David Barrie Williams

This appeal concerned a solicitor's negligence claim where the appellant alleged his former lawyers settled an estates dispute without his instructions, specifically regarding his ability to sue another lawyer involved in the estate.

The trial judge found that the settlement document did not preclude such a claim and that the lawyers had acted within instructions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings that the settlement terms did not prevent subsequent litigation against the third-party lawyer and that the limitation period argument was not a bar to commencing an action.

The court emphasized that the objective intention of the parties, not a default "standard form release," determines the scope of settlement terms.

The defendants Toufik Benhamiche and Kahina Bensaadi brought a motion challenging the Ontario Superior Court's jurisdiction over a tort and contract claim arising from a fatal speedboat accident in Cuba.

They sought an order recognizing lack of jurisdiction, or in the alternative, summary judgment on jurisdiction or a stay based on forum non conveniens.

They also sought summary judgment for Kahina Bensaadi and a declaration limiting damages to Cuban law.

The court found that Ontario had a real and substantial connection to the litigation based on the domicile and business operations of other defendants (Sunwing), and the contract being made in Ontario.

The court dismissed the moving parties' arguments regarding forum non conveniens, finding Ontario to be the clearly more appropriate forum, partly due to the unavailability of certain remedies in Cuba.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed due to the moving parties' failure to file a statement of defence, and on the merits for Kahina Bensaadi.

The request to apply Cuban law was also deferred.

This appeal concerned the enforceability of a "kitchen table" domestic contract signed by former common-law spouses regarding the transfer of property.

The trial judge found the agreement unenforceable due to non-compliance with formal requirements under s. 55(1) of the Family Law Act, specifically the lack of a witness, and alternatively, that it would be set aside under s. 56(4) due to the respondent's lack of understanding of its vague terms and absence of independent legal advice.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, deferring to her findings of fact.

The court affirmed that a video recording of signing was not a substitute for proper witnessing and that the test for relaxing s. 55(1) formalities is distinct from the test for setting aside a contract under s. 56(4).

The appeal was dismissed, and the property sale was ordered.

The plaintiff, Stephan Wiener, brought a claim for solicitor's negligence against his former lawyer, Paul Strickland, and his firm, Siskinds LLP.

The claim arose from a mediation where a settlement document was prepared.

The plaintiff alleged that Mr. Strickland bound him to the settlement without his instructions, specifically concerning his ability to sue a third-party lawyer (Douglas Gunn) and the expiry of a limitation period for such a claim.

The court found that the settlement document, which referred to "standard releases," did not prevent the plaintiff from suing Mr. Gunn.

The court also rejected the argument that the limitation period had expired, noting that the defendant was not retained to advise on a claim against Mr. Gunn and that a limitation period is a defence, not a bar to launching an action.

The plaintiff's claim was dismissed.

The appellant, Bluemoon Capital Ltd., appealed the dismissal of its application for a Norwich order and the quashing of a Rule 39.03 notice of examination.

The appellant, a shareholder of Ceridian HCM Holding Inc., sought pre-action discovery regarding the alleged undervaluation of LifeWorks Corporation Ltd. shares during Ceridian's 2018 distribution and subsequent sale to Morneau Shepell.

The application judge dismissed the Norwich order, finding it unnecessary and not in the interests of justice, and quashed the notice of examination as moot.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error, affirming the application judge's discretionary decision that the appellant had sufficient information to commence its class action and that the Norwich order was not sought for a legitimate purpose.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

A non-party lawyer appealed an order requiring him to attend for examination as a witness in a motion pending before the Superior Court of Justice.

The lawyer was counsel of record for the City of Windsor.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, finding that the case management judge had properly applied the stringent test for ordering opposing counsel to be examined and had made no error warranting appellate intervention.

The Personal Insurance Company appealed a motion judge's decision striking out a third party claim against the plaintiffs' lawyers.

The plaintiffs had sued the insurer for negligence in failing to preserve a vehicle that might have helped prove their case in a personal injury action.

