Daniel Allan Schwartz

This decision concerns an appeal under section 45(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1991, from an arbitral award regarding four disputes arising out of a major public-private partnership infrastructure project (Highway 427 expansion).

The appellant, His Majesty the King in Right of Ontario (as represented by the Minister of Transportation and Ontario Infrastructure and Lands Corporation), challenged the arbitral tribunal’s interpretation of the Project Agreement on four issues: the Crossfall Dispute, the Zenway Boulevard Dispute, the 407 ETR Dispute, and the 2014-2016 Dispute.

The court held that the tribunal correctly identified and applied the principles of contractual interpretation, found no extricable errors of law, and dismissed the appeal.

The court determined the scale and quantum of costs following previous motions.

Primont Homes (Vaughan) Inc. sought substantial indemnity costs, arguing delay and unproven fraud allegations by the defendants, Maplequest (Vaughan) Developments Inc. and 2373480 Ontario Inc. The defendants argued for reduced partial indemnity costs due to mixed success and over-lawyering by Primont.

The court found partial indemnity was appropriate, rejecting substantial indemnity as the fraud allegations were not adjudicated on their merits.

The court also reduced Primont's requested quantum due to its unsuccessful abuse of process argument and duplicative work by its multiple timekeepers, ultimately awarding $140,000.00 in partial indemnity costs.

The plaintiff, Primont Homes (Vaughan) Inc., sought an interlocutory injunction to prevent the defendants, Maplequest (Vaughan) Developments Inc. and 2373480 Ontario Inc., from dealing with certain land lots, asserting a contractual right to acquire them.

The defendants moved to dissolve an existing interim injunction, arguing the plaintiff failed to provide an adequate undertaking as to damages and made material non-disclosures.

The court dismissed the defendants' motions to dissolve the interim injunction, finding them precluded by Rule 2.02 due to significant delay.

The court then granted the plaintiff's motion for an interlocutory injunction, determining there was a serious issue to be tried regarding the enforceability of the agreement and entitlement to specific performance, that the plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm due to the primary defendant's inability to satisfy a damages award, and that the balance of convenience favored maintaining the injunction.

The court also found the plaintiff's undertaking as to damages sufficient given the defendants' failure to quantify their potential damages from delay.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard an appeal and cross-appeal concerning the interpretation of an easement.

The primary issue was whether an easement for "vehicular and pedestrian access and egress" included the right to park.

The application judge had ruled it did not.

The appellant (Friuli Long Term Care) argued the application was speculative and that parking rights were ancillary or an easement of necessity.

The cross-appellant (Primont (Castelmont) Inc.) sought an additional declaration regarding redevelopment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and the cross-appeal, affirming the application judge's finding that the easement did not include parking rights and that parking was a contractual matter.

The court also upheld the refusal of the additional declaration due to procedural issues.

The court held a voir dire to determine the testimonial capacity of the applicant, Barbara Cohen, who suffers from mild dementia.

The respondents argued she had capacity, while her counsel argued she lacked it.

Based on expert reports from two geriatric specialists (Dr. Joel Sadavoy and Dr. Richard Shulman) and the court's own questioning of Barbara, the court found that the applicant lacked the capacity to testify due to inconsistent memory, difficulty communicating complex ideas, and potential for increased anxiety under cross-examination.

The court ruled that her previous questioning transcripts would be filed instead of compelling her live testimony.

The applicant sought a declaration that mutual easements among the parties, which granted rights for vehicular and pedestrian access and egress, did not include the right for users to park on each other's lands.

The court found that the easements unambiguously dealt only with access and egress, and that parking rights were contractual obligations established through separate agreements, such as a Site Plan Agreement and a tripartite agreement, rather than property rights conveyed by the easements.

The application was granted, and the counter-application was dismissed.

Capital Sewer Servicing Inc. appealed a Superior Court decision that found it liable to indemnify and defend Crosslinx Transit Solutions Constructors under a subcontract.

The dispute arose from property damage claims by third parties during a light rail transit project.

Capital argued that Crosslinx, by undertaking to provide wrap-up insurance, had assumed the risk of such damages, and that the "hold harmless" clause did not include a duty to defend.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that a covenant to insure does not, as a matter of law, automatically transfer risk.

The court emphasized that contractual intent is derived from a holistic reading of the agreement, and found the subcontract's express indemnity provisions, coupled with the mutual intent clause, clearly imposed the obligation on Capital.

The "hold harmless" provision was also found to include a duty to defend, given the broad definition of "Claims" in the contract.

