Gabrielle Pop-Lazic

The court granted the respondent's motion to set aside a final order in a family law matter due to improper service.

The decision reviews the requirements for service under the Family Law Rules and Rules of Civil Procedure, and finds that the applicant did not prove the respondent was properly served at his father's address in Ontario.

The court also addresses the relevance of actual notice, the sequencing of jurisdictional challenges, and the criteria for setting aside a default order.

Costs were reserved to the trial judge.

The respondent father brought a motion to stay the enforcement of his child and spousal support arrears and to temporarily vary his support obligations pending a final determination of his Motion to Change.

He argued that his termination from employment constituted a material change in circumstances.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the respondent failed to establish a strong prima facie case due to his failure to file his 2023 income tax return.

The court also found no clear case of hardship, a lack of urgency, and that the respondent did not come to court with clean hands, having unilaterally ceased support payments and failed to provide updated financial disclosure.

The applicant, Miguel Angel Delgado Sanchez, brought an application seeking a declaration of interest in the former matrimonial home, nullification of a 2003 title transfer to the respondent, Nora Belen Tello-Sotomarino, and other relief, alleging concealed fraud.

The respondent brought a summary judgment motion to dismiss these claims as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, and the Real Property Limitation Act.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, noting the applicant's inconsistent evidence regarding the alleged fraud and his admission that his signature on the transfer documents was genuine.

The court concluded there was no factual foundation for concealed fraud to trigger an extension of the limitation period.

The applicant's claims were dismissed as statute-barred.

The Applicant (Father) brought two motions seeking primary residence and decision-making responsibility for the children, or alternative parenting arrangements, and a declaration that the Respondent (Mother) breached a prior order, seeking to strike her pleadings.

The Respondent (Mother) brought a cross-motion to terminate reunification counselling with Accendus Group.

The court dismissed the Applicant's motions, finding his evidence unreliable and that a drastic change in parenting arrangements was not in the children's best interests.

The court also found the Respondent did not breach the prior order, as Accendus Group had misconceived its role as evaluative rather than therapeutic.

The Respondent's motion to terminate Accendus Group's involvement was granted.

The court provided directions for the payment of Accendus Group's invoices, holding the Applicant liable for costs related to Accendus Group's affidavit sworn in his support.

The appellant sought to appeal a trial judge's decision regarding spousal support, arguing that the indefinite support at the high end of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines, subject to review, constituted an error.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, affirming the significant deference owed to family support decisions.

The court found no material error, serious misapprehension of evidence, or error in law in the trial judge's reasoning or result, noting that the appellant's objection primarily concerned the weighing of factors, which is not a basis for appellate intervention.

The applicant sought an order to relocate with the children from Oakville to Sarnia and to vary the existing parenting time schedule.

She also requested retroactive and ongoing child support, including Section 7 expenses, and life insurance as security.

The respondent opposed the relocation and sought to vary the parenting time schedule regardless of the relocation outcome.

The court denied the applicant's proposed relocation, finding it not to be in the children's best interests due to the significant risk it posed to their relationships with the respondent and their half-sister, exacerbated by the applicant's diminished view of the respondent's parental role.

The court also dismissed the respondent's request to vary the Final Order, determining that no material change in circumstances had been proven.

The applicant's claims for child support and life insurance were also dismissed due to lack of evidence.

The mother appealed a temporary order granting the father decision-making authority over whether their 10-year-old child should receive routine childhood vaccinations.

The mother argued the motion judge erred by changing the status quo before trial, taking judicial notice of vaccine safety, and relying on unsworn letters from physicians.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge correctly applied the best interests of the child test, properly took judicial notice of adjudicative and legislative facts regarding vaccine safety, and made no reversible error in admitting the medical evidence or deciding the motion without the child's views and preferences.

In this family law appeal, the appellant sought to enforce a daily financial penalty for non-disclosure, which had accumulated to $224,000.

The motion judge declined to enforce the disproportionate penalty and left the matter to the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal found the order to be interlocutory and thus not appealable, quashing the appeal.

The appellant, Paul Dowdall, appealed an order denying his motion to enforce minutes of settlement for child and spousal support.

The motion judge refused enforcement due to Mr. Dowdall's intentional and material non-disclosure of a significantly higher-paying job offer before accepting the respondent's settlement offer.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's discretionary decision, emphasizing the fundamental duty of full and honest financial disclosure in family law negotiations.

The court found that the non-disclosure deprived the respondent of the opportunity to make an informed decision and withdraw her offer, leading to an unfair result.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant mother brought a motion for an order under section 30 of the Children's Law Reform Act to appoint a qualified person to assess the needs of the parties' 11-year-old child.

The child had expressed a strong desire not to spend time with the applicant and experienced physical and emotional symptoms of stress regarding access visits.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer and a reunification therapist both provided evidence that the child was capable of forming her own views and that forcing a further assessment would be counterproductive and potentially harmful.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that there was already sufficient expert and clinical evidence available for trial and that a further assessment would not be in the child's best interests.

The applicant mother and respondent father both brought motions seeking primary residency and to determine the school enrollment for their 12-year-old son after both parents relocated to different cities.

Given the conflicting evidence, lack of cross-examinations, and absence of input from the child, the court declined to make a substantive residency order.

