Wendy M. Matheson

The applicant appealed and sought judicial review of a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision granting statutory accident benefits to a passenger injured when a bus drove over a raised manhole cover.

The Divisional Court found no error in the Tribunal's findings that the manhole cover was an 'object' and the impact constituted a 'collision' under s. 268(1.1) of the Insurance Act.

The appeal and application were dismissed.

The appellants appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision finding they knowingly registered an invalid bill of sale and breached registration conditions, resulting in an eight-month suspension for the individual appellant and a two-year lien registration prohibition for the corporate appellant.

The Divisional Court upheld the liability findings but allowed the appeal in part on penalty, finding the sanctions were at the high end for an isolated incident and lacking in reasoning linking them to the misconduct.

The sanctions were varied to time completed.

The applicant, a blind law student, sought shared housing but was refused a room by a homeowner who stated the accommodation was unsuitable due to his disability.

The applicant challenged the constitutionality of section 21(1) of the Human Rights Code, which exempts shared owner-occupied housing from discrimination protections.

The Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario dismissed the application, finding no evidence of disproportionate impact under section 15(1) of the Charter due to a lack of disaggregated statistical data.

On judicial review, the Divisional Court held the HRTO erred by requiring statistical evidence where none existed and failing to draw appropriate inferences from qualitative expert evidence.

The court remitted the matter to the HRTO to complete the Charter analysis.

The appellant was struck by an uninsured motorcycle and suffered serious injuries.

She applied for statutory accident benefits 14 months after the accident, well beyond the 7-day notice period.

The License Appeal Tribunal found she did not have a reasonable explanation for the delay and barred her claim.

On appeal to the Divisional Court, the appellant argued the adjudicator erred in law by failing to address a prior LAT decision with similar facts.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that an administrative tribunal's failure to follow or expressly distinguish its own prior decisions does not constitute an error of law, and the adjudicator's weighing of the reasonable explanation factors was a question of mixed fact and law not subject to appeal.

The applicant sought judicial review to quash a zoning by-law amendment that permitted a Battery Energy Storage System (BESS) on rural lands, alleging the City of Ottawa acted in bad faith and failed to follow required procedures.

The Divisional Court granted the applicant public interest standing and exercised its discretion to hear the application despite the availability of an alternative statutory remedy.

On the merits, the court dismissed the application, finding no evidence of bad faith or procedural unfairness in the City's sequencing of approvals, suspension of procedural rules, or reliance on the submitted technical studies.

The moving party sought security for costs of an appeal from a Small Claims Court judgment regarding unpaid architectural invoices.

The moving party relied on Rule 61.06(1)(a) and (c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Divisional Court found good reason to believe the appeal was frivolous, but concluded it was not vexatious, as it was commenced timely and conducted appropriately.

The court also found the moving party failed to establish that collecting costs would be nearly impossible under Rule 61.06(1)(c).

The motion was dismissed with costs awarded to the responding parties.

The appellant, a lawyer, appealed a Law Society Tribunal decision finding he committed professional misconduct during two criminal trials by engaging in uncivil behaviour, failing to competently represent his client, and failing to act with integrity.

The Hearing Panel imposed a three-month suspension and ordered $225,000 in costs.

On appeal to the Divisional Court, the appellant argued the Hearing Panel erred in its application of the test for incivility, improperly admitted expert evidence on the standard of competence, and imposed an unfit penalty and costs award.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal.

The majority upheld the findings of misconduct, concluding the appellant's baseless allegations of racial bias and impropriety against trial judges and Crown counsel crossed the line of resolute advocacy.

The court also upheld the penalty and the costs award, finding the Hearing Panel properly considered the appellant's financial circumstances and his conduct in unnecessarily lengthening the disciplinary proceedings.

One judge dissented in part, concluding the costs award was disproportionate and effectively punitive.

The applicant, Valero Energy Inc., brought a motion in its application for judicial review seeking an order to compel the respondents to produce a further record of proceedings, including internal Cabinet and Ministerial documents.

The underlying application challenges a regulation imposing domestic renewable content requirements for fuels.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the Judicial Review Procedure Act does not require a record of proceedings for a challenge to a regulation, as making a regulation is not a 'statutory power of decision'.

The court declined to exercise its inherent jurisdiction to order production, noting that judicial review of a regulation is a limited exercise in statutory interpretation and does not afford a right to documentary discovery.

The defendants brought motions for leave to appeal a decision and a subsequent reconsideration decision of the motion judge.

The Divisional Court dismissed both motions for leave to appeal without costs.

The tenant appealed and sought judicial review of a Landlord and Tenant Board decision ordering eviction for persistent late payment of rent.

The tenant argued the LTB erred in law by relying on incorrect figures, applying the wrong test under s. 83 of the Residential Tenancies Act, and breaching procedural fairness by correcting clerical errors in the decision without notice.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal and judicial review, finding that the LTB properly corrected the clerical errors under its rules, considered all relevant circumstances for relief from eviction, and made no reviewable errors of law or procedural fairness.

The moving party sought an extension of time of approximately 18 months to apply for judicial review of a labour arbitration award regarding compensation.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the explanation for the delay weak, doubtful apparent grounds for relief given the union's refusal to pursue judicial review, and substantial prejudice to the respondents due to the lengthy delay and the importance of finality in labour relations.

The appellant tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision granting an ex parte eviction order under s. 78 of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006.

The eviction was ordered because the tenant failed to comply with a prior conditional order requiring rent to be paid in full and on time.

The tenant paid rent one day late and short of the full amount.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law.

The court noted that the tenant failed to utilize the statutory mechanism to move to set aside the ex parte order at the Board, which would have allowed for a broader evidentiary challenge.

The Regional Municipality of York appealed an Ontario Land Tribunal decision awarding approximately $2.4 million in compensation to a landowner for the expropriation of a vacant lot.

The appellant argued the Tribunal erred by failing to screen out the expropriation scheme's effect on the property's value under s. 14(4)(b) of the Expropriations Act, and by improperly assessing the risk of land dedications.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no legal error in the Tribunal's application of the Pointe Gourde principle and concluding that the Tribunal's factual findings regarding land dedications were entitled to deference.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Social Benefits Tribunal, which found it lacked jurisdiction to hear their appeal regarding the cancellation of their income support.

The Director had cancelled their benefits and denied an extension of time to request an internal review.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no procedural unfairness in the Tribunal's decision to hold an in-writing hearing and concluding that the Tribunal correctly applied binding precedent in determining it had no jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a denial of an extension of time for an internal review.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a decision of the Superior Court of Justice dated January 27, 2025.

The Divisional Court denied the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party fixed at $10,000 all inclusive.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of ten Cate J. dated December 31, 2025.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding parties fixed at $2,500 all inclusive.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an order of J.K. Trimble J. dated November 26, 2025.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the appeal to be expedited.

Costs of the motion were reserved to the panel hearing the appeal and fixed at $5,000.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of Parghi J. dated February 4, 2026.

The Divisional Court denied the motion for leave to appeal with no order as to costs.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a decision of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party fixed at $5,000 all inclusive.

The appellant appealed an interlocutory order requiring the production of the deceased's counselling records from 2005 to 2009 in a will challenge alleging undue influence.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred in law by applying a low threshold that permitted a fishing expedition for sensitive personal information.

The court also found a palpable and overriding error in relying on the absence of evidence of undue influence in the two years prior to the will's execution to justify broader disclosure.

The order for production was set aside, and costs were awarded to the appellant.