This application concerned a dispute over contractual indemnity and duty to defend obligations between a general contractor (Crosslinx) and its subcontractor (Capital Sewer Servicing Inc.) following property damage claims related to a construction project.

Capital argued that a "Wrap Up" insurance policy, under which it was a Named Insured, negated its indemnity obligations.

The court rejected Capital's argument, emphasizing that specific indemnity provisions in the subcontract took precedence over general insurance clauses, and that the requirement for Capital to obtain its own liability insurance implied an assumption of risk for its negligence.

The court granted Crosslinx's application, confirming Capital's duty to indemnify and defend, and dismissed Capital's cross-application.

The respondents brought a motion to vary a consent order registered on title to land, seeking to limit its application to only lots relevant to the dispute.

The applicants opposed, citing the respondents' breaches of obligations under the consent order and minutes of settlement, and concerns about related companies.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the respondents did not meet the high threshold to vary a consent order, as the "new facts" (PIN assignments) were foreseeable, and the respondents had demonstrated a disregard for their obligations, justifying the applicants' concerns about security.

This endorsement sets out the procedural parameters for costs submissions following a previous ruling on a motion for the preservation of witness evidence.

The parties and a non-party witness had resolved the procedural issues regarding the recording of the witness's evidence, making a further court appearance unnecessary.

The court directed that written costs submissions, limited to four pages exclusive of a bill of costs, must comply with Rule 4 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, with specific deadlines for delivery by the parties and the witness.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision granting specific performance of an agreement of purchase and sale for a Toronto property.

The respondent sought to purchase the property for $4.5 million but the transaction failed to close on the scheduled date.

The central issue was whether the appellant's conduct in providing an altered estoppel certificate and delivering the correct certificate only one hour before the 6:00 p.m. closing deadline precluded it from relying on the time-of-the-essence clause.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment, finding that the appellant's misconduct prevented it from enforcing the strict closing deadline and that specific performance was an appropriate remedy.

The respondent Estate brought a motion to bifurcate the proceeding, seeking a first trial on the validity of a Marriage Contract, separate from other issues including the applicant's claim to set aside the contract, elect equalization, and seek dependant relief.

The applicant opposed, arguing duplication of evidence and prejudice.

The court granted the bifurcation, finding it would lead to a more just, expeditious, and less expensive determination by potentially narrowing issues and promoting settlement, aligning with the culture shift emphasized in Hyrniak v. Mauldin.

The plaintiff, Fortress Carlyle Peter St. Inc., sought costs following its successful summary judgment motion for specific performance.

The defendant, Ricki’s Construction and Painting Inc., challenged the plaintiff's requested all-inclusive sum of $100,000 as excessive and unreasonable, proposing $50,000, and argued for divided success.

The court found the underlying motion was not simple, the plaintiff's costs claim reasonable with a $10,000 reduction, and rejected the argument for divided success.

The court awarded the plaintiff $90,000 in all-inclusive costs.

The plaintiff, Fortress Carlyle Peter St. Inc., brought a summary judgment motion for specific performance of an Agreement of Purchase and Sale for a property in Toronto, or alternatively, relief from forfeiture of a $1 million deposit.

The defendant, Ricki’s Construction and Painting Inc., brought a cross-motion for summary judgment to dismiss the action.

The court granted specific performance to the plaintiff, finding that the defendant's conduct, including delayed delivery and deceitful alteration of an estoppel certificate, disentitled it from insisting on "time of the essence" for the closing.

The property's uniqueness was also a factor supporting specific performance.

Following dismissal of a motion by the Crown to strike a negligence and negligent misrepresentation claim arising from a government procurement process for school bus services, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The plaintiffs sought substantial indemnity costs while the Crown argued for a lower partial indemnity award.

Applying Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the fairness principles from Boucher, the court held that the motion, although unsuccessful, was not wholly devoid of merit and therefore did not justify substantial indemnity costs.

The court also rejected the Crown’s submission that HST should not be included in a costs award against it.

Partial indemnity costs of $39,897 inclusive of disbursements and HST were awarded to the plaintiffs.

The defendant sought leave to appeal to the Divisional Court from a costs endorsement awarding the plaintiffs $190,000 on a partial indemnity basis following a successful interlocutory injunction motion.

The defendant argued the costs award was excessive and inconsistent with principles of fairness, reasonableness, and proportionality.

Applying Rule 62.02(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court considered whether there was good reason to doubt the correctness of the order and whether the proposed appeal raised matters of sufficient importance.

While most alleged errors were rejected, the court found that the unusually high quantum of costs for a one-day injunction motion raised serious concerns regarding reasonableness and proportionality.

Given the potential access to justice implications, leave to appeal the costs award was granted.