Instead, the court made an interim interim without prejudice order requiring the child to attend school remotely through a school in the father's jurisdiction, while ordering the involvement of the Office of the Children's Lawyer and a Voice of the Child Report.

The respondent husband moved to enforce a spousal support settlement agreement with the applicant wife.

The wife resisted, alleging the husband failed to disclose a new, significantly higher-paying job before accepting her offer.

The court found the husband's non-disclosure of his impending employment change and substantial income increase to be deliberate and material.

This informational asymmetry compromised the wife's ability to negotiate fairly, leading to an unfair agreement.

The court exercised its discretion to refuse to enforce the settlement, emphasizing the fundamental duty of full and honest financial disclosure in family law.

The husband's motion for judgment was dismissed, and the matter was directed to proceed to trial.

The Applicant sought a declaration of 50% beneficial ownership in the matrimonial home based on unjust enrichment and a constructive trust, or a monetary judgment.

The Respondent opposed this and claimed spousal support due to a post-separation slip and fall accident exacerbating a pre-existing condition.

The court dismissed the unjust enrichment claim, finding no deprivation to the Applicant and juristic reasons to deny the claim, including the deliberate decision to register the home in the Respondent's name for creditor protection and the Respondent's significant tax debt used for family purposes.

The court granted the Respondent time-limited spousal support, finding entitlement based on the long marriage, interdependence, and the pre-existing medical condition exacerbated by the accident, with support to begin when the youngest child starts university.

The appellant mother appealed an order varying child and spousal support.

The respondent father had previously failed to disclose financial information, resulting in an uncontested order imputing his income at $100,000.

Three months later, he voluntarily quit his $85,000 job for a $35,000 job.

Years later, he sought to vary the support order, relying on the tax information he had previously withheld.

The motions judge reduced the imputed income retroactively to $85,000 and prospectively to $57,200.

The Superior Court allowed the appeal, holding that the motions judge erred in relying on previously withheld disclosure to retroactively vary support, and made a palpable and overriding error by imputing a lower income without evidence that the father was incapable of earning the higher amount.

The respondent mother brought a motion to change a final joint custody order seeking custody and primary residence of the child with her in Hamilton.

The court found a material change in circumstances since the prior order, including the child’s increased age, escalating parental conflict, and significant stress affecting the child’s well-being.

Evidence from professionals and the Office of the Children’s Lawyer indicated the child strongly preferred to reside with the mother and would benefit from the stability of that arrangement.

The court held that the child’s wishes carried considerable weight given her age and circumstances.

A temporary order was granted changing residence to the mother and permitting the child to attend school in Hamilton, with parenting time to the father.

This is a child protection status review application involving a two-year-old child with a complex history of multiple placements and three separate child protection agencies.

The mother brought a motion for return of the child to her care or increased access.

The paternal great-aunt brought motions for party status and access.

The court dismissed the mother's motions, finding no material change in circumstances warranting modification of the temporary care order.

The court granted the paternal great-aunt party status and access, finding her plan merited consideration as an alternative placement option.

Following the breakdown of a long-term marriage, the respondent spouse sought equalization of property and spousal support.

The only significant asset was the applicant’s pension, but the equalization claim was complicated by limitation issues and the absence of sufficient financial evidence to quantify its effect on support.

The court therefore treated the case primarily as a spousal support claim under s. 15.2 of the Divorce Act.

Considering the lengthy relationship, traditional division of roles, the respondent’s modest income, and the applicant’s pension income, the court ordered retroactive and ongoing spousal support and secured the obligation against the applicant’s property.

The appellant mother appealed a summary judgment order making her infant child a Crown Ward with no access for the purposes of adoption.

The motion judge had relied heavily on a past parenting capacity assessment and historical child protection involvement, while dismissing the mother's new evidence, which included a recent psychological assessment and a plan of care with her new partner.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in granting summary judgment because the mother had presented sufficient conflicting evidence that required a trial.

The court ordered an expedited trial to determine the child's disposition.

The applicant brought a motion for interim child and spousal support, production of financial disclosure, and related relief.

The respondent repeatedly failed to comply with prior court orders requiring disclosure of personal and corporate financial records relevant to determining income for support purposes.

Relying on s. 19 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines, the court held that income may be imputed where a payor fails to provide required disclosure or where income may be diverted through a corporation.

Due to incomplete disclosure and evidence of substantial unexplained deposits into personal accounts, the court imputed income to the respondent for interim support purposes.

The court also ordered further production of corporate records, granted leave for questioning, issued a non‑depletion order under the Family Law Act, and awarded substantial indemnity costs.

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto brought a motion for summary judgment seeking statutory findings that four children were in need of protection and dispositional orders placing two children with their maternal grandparents and two children with their paternal grandmother, subject to Society supervision and specified access conditions.

The mother opposed the motion and sought to have all children returned to her care.

The court granted the summary judgment motion, finding that the mother had failed to demonstrate a genuine issue for trial.

The court found that the mother had not successfully addressed her lifestyle and parenting challenges, remained incapable of forming therapeutic relationships with professionals, and was unable to prioritize the children's needs over her own.

The court made custody orders under section 57.1 of the Child and Family Services Act placing the children with their grandparents, with access to the parents as agreed by the custodians or as specified by the court.