Ronald Carr

The plaintiff staked unpatented mining claims on Crown land where the Ministry of Transportation (MTO) planned to build a realigned highway.

The plaintiff subsequently applied for aggregate permits, which were delayed and limited due to the highway construction.

The plaintiff brought an action claiming the MTO expropriated the property and sought compensation for the lost aggregate value.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the action, finding that an unpatented mining claim is not 'land' under the Expropriations Act.

The court further held that even if it were land, the claims had no value because the plaintiff could not have obtained an aggregate permit for the entire property, and the property was not wrongfully downzoned.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's consolidated fresh as amended statement of claim without leave to amend.

The claim arose from the procurement process for the Pan/ParaPan American Games Athletes' Village, where the plaintiff alleged it was wrongfully excluded from participating in the winning bid's financing.

The court struck several claims, including breach of the term sheet, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, and a novel 'public law claim', without leave to amend.

Claims for breach of an oral agreement and misfeasance in public office were struck with leave to amend.

Claims for fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation against the private defendants and the Crown agency were allowed to stand.

The applicant in a receivership proceeding sought approval of its counsel's fees to be paid from an administration charge.

The Attorney General opposed, arguing that the fees should only cover work related to the receivership and not the concurrent forfeiture proceedings.

The court rejected this distinction, finding that the forfeiture application created barriers to the sale of the business that counsel had to address.

The court found the fees reasonable and approved them.

The defendants moved to strike the plaintiff's consolidated fresh as amended statement of claim without leave to amend.

The action arose from the procurement process for the Pan/ParaPan American Games Athletes' Village, where the plaintiff alleged it was wrongfully excluded from participating in the winning bid's financing.

The court struck several claims, including breach of the term sheet, breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment against the Crown, without leave to amend.

The claim for breach of an oral agreement was struck with leave to amend to provide better particulars.

The claims for fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation against the private defendants and Infrastructure Ontario were allowed to proceed.

A junior mining company sued Ontario for damages after its relationship with a First Nation collapsed and its exploration program stalled.

The plaintiff argued that the Crown's constitutional duty to consult and related obligations under the Mining Act extended to protect the company as a third-party mining claimant.

The court held that the honour of the Crown and any associated fiduciary or consultation duties run to Indigenous communities, not to mining proponents, and do not create an enforceable private law duty of care in favour of the plaintiff.

Applying the Anns/Cooper framework, the court further found that neither the legislative scheme nor the limited interactions between the parties established sufficient proximity.

The action was dismissed.

The applicant bank sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order awarding $30,000 in costs to the respondent Crown.

The costs were awarded after the Crown responded to an application involving a dissolved corporation and a void property transfer.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that the motion judge's discretionary costs award did not meet the strict test for leave under Rule 62.02(4), as there was no conflicting decision, no reason to doubt the correctness of the order, and no matter of general importance.

The applicant sought an order requiring consumer reporting agencies to remove debts older than two years from his credit report, arguing that once the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002 expires, such debts cannot be legally enforced and should not be reported.

The court considered whether the limitation period governing civil proceedings should apply to the time frame for reporting debts under the Consumer Reporting Act.

The court held that the statutes serve distinct purposes: the Limitations Act governs the enforcement of legal claims, while the Consumer Reporting Act regulates consumer credit reporting.

Because neither statute incorporates the other, the two‑year limitation period does not restrict the reporting of debts under the Consumer Reporting Act.

The applicant’s Charter argument also failed because the actions complained of involved private entities rather than governmental action.

The Crown commenced a civil action seeking to recover environmental remediation costs arising from buried waste drums that contaminated groundwater.

The defendants moved to dismiss the action for delay and as statute-barred, while the Crown sought summary judgment against certain defendants relying on prior convictions under environmental legislation.

The court held that the claim was not barred by the applicable limitation period but refused summary judgment, finding genuine issues requiring trial, including damages and apportionment of liability.

Applying the Woodheath test, the court concluded that the approximately twenty‑one‑year delay in prosecuting the action was inordinate and inexcusable and created a presumption of prejudice that was not rebutted.

Given the death of key witnesses, fading memories, and lack of preserved evidence, the court found both presumed and actual prejudice and dismissed the action for delay.

Following the dismissal of an action on summary judgment concerning alleged nondisclosure in a land sale, the successful defendants sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The plaintiffs had alleged that the vendor Crown breached duties of good faith and honesty by failing to disclose Indigenous land-related claims affecting the property.

The court reviewed the principles governing costs under Rule 57.01 and the Courts of Justice Act and rejected the argument that the Crown’s costs should be discounted because government counsel are salaried.

The court held the defendants’ claimed fees and disbursements were reasonable given the complexity of responding to allegations of bad faith and the extensive factual investigation required.

Costs of $383,745.81 on a partial indemnity basis were awarded to the defendants.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' action arising from a real estate transaction.

The plaintiffs, real estate developers, purchased surplus government land and later faced blockades by aboriginal protesters.

The plaintiffs alleged the defendants breached a duty of good faith and failed to disclose latent defects by not informing them of prior monetary claims and a lawsuit by the Six Nations regarding the land.

The court granted summary judgment dismissing the action, finding no duty to disclose the claims under the contract, no evidence of dishonesty to trigger a breach of good faith, and that the claims did not constitute a latent defect as they did not render the land uninhabitable or dangerous.