The insurer sought contribution and indemnity from the lawyers, alleging they breached their duty to preserve evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the striking of the third party claim, holding that the lawyers' alleged negligence fell within the scope of their retainer and was therefore attributable to the plaintiffs.

Where a third party's negligence is attributable to the plaintiff, no cause of action for contribution and indemnity exists against that third party.

The respondent and the deceased operated a jewellery store through a company and each named the other as sole beneficiary of a life insurance policy.

Following the deceased's death, the respondent sought a declaration that he was entitled to the insurance proceeds and judgment on a promissory note.

The estate claimed the proceeds were subject to a buy-sell agreement and constructive trust.

The motion judge granted partial summary judgment declaring the respondent entitled to the proceeds and dismissed the estate's counterclaim, but directed the promissory note claim to trial.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiff, Catherine Patrick, was injured in a single-car accident in February 2014.

She initially sued Southwest Middlesex, but later sought to add The Corporation of the County of Middlesex ("Middlesex County") as a defendant.

Middlesex County moved for summary judgment, arguing the plaintiff failed to provide timely statutory notice under s. 44(10) of the Municipal Act, 2001, and that her claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court found that Patrick did not establish a "reasonable excuse" for the more than two-year delay in notifying Middlesex County, particularly for the initial 16-month period of inaction before retaining counsel.

As satisfying the "reasonable excuse" prong of s. 44(12) is mandatory, the court granted summary judgment, dismissing the action against Middlesex County.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his claim against his former lawyer and law firm on the basis that the claim was statute barred under section 4 of the Limitations Act, 2002.

The motion judge found that the appellant discovered the material facts giving rise to his claim no later than February 3, 2014, and that the statement of claim issued on March 2, 2016 was therefore outside the two-year limitation period.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondents.

This is the third appeal in a class action arising from the acquisition of London Life by Great-West Life.

The class alleged that participating policy account (PAR) transactions violated the Insurance Companies Act.

The trial judge found breaches and awarded class counsel fees of $16.4 million with a first charge over the $56.43 million returned to PAR accounts, awarded $4 million in partial indemnity costs to the class, and imposed a levy in favour of the Law Foundation of Ontario.

The appellants challenged the class counsel fees, costs award, and levy.

The majority upheld all trial judge decisions, while the dissent argued that no monetary award was made to the class and therefore no charge could attach to the PAR accounts.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action against his father, the vehicle owner, on the basis that the claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The appellant was injured in a motor vehicle accident on February 5, 2012, and commenced an action on January 31, 2014, initially against the deceased occupants' estates but not against his father.

The appellant later added his father as a defendant in October 2014.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the claim against the father as statute-barred, finding the appellant failed to rebut the statutory presumption that he knew of the matters required for discoverability on the date of the accident.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, holding that the appellant was presumed to know the vehicle owner's identity and that an action against the owner was an appropriate remedy as of the accident date.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment concerning equalization amounts, spousal support, and child support.

The appellant sought to adduce fresh evidence consisting of a psychiatric report regarding a child's dependent status.

The Court of Appeal declined to consider the fresh evidence on appeal, noting that the appropriate remedy was to seek variation under section 37(2.1) of the Family Law Act.

On the merits, the Court of Appeal applied the stringent standard of review for family law decisions and found that the appellant failed to demonstrate that the trial judge's decision was plainly wrong.

The trial judge's findings regarding income imputation and business valuation were entitled to deference.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

This decision addresses costs following a motion to change custody, child support, and section 7 expenses.

The applicant father was substantially successful in the underlying proceeding, being awarded custody of the child.

The court considered factors under Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, including time spent, result achieved, complexity, and proportionality, as well as principles from Boucher and Davies.

The court awarded the applicant costs in the amount of $25,000 inclusive of HST, plus disbursements of $805.40, finding no compelling reason for substantial indemnity costs.

The plaintiffs moved under Rule 59.06(2)(c) to enforce a prior trial judgment's prohibition against the defendants debiting defence costs from participating accounts.

The defendants had allocated 50% of legal costs to these accounts prior to the judgment without seeking leave.

