Sandra Nishikawa

The defendant, Her Majesty The Queen in Right of Ontario, brought a motion to stay an order dated August 4, 2017.

Following the Divisional Court's dismissal of Ontario's motion for leave to appeal on October 3, 2017, the Superior Court of Justice dismissed the motion to stay as moot.

Costs of the motion were reserved to the disposition of the defendants' motions for summary judgment.

The plaintiffs sought costs of $132,992.26 after successfully opposing the defendants' motions to quash summonses.

The defendants argued that costs should be reserved to the disposition of upcoming summary judgment motions, or alternatively that the costs claimed were excessive.

The court found that the plaintiffs' costs outline did not sufficiently delineate the time spent on the motions to quash versus other related motions.

Due to the lack of required facts and detailed submissions, the court reserved the costs of the motions to quash to the hearing of the motions for summary judgment.

The defendants, Ontario and OLG, brought motions to quash summonses to witness served by the plaintiffs on 13 non-parties, including former and current Cabinet ministers, in advance of pending summary judgment motions.

The plaintiffs sought to examine these witnesses under Rule 39.03 regarding the cancellation of the Slots at Race Tracks Program (SARP).

The court held that the defendants had standing to challenge the summonses and that the plaintiffs had met the low threshold of showing the proposed witnesses might have relevant evidence.

The court rejected arguments that the examinations were an abuse of process or barred by Cabinet confidentiality at this stage.

However, the court quashed the summonses served on Premier Kathleen Wynne and Minister Ted McMeekin on the basis of parliamentary privilege, as they were sitting members of the legislature.

Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario (HMQ) sought an order to enforce an agreement between counsel to delay examinations under Rule 39.03 pending a motion to quash summonses, or alternatively, to stay the summonses.

The court applied the RJR MacDonald test for a stay, finding a serious issue to be tried regarding the quashing of summonses and the standing of HMQ/OLG to quash summonses for unrepresented witnesses.

The court determined that proceeding with examinations would cause irreparable harm to HMQ's legal interests by rendering the motion to quash moot.

The balance of convenience favoured HMQ, and the motion to stay the summonses was granted.

An agricultural industry association sought a stay of a provincial regulation restricting the use of neonicotinoid‑treated seeds pending further compliance time, arguing farmers would suffer economic harm due to regulatory timing requirements.

The province opposed and brought a cross‑motion to strike the application for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The court held that injunctive relief against the Crown is highly restricted and unavailable absent circumstances such as deliberate flouting of the law, which were not present.

Even if relief were available, the applicant failed to meet the RJR‑MacDonald test for an interlocutory stay because the alleged harm was speculative and compensable in damages and the balance of convenience favoured environmental protection.

The court also held the application improperly sought to rewrite or delay the operation of a regulation rather than determine legal rights and therefore disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The respondent, Financial Services Commission of Ontario (FSCO), brought a motion to strike the applicant's application for declaratory relief, arguing that as a non-corporate statutory entity, it lacked the capacity to be sued.

The court dismissed the motion, distinguishing prior case law that barred actions for damages against FSCO.

The court held that because the applicant sought declaratory relief rather than damages, the application could proceed.

Family members of a deceased victim brought a claim under s. 61 of the Family Law Act alleging that police breached a duty of care by failing to arrest an intoxicated offender with a known history of violence who later killed the victim.

The defendant moved under Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike the statement of claim on the basis that police owed no private law duty of care to the deceased or his relatives.

The court held that plaintiffs bringing derivative claims under s. 61 need only establish that a duty of care was owed to the deceased, not directly to the relatives.

Applying the Cooper-Anns framework, the court concluded it was not plain and obvious that foreseeability and proximity could not be established based on the pleaded facts, including the police's alleged knowledge of the offender’s past violence against the victim and their shared residence.

Residual policy considerations did not clearly negate a prima facie duty of care at the pleadings stage.

The Attorney General of Ontario brought an application under the Civil Remedies Act for the civil forfeiture of a residential property and a vehicle, alleging they were instruments of unlawful activity related to drug trafficking.

The court found that both the property and the vehicle were instruments of unlawful activity.

However, the application was dismissed.

The court held that the owner of the vehicle was a 'responsible owner' who took reasonable steps to prevent its unlawful use.

Regarding the real property, although the owner failed to establish the responsible owner exception, the court found that forfeiture was clearly not in the interests of justice due to the Attorney General's unexplained six-year delay in bringing the application, during which the owner unwittingly built up equity in the property.

The moving parties sought exemption from attending examinations for discovery on medical grounds.

The court considered the prima facie right of a party to examine adverse parties under Rule 31.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the requirement that any exemption be supported by compelling medical evidence.

The medical notes provided were vague and lacked detail regarding the alleged inability to participate in discovery or the specific risks posed by the process.

The court held that the moving parties failed to discharge their burden to justify exemption from discovery.

The motion was dismissed, though the court permitted reasonable accommodations during discovery to mitigate potential health concerns.