Darla A. Wilson

The appellant appealed his convictions and nine-year sentence for impaired driving causing death, criminal negligence causing death, and related offences.

The collision occurred after the appellant drove at excessive speeds and struck oncoming traffic.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in identifying him as the driver based on seatbelt marks, and in dismissing his Charter challenges regarding his arrest and right to counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly inferred the appellant was the driver and correctly held that police had reasonable grounds to arrest both occupants when they blamed each other.

The court also upheld the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis and found the nine-year sentence was not demonstrably unfit given the high moral blameworthiness of the conduct.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching against a child complainant.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's credibility, misapplied the W.(D.) framework, and relied on facts not in evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no reviewable errors, holding that the trial judge properly assessed credibility, did not shift the burden of proof, and grounded his findings in the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant abandoned her appeal on the eve of the hearing after the respondents had delivered responding materials in an estate accounting dispute.

The court applied r. 61.14(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and held that the respondents were entitled to their costs of the abandoned appeal.

The respondents' motion for leave to cross-appeal the application judge's discretionary costs award, seeking full indemnity costs, was denied because no reversible error was shown and the elevated scale was not justified.

The appellant was awarded costs of the cross-appeal motion, set off against the appeal costs, leaving a net amount payable to the respondents.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his claim against an individual respondent arising from unpaid legal services provided to related corporate respondents in tax litigation.

The court held that the trial judge correctly applied the test for contract formation and reasonably found that the essential elements of offer and acceptance were not established on the evidence.

The court also upheld the conclusion that there was no enforceable personal guarantee of the corporate debt and that any such guarantee would have to comply with s. 4 of the Statute of Frauds.

The appeal was dismissed with agreed appeal costs to the respondents.

The appellants, pediatric neurologists, appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for medical negligence in their treatment of an infant with a rare seizure disorder.

The trial judge found that the appellants breached the standard of care by prematurely concluding that a pyridoxine trial was ineffective and failing to reintroduce it when seizures returned.

The trial judge also found a breach of the duty to obtain informed consent for failing to disclose the pyridoxine trial to the parents.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's findings on the standard of care were grounded in expert evidence, the failure to disclose a reasonable alternative treatment constituted a breach of informed consent, and the causation finding was supported by a commonsense approach to the evidence.

The appellant appealed a decision finding that an assignment of an agreement of purchase and sale was null and void.

The assignment was subject to a true condition precedent requiring vendor approval.

The motion judge found that the vendor insisted on unreasonable terms for its approval, which constituted a 'deal breaker', and that the respondents' subsequent attempt to negotiate an abatement was not an anticipatory breach.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's conclusions, and affirmed that the failure of the condition precedent rendered the agreement null and void, entitling the respondents to the return of their deposit.

The appellant appealed an order staying the proceedings below.

The motion judge had found an abuse of process based on the appellant's failure to immediately disclose settlement agreements, relying on the Handley Estate doctrine.

However, this doctrine was overruled by the Court of Appeal in 1086289 Ontario Inc. (Urban Electrical Contractors) v. Welland (City), 2026 ONCA 352, after the motion judge's order.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge's decision was based on an unduly rigid inquiry that did not consider actual prejudice, as is now required.

The appeal was allowed, the stay was set aside, and the matter was remitted to the motion judge for re-determination under the current law.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his summary judgment motion, which sought to dismiss the respondent's personal injury action as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The respondent was injured in a motor vehicle accident in November 2015 but did not commence her action until November 2021.

The motion judge found the claim was timely because the respondent only discovered her injuries met the 'permanent serious impairment' threshold under the Insurance Act in July 2020, following a meeting with a neuropsychologist.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred by failing to consider whether the respondent reasonably ought to have known her injuries met the threshold earlier.

Given the persistence of her debilitating symptoms and earlier medical advice that she might never fully recover, the Court held the claim was discoverable more than two years before it was commenced.

The action was dismissed.

The appellant, a director of the bankrupt company, sought to pursue a cause of action against the respondent secured creditor.

The motion judge permitted the trustee to auction the cause of action and allowed the respondent to credit-bid up to the face value of its secured debt.

The appellant sought to appeal this decision.