The court found that the prohibition order, which enjoined the defendants from debiting "any costs or expenses incurred... in the defence of these actions," applied retrospectively to all costs, whenever incurred, and was not merely prospective.

The court rejected the defendants' functus officio argument, affirming its jurisdiction under Rule 59.06(2)(c) to carry its orders into operation.

The defendants were ordered to move for leave to charge the previously allocated legal costs.

The defendant, Karen Pacey, brought a motion to stay a proceeding initiated by Allied Accounting & Tax Services Limited and Allied Associates LLP, arguing that the dispute fell under an arbitration clause in a Shareholders’ Agreement (SA).

The plaintiffs alleged breaches of confidentiality and non-competition provisions in both the SA and a Representative’s Contract, the latter lacking an arbitration clause.

The court found that the SA's arbitration clause was qualified by other provisions explicitly referring to "court" for equitable relief, indicating an exclusion for such disputes from arbitration.

Additionally, the court found that the defendant unduly delayed in bringing the motion for a stay, which would have been a separate ground for refusal.

The motion to stay the proceeding was dismissed.

The plaintiff corporation brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a declaration that an associate dentist breached an Associate Agreement and a permanent injunction.

The dispute arose from the termination of the associate's arrangement with the plaintiff and another principal dentist at a dental clinic, and the associate's subsequent agreement to purchase the other principal dentist's practice.

The responding parties argued that the Associate Agreement was subject to an overarching Practice Agreement and that the plaintiff's termination was not in good faith.

The court dismissed the motion for summary judgment, finding genuine issues requiring a trial, particularly regarding the common law duty of honest performance in contracts and the advisability of partial summary judgment in the context of the litigation as a whole.

This endorsement addresses the approval of class counsel fees, plaintiffs' costs, defendants' costs, and the Law Foundation of Ontario's levy following a decade-long class action concerning the legality of Par account transactions (PATs) by London Life and Great-West Life.

The court approved class counsel fees of $16.4 million, found the plaintiffs entitled to $4 million in partial indemnity costs from the defendants, and denied the defendants' claim for costs.

It also determined that the Law Foundation of Ontario was entitled to a levy of $1,520,346.50 (repayment of disbursements) plus 10% of the net monetary award ($4,030,000), totaling $5,550,346.50, to be paid from the participating accounts.

The court clarified that a "monetary award" for the purposes of the Class Proceedings Act and the Law Society Act includes funds paid to the benefit of class members through participating accounts, even if not directly distributed to individuals.

The defendant sought leave to appeal to the Divisional Court from a costs endorsement awarding the plaintiffs $190,000 on a partial indemnity basis following a successful interlocutory injunction motion.

The defendant argued the costs award was excessive and inconsistent with principles of fairness, reasonableness, and proportionality.

Applying Rule 62.02(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court considered whether there was good reason to doubt the correctness of the order and whether the proposed appeal raised matters of sufficient importance.

While most alleged errors were rejected, the court found that the unusually high quantum of costs for a one-day injunction motion raised serious concerns regarding reasonableness and proportionality.

Given the potential access to justice implications, leave to appeal the costs award was granted.

Following a prior trial and a partial appeal, the court conducted a rehearing to determine the appropriate remedy in a certified class proceeding concerning participating account transactions and an unlawful pre‑paid expense asset used by life insurance companies.

The Court of Appeal had upheld the finding of illegality but directed the trial judge to determine the monetary amounts required to unwind the transactions and restore funds to participating policyholder accounts.

The central disputes concerned the calculation of merger synergy deductions, whether historical amortization charges should be deducted when determining the benefit received by participating accounts, the interpretation of a 6.91% return provision, and the appropriate “effective date” for unwinding the transactions.

The court concluded that amortization expenses since 1997 must be deducted to reflect the “no contribution/no benefit” principle and interpreted the Court of Appeal formula as adding, not subtracting, the 6.91% return to the participating accounts.

The court fixed December 31, 2011 as the effective date and ordered that $284,675,000 be paid to the participating accounts, with cancellation of the pre‑paid expense asset and related amortization charges.