The respondent, Financial Services Commission of Ontario (FSCO), brought a motion to strike the applicant's application for declaratory relief, arguing that as a non-corporate statutory entity, it lacked the capacity to be sued.

The court dismissed the motion, distinguishing prior case law that barred actions for damages against FSCO.

The court held that because the applicant sought declaratory relief rather than damages, the application could proceed.

The Ministry of Transportation (MTO) appealed a trial judgment finding it liable for the failure of a road surface treatment applied by the respondent contractors.

The trial judge concluded the contract was a method specification contract, placing the risk of failure on the MTO, and heavily criticized MTO's counsel for allegedly improperly influencing its expert witness, awarding full indemnity costs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's interpretation of the contract but found he erred in his severe criticism of MTO's trial counsel, noting that counsel's interactions with the expert were appropriate under the principles in Moore v. Getahun.

Consequently, the Court reduced the trial costs award from full to substantial indemnity.

The appellant submitted the lowest bid for a highway widening project but failed to declare the value of imported steel, rendering the bid non-compliant.

The Ministry of Transportation investigated, deemed the bid non-compliant, and awarded the contract to the second-lowest bidder.

The appellant sued for lost profits.

The Court of Appeal held that while a Contract A arose upon submission of the bid, the Ministry acted reasonably in refusing to waive the non-compliance.

Furthermore, an exculpatory clause in the tender documents barred the appellant's claim for damages arising from the non-acceptance of its bid.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown brought a motion for leave to appeal an order permitting the plaintiffs to amend their statement of claim to add the Crown as a defendant in litigation concerning the implementation of competitive procurement for student transportation services.

The plaintiffs alleged the Ministry of Education improperly influenced school boards to use RFP processes under the Broader Public Sector Accountability Act and related procurement directives, disadvantaging smaller operators.

The court held that the claims, including allegations of negligent misrepresentation and breach of statutory duties, were not plainly untenable and required a full factual record at trial.

Questions regarding Crown immunity and the scope of any duty of care could not be resolved without detailed factual findings.

Leave to appeal was therefore refused.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his civil wrongful-conviction action as an abuse of process and alternatively staying it under s. 106 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The action alleged negligence, misfeasance, malicious prosecution, conspiracy, misrepresentation, and Charter breaches arising from the non-disclosure of potentially exculpatory alibi evidence in a murder prosecution.

The court held that the prior criminal reference did not determine all issues raised in the civil action and was not intended to bind future proceedings after the conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered.

The motion judge also erred in relying on delay and changed positions by the appellant to justify a stay.

The appeal was allowed and the dismissal and stay orders were set aside.

The appellant municipality appealed the dismissal of its application for judicial review of a ministerial order prohibiting public access to certain Crown lands adjacent to Bala Falls for safety reasons.

It argued that the site was subject to a protected portage under s. 65(4) of the Public Lands Act and that s. 3 required the frontage to be set aside for recreational and access purposes.

The court held that s. 28 of the Public Lands Act is not subject to ss. 3 or 65(4), and that the minister's decision to restrict access was reasonable given the public safety concerns.

The court also held that the common law right of navigation does not include a right to portage over another's land.

The appeal was dismissed with costs to each respondent.

The plaintiffs, seven private school bus operators, brought a motion to amend their statement of claim and add the Ministry of Education as a party defendant in their action against a student transportation consortium regarding the use of Requests for Proposals (RFPs) for procurement.

The plaintiffs also sought an order declaring the Ministry's funding of the consortium's legal costs ultra vires and an interim costs funding order for their own legal fees.

The court granted leave to amend the pleadings and add the Ministry as a defendant, finding no non-compensable prejudice and that the Ministry was a necessary party given its role in directing the RFP process.

The court adjourned the issue of the consortium's funding to the trial judge, noting it required judicial review.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' request for interim costs funding, finding they had not established impecuniosity.

Following dismissal of a motion by the Crown to strike a negligence and negligent misrepresentation claim arising from a government procurement process for school bus services, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The plaintiffs sought substantial indemnity costs while the Crown argued for a lower partial indemnity award.

Applying Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the fairness principles from Boucher, the court held that the motion, although unsuccessful, was not wholly devoid of merit and therefore did not justify substantial indemnity costs.

The court also rejected the Crown’s submission that HST should not be included in a costs award against it.

Partial indemnity costs of $39,897 inclusive of disbursements and HST were awarded to the plaintiffs.

The Ministry of Training, Colleges and Universities granted funds to a First Nations limited partnership to provide skills training.

The partnership applied to dissolve and an interim receiver was appointed.

The application judge found that the unspent grant moneys were subject to a Quistclose trust for the Ministry's benefit and ordered the receiver to return them.

The Court of Appeal allowed the receiver's appeal, finding that the funding agreement characterized unused funds as a debt, not a trust, and gave the partnership significant discretion to spend the funds.

Therefore, the requirements for a Quistclose trust were not met and the funds were available for distribution in the receivership.

The Township of Muskoka Lakes brought an application for judicial review to stop the Ministry of Natural Resources from leasing Crown lands to Swift River Energy Limited for the construction of a hydro-electric facility.

The Township argued that the Ministry's decision to issue a Notice under s. 28 of the Public Lands Act prohibiting public access to the lands was unreasonable and an attempt to thwart portage and public access rights.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Ministry's decision was reasonable given the public safety concerns associated with the site, where two drownings had previously occurred.

The court also noted that a lease of Crown lands does not constitute a disposition under s. 65(4) of the Act.