Megan Stephens

The Court dismissed the Crown appeal and upheld an order for a new trial on second degree murder, holding that the jury charge contained reversible errors on the use of post-offence conduct evidence for intent and that the curative proviso did not apply.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his global sentence of 13 years for attempted murder and breaches of firearms prohibition and recognizance orders.

He argued the trial judge failed to consider his youth, first-time custodial status, and rehabilitative prospects, and that the sentence was outside the acceptable range.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, emphasizing that denunciation and deterrence are paramount for gun violence in public places, particularly as the appellant shot at a security guard multiple times while under prohibition orders.

The applicant sought appointment of counsel for a criminal convictions appeal after receiving legal aid for a sentence appeal but not for the convictions appeal.

The Crown conceded the applicant lacked means, that the appeal met the merit threshold, and that he could not effectively present the appeal personally, but argued the appeal could be decided without appointed counsel.

The court held that appointment of counsel was desirable in the interests of justice, given the applicant's youth, the seriousness of the convictions, the overlap with the sentence appeal, and the need for an independent advocate on issues including the curative proviso.

The application was granted, with the endorsement directed to the Legal Aid Director and, failing issuance of a certificate, counsel to be appointed under s. 684(1).

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault, sexual exploitation, and assault involving a teenage complainant.

The trial judge found that the appellant had cultivated a relationship of trust with the vulnerable youth, provided drugs and gifts, and engaged in grooming behaviour culminating in sexual activity.

The Court of Appeal held that the evidence supported the finding that the appellant occupied a position of trust and that a deliberate course of grooming conduct could amount to an invitation to sexual touching for the purposes of the sexual exploitation offence.

The court also upheld the trial judge’s credibility assessments and found no reversible error arising from the limited adverse inference relating to cross‑examination.

The convictions were affirmed.

The appellant appealed his convictions on nine counts of sexual offences involving two minors.

He argued that the trial judge's interventions during witness examinations created an appearance of unfairness and that the trial judge improperly minimized the impact of a false statement made by one of the complainants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's interventions, while numerous, did not create an appearance of unfairness or suggest he had pre-judged the appellant's credibility.

The court also held that the trial judge's credibility findings regarding the complainant were entitled to deference.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after killing the victim and subsequently burying her body and cleaning the crime scene.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge misdirected the jury on the intent required for murder, the common sense inference, self-defence, and the use of post-offence conduct.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge erred by failing to properly instruct the jury on how the post-offence conduct (flight, lies, and concealment of the body) could be used to infer the specific intent required for murder.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference involving a minor complainant who alleged he touched her while she slept during an overnight visit.

The appeal focused on whether the trial judge misapplied the burden of proof in a credibility contest between the complainant and the accused.

The Court of Appeal held that although the trial judge correctly recited the W.(D.) principles, his analysis treated the case as a choice between competing versions rather than determining whether the accused’s evidence raised a reasonable doubt.

Because the reasons showed that the possibility of reasonable doubt was not properly considered, the burden of proof was misapplied.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed from sentence and challenged a s. 109 weapons prohibition order.

The Crown conceded that the order had been made without jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal to that limited extent and quashed the s. 109 order.

A publication ban remained in effect under the Criminal Code.

Current and former sex workers challenged three Criminal Code provisions prohibiting bawdy-houses, living on avails, and public communication for prostitution purposes.

The Court held the provisions deprived security of the person by materially increasing risks of violence and preventing safety-enhancing measures, and that the deprivations were not in accordance with fundamental justice due to gross disproportionality and overbreadth.

The Court affirmed that lower courts may revisit precedent when a new legal issue or significant evidentiary change is shown, and confirmed deference to trial findings on social and legislative facts absent palpable and overriding error.

Section 210 (as related to prostitution), section 212(1)(j), and section 213(1)(c) were declared unconstitutional.

Invalidity was suspended for one year to permit legislative response.

The appellant challenged convictions arising from a domestic attempted murder shooting and sought leave to appeal a 22-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal rejected arguments that the trial judge improperly admitted prior discreditable conduct, delivered an unfair jury charge, and wrongly answered a jury question on reasonable doubt.

Although the recharge on reasonable doubt contained error, the court applied the curative proviso because the Crown’s circumstantial case was overwhelming and the alternative suspect theory lacked evidentiary support.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence was held to fall within the applicable range for domestic attempted murder involving significant aggravating factors.

