadequate supervision plan, was deemed insufficient.

The court found her detention necessary in the public interest due to her extensive history of fraudulent activities and risk to public safety.

The application for bail pending appeal was denied.

The appellant, Gordon Morin, appealed his conviction and sentence for multiple counts of abuse against his domestic partner.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the conviction appeal, ordering a new trial.

The trial judge erred by improperly using the complainant's prior consistent text messages as corroborating her in-court testimony and contradicting the appellant's evidence, in violation of the hearsay rule and the rule against self-corroboration.

The trial judge failed to instruct herself on the permissible and impermissible uses of these statements, which was critical in a case turning on credibility.

The appellant appealed his convictions for discharging a firearm with intent to wound or prevent arrest and attempted murder, and his sentence.

The charges arose from a violent encounter with police where the appellant fired shots at officers during an arrest attempt.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's self-defence claim, finding he was lawfully arrested, used unreasonable force, and had no reasonable grounds to believe the police were acting unlawfully.

On appeal, the court found no error in the trial judge's credibility findings or the rejection of self-defence, including the assessment of the appellant's subjective fear of police.

The court also upheld the sentence, finding the trial judge properly considered the collateral consequences of the appellant's injuries (sustained during arrest) as not mitigating, given they flowed from his own conduct.

Furthermore, the court found the trial judge adequately weighed anti-Black racism and mental health issues as slight mitigators, and correctly applied principles regarding "Duncan credit" for pre-sentence custody.

Both the conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed her conviction for criminal harassment against her former domestic partner.

The trial judge had convicted the self-represented appellant after rejecting her evidence and accepting the complainant's evidence.

On appeal, the Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge failed to properly apply the third step of the W.(D.) test and provided insufficient reasons regarding the elements of the offence, specifically whether the complainant was repeatedly followed and whether the appellant had the requisite mens rea.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of child luring following an online sting operation.

He appealed, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and seeking to raise the issue of entrapment for the first time on appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the ineffective assistance claim, finding no reasonable probability of a different trial outcome.

However, the court allowed the entrapment issue to be pursued at a new trial, citing the Supreme Court's recent decision in R. v. Ramelson, which provided clearer guidelines for internet sting operations.

The court found that the record did not definitively show compliance with these new guidelines and that the Crown would not suffer procedural prejudice by allowing the issue to be heard.

The conviction was quashed, and a new trial was ordered solely on the issue of entrapment.

The appellant sought leave to appeal the termination of his conditional sentence order, which directed him to serve the remaining eight and a half months in custody due to a second breach.

The appellant argued the sentencing judge overemphasized the presumption of termination and failed to consider proportionality and restraint.

The Court of Appeal found no error, affirming that the sentencing judge properly considered all circumstances, including the deliberate nature of the breach and the appellant's repeated non-compliance.

The Court concluded that the resulting sentence was not disproportionate or in violation of the jump principle, considering the original "crime spree" offences and the global sentence served.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The accused, T.K., charged with sexual interference and sexual assault, brought an application under section 278.4 of the Criminal Code seeking production of the complainant's and witnesses' electronic communications and photos/videos from a specific period.

The defence argued these records were relevant to the accused's belief regarding the complainant's age and consent.

The Crown and witnesses opposed, citing privacy and arguing the records were not necessary for full answer and defence.

The court, applying section 278.5(2) factors, found potential relevance and ordered the records to be produced for judicial review to determine if they are necessary for full answer and defence, balancing privacy interests against the accused's right to defence.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 15 years for attempted murder, along with 1.5 years consecutive on two counts of failure to comply with probation.

The appellant had repeatedly harassed a female acquaintance, was convicted of criminal harassment, and subsequently appeared at her home armed with weapons and homemade bombs.

During a confrontation, he stabbed a family member multiple times, inflicting serious injuries.

The Court of Appeal upheld the attempted murder sentence as appropriate and within the sentencing range for such offences, but allowed the appeal in part by making the failure to comply sentences concurrent rather than consecutive, reducing the overall sentence from 16.5 years to 16 years before credit for pre-sentence custody.

The appellant was convicted of four counts of sexual interference and four counts of sexual assault of his daughter between ages 11 and 14.

The four counts of sexual assault were stayed pursuant to the Kienapple principle.

He was sentenced to 18 months in addition to pre-trial custody.

On appeal, the appellant challenged his convictions on two grounds: alleged infringement of his Charter right to trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) due to an 11-month adjournment, and alleged errors in the trial judge's credibility analysis of the complainant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no Charter breach and no error in the trial judge's credibility findings.

Sentencing following convictions for four counts of sexual assault and one count of sexual interference arising from incidents involving three male complainants over a nine-year period in the modelling industry.

The court held that, under the version of s. 742.1 then in force, conditional sentences were unavailable for the two sexual assault counts involving the adult complainant because sexual assault was a serious personal injury offence as defined in s. 752.

Balancing denunciation and deterrence against the offender's lack of record, community support, medical issues, publicity-related consequences, and the age of the offences, the court imposed a six-month conditional sentence on one count, concurrent 18-month conditional sentences on two further counts, and a concurrent 30-day intermittent custodial sentence with two days' credit on the remaining two counts.

DNA, firearms prohibition, and SOIRA orders were also made.

The applicant was convicted of first-degree murder of his wife following a jury trial.

He sought judicial interim release pending appeal, which was initially denied.

Three years later, he brought a second application for bail, citing new grounds of appeal, fresh evidence regarding a potential third-party suspect, and the passage of time as material changes in circumstances.

The Crown conceded that the appeal was arguable but opposed release on public interest grounds.

The court granted the application, finding that the interests of reviewability outweighed the interests of enforcement, particularly given the serious new ground relating to defence counsel's removal from the record, the substantial fresh evidence regarding an alternative suspect, the applicant's four years of incarceration pending appeal, and the imminent scheduling of the appeal hearing.

The applicant, convicted of sexual assault and sexual exploitation, brought a Charter challenge against s. 742.1 of the Criminal Code, which prohibits conditional sentences for serious personal injury offences.

The applicant argued the provision violated s. 7 (overbreadth) and s. 12 (cruel and unusual punishment) of the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, finding the provision was rationally connected to its purpose of denunciation and deterrence, and did not impose a grossly disproportionate sentence on the applicant or reasonably hypothetical offenders.

The appellant pled guilty to conspiracy to commit fraud over $5,000 and uttering a forged document, and was sentenced to nine months in jail.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the sentencing judge failed to provide sufficient reasons for the disparity between his sentence and the 90-day intermittent sentence imposed on his co-accused.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence was fit and the sentencing judge properly considered the parity principle, noting material differences between the offenders such as the co-accused making full restitution.

The Crown appealed the youth's acquittals for human trafficking and living on the avails of prostitution, while the youth cross-appealed his convictions for assault and breach of an undertaking.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, finding the trial judge erred by applying a subjective standard to the definition of exploitation and by concluding a single act could not constitute prostitution.

The youth's cross-appeal was dismissed as the trial judge's credibility findings and verdicts were reasonable.

A new trial was ordered on the trafficking and prostitution charges.