The Court of Appeal found no appeal as of right under s. 193 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act but granted leave to appeal under s. 193(e), noting that whether a creditor may use a credit bid to acquire an asset that does not attach to its security is an unsettled issue of general importance.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court of Justice decision that dismissed an appeal from a child protection order made in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the appeal judge's conclusions regarding the inapplicability of the federal Conflict of Interest Act, the absence of a reasonable apprehension of judicial bias, and the delay in releasing the initial decision.

The Court of Appeal declined to entertain arguments or fresh evidence relating to the merits of the initial decision, as those issues were not pursued before the appeal judge.

The appeal and fresh evidence application were dismissed.

The moving party children's aid society brought a motion to quash the appellant's appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The appellant sought to appeal a final order of the Superior Court of Justice – Family Branch placing the children in the care and custody of their maternal aunts under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion to quash, finding that the appeal properly lies with the Divisional Court pursuant to s. 19(1)(a.1) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellant bank appealed an order dismissing its motion regarding the character of a debt.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the motion judge's order was not a final order because it did not resolve the substantive dispute between the parties, leaving the issue open to be pursued before the Bankruptcy Court.

The appellant brought a motion under s. 7(5) of the Courts of Justice Act for a panel review of a single judge's case management decision requiring him to order full transcripts for his family law appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no basis to interfere with the discretionary case management decision.

The respondent's cross-motion to dismiss the appeal for delay was referred to the Registrar.

A lawyer employed on a contingency fee commission basis resigned to join a competing firm.

The employer law firm terminated him immediately and sought a declaration that he was not entitled to compensation for unbilled work in progress (WIP) or files settled but not yet collected.

The motion judge found the lawyer was entitled to compensation for both.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that while the lawyer was entitled to his share of fees for files settled prior to his departure, the employment contract did not provide for compensation for WIP on files that remained at the firm and were settled after his departure.

The Court also upheld the finding that the lawyer did not breach his duty of good faith by merely planning his departure.

The appellant was convicted of drug trafficking offences following the execution of search warrants.

He applied to reopen his trial based on fresh evidence from a related proceeding where a judge found a police officer had deliberately misled the issuing justice.

The trial judge dismissed the application, finding the misconduct was not relevant to the appellant's defence and the evidence could have been adduced with due diligence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's decision not to reopen was a reasonable exercise of judicial discretion and the Palmer criteria for fresh evidence were not met.

The appellant sought to consolidate several pending applications for leave to appeal in the Divisional Court with an appeal properly before the Court of Appeal.

The motion for directions was dismissed as the appellant had not obtained leave from the Divisional Court.

On the main appeal, the appellant challenged the application judge's finding of a purchase money resulting trust that awarded the respondent a 50 percent beneficial interest in a townhouse.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidentiary support for the application judge's conclusions regarding the respondent's contributions to the down payment and mortgage.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of aggravated assault arising from a shootout outside a nightclub that injured the initial shooter and five bystanders.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by refusing a mistrial over the Crown's opening address, declining to direct acquittals on the assault charges, and refusing to leave self-defence with the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's corrective instruction was sufficient, there was circumstantial evidence to support secondary party liability, and self-defence lacked an air of reality given the indiscriminate nature of the return fire.

The moving party brought a motion to quash an appeal from a family court order made solely under provincial legislation.

The Court of Appeal held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, as section 19(1)(a.1) of the Courts of Justice Act directs such appeals to the Divisional Court.

The court declined to transfer the appeal to the Divisional Court under section 110(1) of the Act, finding it was not in the interests of justice due to the appeal's lack of merit and the prejudice caused by delay.

The motion to quash was allowed.

The moving party sought a panel review of a motion judge's decision denying a stay of a Divisional Court order that removed a stay of an eviction order.

The moving party had already been evicted.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no error in principle or unreasonable result by the motion judge, and noting that the motion for a stay was moot.

The appellant appealed an order finding that the civil courts had jurisdiction over the respondent's claims of sexual assault by a priest and negligence by the appellant.

The appellant argued the motion judge breached natural justice by relying on an academic article and case law not raised by the parties.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the motion judge's reference to an academic article criticizing prior case law did not breach natural justice, as it did not involve relying on facts outside the record.

The Court upheld the finding that the dispute was not purely ecclesiastical in nature and subject to canon law.

Furthermore, the Court found no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's exercise of discretion under the Van Breda framework.