The appellant appealed a conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing credibility, applied different standards of scrutiny, and improperly used discreditable conduct evidence regarding an extramarital affair.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the W.D. principles, did not shift the burden of proof, and correctly used the evidence of the affair to assess credibility rather than for impermissible propensity reasoning.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual assault.

The complainant was highly intoxicated and put to bed by friends, who shortly after discovered the appellant having sexual intercourse with her.

The trial judge found the complainant lacked the capacity to consent and rejected the appellant's claim of consensual sex.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence, proper application of the burden of proof, and no air of reality to the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The appellant pled guilty to aggravated assault and breach of probation after attacking a man with a tire iron who intervened when the appellant approached his ex-wife.

He was sentenced to five years' imprisonment less pre-trial custody.

On appeal, the appellant argued the sentencing judge erred by treating a lack of remorse as an aggravating factor and by finding a high risk to reoffend without expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge merely rejected remorse as a mitigating factor and reasonably inferred a high risk of reoffending from the appellant's escalating aggressive conduct.

The appellant was found not criminally responsible for threatening his nephew.

At the Ontario Review Board hearing, both the hospital and the Crown supported an absolute discharge, but the Board imposed a conditional discharge.

The appellant appealed, arguing the Board applied the wrong legal test.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the Board erred in its interpretation of the 'significant threat to the safety of the public' threshold under s. 672.54(a) of the Criminal Code.

The Board improperly relied on 'psychological stress' rather than significant psychological harm resulting from criminal conduct, and applied a standard that was too low by finding a physical response 'could not be ruled out'.

The appeal was allowed and an absolute discharge was granted.

The respondents challenged the constitutionality of three Criminal Code provisions relating to prostitution: operating a common bawdy-house, living on the avails of prostitution, and communicating for the purpose of prostitution.

The application judge struck down all three provisions as violating section 7 of the Charter.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the striking down of the bawdy-house provision (suspended for 12 months) and read in an exploitation requirement to the living on the avails provision.

However, the Court of Appeal reversed the application judge's decision on the communicating provision, finding it did not violate the principles of fundamental justice and was a justified limit on freedom of expression, binding the lower court to the Supreme Court's previous decision in the Prostitution Reference.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter after striking the victim in the head with a metal bar during an altercation in a truck.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge erred by failing to correct a misstatement in the Crown's closing address regarding when certain photographs of the truck's interior were taken, and by accepting the jury's verdict before answering a question the jury had asked about those photographs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the misstatement did not require a correcting instruction and that the trial judge acted appropriately in accepting the verdict with the agreement of counsel.

The moving party, Maggie's: The Toronto Sex Workers' Action Project, brought a motion to intervene in an appeal concerning the constitutionality of prostitution-related offences.

The moving party sought to raise a new challenge under s. 15 of the Charter and to argue that the legislation was impermissibly driven by moral views.

The court dismissed the motion to intervene on the s. 15 issue, finding that the evidentiary record was not developed for such a challenge and that allowing it would be unfair to the parties and delay the appeal.

The court also declined to grant separate intervener status on the morality issue, as it was already being raised by others, but permitted the moving party to join an existing intervener group.

The appellant appealed his custodial sentence, arguing the trial judge erred by not imposing a conditional sentence.

He submitted the trial judge failed to give sufficient weight to the fact he drove to flee an attacker, the victim's prognosis, and his compliance with stringent bail conditions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge thoroughly balanced the mitigating factors against the catastrophic injuries caused to the child victim and the appellant's choice to continue driving when he could have stopped.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to consider the defence of honest but mistaken belief, misapprehending expert evidence, and applying uneven scrutiny to the testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no air of reality to the defence of mistaken belief.

The court also held that the trial judge properly used expert evidence to confirm the complainant's testimony regarding lack of consent and anal intercourse, and found no indication of uneven scrutiny.

The appellant, a 73-year-old retired labourer, was convicted of uttering a death threat after posting a poorly written, satirical poem about his municipal councillor on neighbourhood mailboxes.

The poem expressed frustration over the councillor's performance and included imagery about digging a hole to hide her body.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by failing to consider the full context of the poem, including its nature as political commentary and the appellant's public posting of it.

The Court concluded that a reasonable person, fully informed of the circumstances, would not view the poem as a serious threat.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal entered.